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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose
The purpose of t h i s  re se a rc h  i s  to  i d e n t i f y  and measure 
p o s s ib le  m oderating  e f f e c t s  o f  em ployee-perceived eq u i ty  and 
in e q u i ty  of pay on ta s k  perform ance. To dem onstra te  how t h i s  
purpose was r e a l i z e d  a b r i e f  synopsis  o f  re se a rc h  p rocedures 
i s  p re se n te d  to  o r i e n t  th e  re a d e r .
The re se a rc h  was conducted in  a f irm  lo c a te d  in  Okla­
homa C i ty ,  Oklahoma, la rg e  enough to  p ro v id e  a minimum of 
f i f t y  s u b je c t s  who perform  s im i la r  ta s k s  f o r  s im i l a r  pay.
Two ex p e rim en ta l  groups and one c o n t ro l  group were invo lved  
in  th e  re se a rc h  e f f o r t .  Each group had s ix t e e n  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
Performance measures f o r  a l l  th r e e  groups were taken  two weeks 
p r i o r  and two weeks a f t e r  th e  experim en ta l i n t e r v e n t io n .  Five 
t r i a l s  (p e r io d s  o f  ex perim en ta l in te rv e n t io n )  were invo lved  in  
th e  s tu d y . A d d it io n a l  pay was given to  one experim en ta l group 
fo r  th r e e  t r i a l s .  Both ex perim en ta l groups were informed of 
th e  e x t r a  pay be ing  given to  th e  one ex perim en ta l group. The 
e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  d is c r im in a t io n  was expected  to  r e s u l t  in  f e e l ­
ings of in e q u i ty  which in  tu rn  was expected  to  r e s u l t  in  d i f ­
f e r in g  perform ances among th e s e  same two ex p erim en ta l groups. 
The c o n t ro l  group d id  n o t have knowledge o f  pay d i f f e r e n c e s ;
2th e  c o n t ro l  g ro u p 's  performance was compared in  th e  s ta n d a rd  
manner w ith  the  perform ances o f  both  experim en ta l groups.
The r e s u l t s  were analyzed and in t e r p r e t e d  by means of r a th e r  
co n v en tiona l s t a t i s t i c a l  te ch n iq u es :  d e s c r ip t iv e  s t a t i s t i c s ,
a n a ly s is  and v a r ia n ce  and c o r r e l a t i o n a l  s t a t i s t i c s .  Before 
e la b o ra t in g  on th e s e  in t ro d u c to ry  remarks a d d i t io n a l  r e f in e ­
ments of terms and t h e i r  r e l a t e d  d e f in i t i o n s  a re  o f fe re d .
Terms and D e f in i t io n s
Pay
Pay i s  d e f in e d  as monetary reward f o r  perform ance. 
I n t u i t i v e l y  the  employee does what he does because he f in d s  
i t  rew ard ing .^  Pay o r  money i s  a reward. With some excep­
t i o n s ,  pay i s  u n iv e r s a l  in  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  And in  th e  n a tu re  
of a more d e f i n i t i v e  s ta tem en t B elcher (1962, p . 43-44) sa y s ,  
" I f  m o tiv a tio n  i s  now recogn ized  as being  much more complex 
than  we used to  assume, pay s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  most impor­
t a n t  s in g l e  m o tiv a to r  used in  our s o c i e ty . "  G enera lly  when 
job  b eh av io r  i s  fo llow ed by a reward th a t  beh av io r  i s  r e i n ­
fo rc ed  and th e re fo r e  i s  l i k e l y  to  occur again  assuming some 
constancy in  th e  environm ent. On th e  b a s i s  o f  ex p e rien ce , 
employees come to  a n t i c i p a t e  o r  expect a reward. What i s  
rew ard ing , th e  e x te n t  to  which pay i s  rew ard ing , and when pay 
i s  rew arding i s  d e f in e d  by the  r e c i p i e n t ,  and th e r e in  l i e s  an 
u l t im a te  c o n s t r a in t  on management p r a c t i c e s .  O rg an iza tio n s
^Study o f t h i s  employee p e rc e p t io n  has been th e  o b je c t  
o f  much re se a rc h  e f f o r t ,  b u t th e  r e s u l t s  a re  not a l to g e th e r  
c o n s i s t e n t .
3a re  made up o f  people  w ith  t h e i r  own unique p e rc e p t io n s  o f  
what i s  and what ought be. P eople , l i k e  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  a l l  too  
o f te n  o p e ra te  in  a p e rc e p t iv e  environm ent. These p e rc e p t io n s  
a re  not fo rm ula ted  in  a vacuum bu t in s t e a d  a re  a r r iv e d  a t  
through v a r io u s  means, one o f  which i s  comparison w ith  th o se  
rewards given to  o th e r s .
T racing  "pay" over an extended p e r io d  one f in d s  i t  a t  
th e  focus of value  th e o ry ,  wage th e o ry ,  exchange th e o ry ,  and 
b a rg a in in g  th e o ry .  Pay in  contemporary term s i s  cons idered  
in  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  p e rso n n e l management, wage and 
s a l a r y ,  compensation a d m in is t ra t io n  and m o tiv a t io n  th e o ry . 
Economists from th e  c l a s s i c a l  p e r io d  such as Smith and 
R icardo, and l a t e r  econom ists such as Marx, Jevons, M arsha ll ,  
and C lark , and then  l a t e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  econom ists and o th e r s  
in to  th e  p re s e n t  have dem onstrated  a keen i n t e r e s t  in  pay and 
i t s  r o l e  in  th e  g r e a t e r  scheme of th in g s .  C lo se r  to  manage­
ment, pay i s  viewed as an i n t e g r a t in g  f e a t u r e  o f  compensation 
theo ry  and i s  th e  c e n t r a l  focus in  "Wage and S a la ry ."  Wage 
and s a l a r y  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  o r  to  use a more contemporary term  
Compensation A d m in is tra t io n , fo rm a liz e s  th e  exchange p ro cess  
between employer and employee and th e  exchange p r o c e s s 's  
p r in c ip a l  v e h ic le  i s  pay. The use o f  pay as a formal reward 
may in  e f f e c t  c l e a r ly  dem onstra te  how management views i t s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  th e  employee r e g a rd le s s  o f  what a t t i t u d e s  
o f  le a d e r s h ip  a re  exp ressed , th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c l im a te  advo­
c a te d ,  and o th e r  means e x e rc is e d  by management to  s t im u la te  
workers to  do t h e i r  jo b s .  In case  i t  h a s n ' t  been made
4e v id e n t ,  and i t  p robably  h a s n ' t ,  pay in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  t h i s  
p ro p o sa l  i s  money and not o th e r  forms o f compensation such as 
f r in g e  b e n e f i t s .
Performance
Perform ance i s  o v e r t  jo b  b eh a v io r  as i t  r e l a t e s  to  th e  
accomplishment o f  th e  a ss ig n ed  work ta s k .  With t h i s  d e f i n i ­
t io n  perform ance may be reduced to  an o v e r ly  sim ple  fu n c t io n .  
L i t e r a t u r e  abounds w ith  th e  problems and te c h n iq u e s  o f  job  
e v a lu a t io n ,  and a t  th e  c e n te r  of much concern i s  what c o n s t i ­
t u t e s  perform ance.
Performance i s  d e f in e d  as th e  degree  o f  q u a n t i ty  and 
q u a l i ty  o f  o u tp u t as i t  r e l a t e s  to  an a s s ig n e d  t a s k ,  o r  t a s k s ,  
f o r  an employee w i th in  a p red e te rm in ed  tim e p e r io d .  Q uan tity  
r e l a t i v e  to  perform ance i s  th e  amount o f  o u tp u t  o f  a g iven  
employee w ith in  a g iven tim e frame. Q u a l i ty  r e f e r s  to  th e  
degree o f  e x c e l le n c e  f o r  a given perform ance. S ta te d  ano ther  
way, q u a l i t y  i s  a la c k  o f  e r r o r  in  perfo rm ing  th e  ass igned  
work r o l e .  Task o r  ta s k s  i s  what a p a r t i c u l a r  employee i s  
r e q u i r e d  to  do in  h i s  a ss ig n ed  work r o l e .  Perform ance, l i k e  
pay, i s  a ls o  f re q u e n t ly  d e f in ed  by th e  r e c i p i e n t  r e l a t i v e  to  
what c o n s t i t u t e s  a rea so n ab le  perform ance , i . e . ,  a f a i r  d a y 's  
work f o r  a f a i r  d a y 's  wage. To confound th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  pay 
and perform ance a re  in terw oven to  such an e x te n t  t h a t  i t  i s  
o f te n  d i f f i c u l t  to  i s o l a t e  a v a l id  independent and dependent 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A common problem in  th e  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  a 
c e r t a in  wage f o r  a g iven  ta s k  i s  to  a s s e s s  th e  s t r e n g th  o f the
5connection , in  th e  mind o f  th e  employee, between pay (reward) 
and perform ance. For q u a n t i t a t i v e  purposes pay seems to  
r e p re s e n t  a b e t t e r  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  in  th e  i n v e s t ig a t i o n  of th e  
a s s o c ia t io n  of th e  two. The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  i s  based  on 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  pay i s  r e p re s e n te d  in  num erica l term s and t h i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  allow s a s a f e r  assignm ent o f  pay as th e  inde­
pendent v a r ia b le .  In p a r t  t h i s  may beg th e  i s s u e  because as 
s t a t e d  e a r l i e r  pay i t s e l f  may mean d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  to  d i f ­
f e r e n t  employees.
Employees
Employees a re  d e f in e d  as th o se  in d iv id u a l s  who make up 
an i d e n t i f i a b l e  work group whose members perform  l i k e  ta sk s  
th a t  a re  a ss ig n ed  by management. For th e  purpose  o f  t h i s  
experim ent group memberships and work assignm ents  were not 
a l t e r e d  in  any way. I n te r v e n t io n  by th e  ex p e rim en te r  was 
l im i te d  to  a d m in is te r in g  a t t i t u d e  q u e s t io n s  and changing the  
pay o f one work group.
Equity  Theory
Equity  theo ry  i s  based  on th e  p rem ises  o f  exchange 
th eo ry  and f o r  many i s  alm ost one and th e  same. E quity  theo ry  
p o s tu l a t e s  a s o c i a l  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w herein  a p e r ­
son compares h i s  p e rc e iv e d  g a in s  and c o s ts  w ith  th e  g a in s  and 
c o s ts  o f  o th e r s .  While th e  comparison o f  one to  an o th e r  i s  
c e r t a i n l y  a s o c io lo g ic a l  phenomenon th e  frame o f  r e f e r e n c e  o f  
th e  com parator i s  always p sy c h o lo g ic a l .  In r e a l i t y  t h i s  i s  a 
complex s i t u a t i o n  where a p e r s o n 's  c o g n i t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  a re
i n t e r a c t i n g  d i r e c t l y  w ith  h i s  s o c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  In t h i s  
s tu d y , as in  s ta te m en ts  of e q u i ty  th e o ry  i t s e l f ,  ga ins  are  
d e f in e d  as pay and performance i s  c o s t .  O bviously, th e se  
d e f i n i t i o n s  a re  c a s t  in  th e  em ployee 's  v iew po in t. In Adams' 
fo rm u la tio n  o f  e q u i ty  theo ry  pay becomes outcome and p e r f o r ­
mance i s  in p u t  fo r  th e  employee.
The use of th e  word e q u i ty  c l e a r ly  connotes and denotes 
the  id e a  o f  f a i r n e s s  j u s t  as in e q u i ty  communicates th e  id e a  of 
u n fa i rn e s s .  I t  i s  th e  p e rce iv ed  f a i r n e s s  o r  u n fa i rn e s s  t h a t  
i s  thought to  moderate an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  job perform ance. P e r­
ce ived  in e q u i ty  i s  presumed to  e x i s t  when th e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
im balanced. To t e s t  e q u ity  th eo ry  t h i s  experim ent w i l l  i n t e r ­
vene in  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  by a l t e r i n g  pay which shou ld , in  
tu r n ,  cause some employees to  a l t e r  perform ance.
What remains to  be d isc u sse d  in  t h i s  in t ro d u c to ry  o v er­
view i s  th e  framework s e le c te d  fo r  t h i s  re s e a rc h .  Equity 
th eo ry  was s e l e c te d  fo r  th e  m ed ia ting  o r  in te rv e n in g  ro le  
between pay and perform ance. This r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  demon­
s t r a t e d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  diagram (F ig u re  1).
PerformancePay
Employees : P ercep­
tu a l l y  induced 
f e e l in g s  o f  
E q u ity / In e q u ity
F igu re  1. The M ediating Function  o f  Equity  P e rc e p t io n s
The id e a  beh ind  e q u ity  th eo ry  i s  f a r  from be ing  new; 
and a lthough  eq u i ty  th eo ry  i s  one o f  s e v e r a l  m o tiv a t io n a l
7t h e o r ie s ,  n e v e r th e le s s  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  m ostly o f  re c e n t  
o r ig in .  The most comprehensive trea tm en t o f  eq u i ty  theo ry  
has r e s u l t e d  from th e  e f f o r t s  o f  Adams (1962, 1963a, 1964, 
1965) and o th e r s .  Adams (1965) c i t e s  t h e o r i s t s  such as Homans 
(1961), Jaques (1956, 1961, 1964b), Patchen (1961), Z a lezn ik , 
C h ris ten sen  and R o e th l i sb e rg e r  (1958) and o th e rs  who have 
sought to  apply to  th e  work environment th e  concepts embodied 
in  eq u ity  th e o ry .  Adams' fo rm u la tio n  o f  in e q u i ty  i s  c lo s e ly  
fo llow ed in  t h i s  r e s e a rc h .  Adams (1965, p. 280) d e fined  
in e q u ity  as :
In e q u ity  e x i s t s  f o r  Person whenever he p e rc e iv e s  t h a t  
th e  r a t i o  of h is  outcomes to  in p u ts  and th e  r a t i o  o f  
O th e r 's  outcomes to  O th e r 's  in p u t a re  unequal. This 
may happen e i t h e r  (a )  when he and O thers  are  in  a 
d i r e c t  exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p  o r  (b) when both  are  
in  an exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  a t h i r d  p a r ty  and 
Person compares h im se lf  to  O ther. The v a lu es  o f  
outcomes and in p u ts  a r e ,  o f  co u rse , as p e rce iv ed  by 
P e rso n .
As a p o in t  o f  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  concerning  term s eq u i ty  appears 
t o  be g e n e r ic  in  n a tu re  w h ile  in e q u i ty  r e p re s e n ts  th e  absence 
o f  e q u i ty .  In e q u ity  i s  th e  focus in  most o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  
reviewed. The reason  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  i t  appears to  e l i c i t  
th e  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t .  S chem atica lly  e q u i ty  and in e q u i ty  may 
be r e p re s e n te d  in  t h i s  manner (u s in g  Adams' n o ta t io n  and sub­
s c r i p t s ) .
E qu ity : ^  ^  where 0 -  Output
IP I -  Input
p -  person  
a -  o th e r
8In eq u ity :  < f| (o r )  > ft
(Disadvan- (Advan­
tageous tageous
fo r  Person) f o r  Person)
This proposed re se a rc h  e f f o r t  has a ttem pted  no t to  
emphasize in e q u i ty  to  th e  ex c lu s io n  o f  e q u i ty .  Both are  
in te g r a te d  in to  th e  re se a rc h  design  w ith  e q u i ty  presumed to  
be e x i s t e n t  in  th e  c o n t ro l  group and in e q u i ty  e x i s t i n g  in  th e  
two experim en ta l groups. As m entioned e a r l i e r  th e  essence  o f 
th e  d is c r im in a t io n  in  th e  re se a rc h  i s  based on th e  d i f f e re n c e s  
in  performance among th e  c o n t ro l  and th e  two experim en ta l 
groups. In eq u ity  i s  c r e a te d  f o r  th e  experim en ta l groups by 
m an ipu la ting  pay and th e  r e s u l t i n g  changes in  perform ance a re  
h ypo thesized  to  be th e  e f f e c t  o f  employee p e rc e iv e d  in e q u i t ie s .
In summary e q u i ty  th eo ry  i s  based  on th e  comparison o f 
Person to  O ther on the  b a s i s  o f  P e r s o n 's  p e rc e iv e d  r a t i o s  of 
t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  in p u ts  and outcomes. For th e  purpose of 
t h i s  re se a rc h  we a re  d i r e c t in g  our a t t e n t io n  to  eq u i ty  and 
in e q u ity  as c re a te d  by th e  in te r v e n t io n  o f  th e  r e s e a rc h e r  as 
th e  t h i r d  p a r ty .
I t  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  assumed th a t  th e  d is c r im in a te  use o f  
pay by management may imbalance th e  input-outcom e r a t i o  
r e s u l t i n g  in  an em ployee-perceived i n j u s t i c e  and th e reby  
modify th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between pay and perform ance, o r  more 
p o s i t iv e l y  s t a t e d ,  improper a l l o c a t io n  o f  pay among employees 
doing th e  same work may r e s u l t  in  an a l t e r a t i o n  by some 
employees a l t e r i n g  t h e i r  b eh av io r  so as to  r e s to r e  th e
9input-outcom e r a t i o .  This rea lig n m en t may ta k e  s e v e ra l  forms 
as w i l l  be d is c u s se d  l a t e r ,  bu t t h i s  r e s e a rc h  i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
d i r e c te d  a t  th e  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  perform ance by th e  employee as 
th e  r e s u l t  o f  a change in  pay.
Research Design; A Summary
Research models may be modeled in  many d i f f e r e n t  con­
f ig u r a t io n s  such as an ic o n ic  model, th e  analog  model, and 
symbolic model. In i t s  sim ple form a model s t r u c t u r e s  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among th e  component p a r t s  o f some system  and i s  
based on th e  id e a  o f  isom orphicism . This overview o f  th e  
re se a rc h  d es ig n  i s  p re se n te d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  an analog  model 
which seeks to  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between: (a )  th e
problem s, (b) th e  hypo theses , (c )  th e  u n iv e rs e ,  (d ) th e  
sample, (e )  d a ta  c o l l e c t i o n  p ro c e d u re s ,  ( f )  s t a t i s t i c a l  
d e s c r ip t io n  and in fe re n c e ,  and (g) th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  
r e s e a rc h .  The r e se a rc h  des ign  in  model c o n f ig u ra t io n  i s  
p re se n te d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  r e s e a rc h  diagram (F ig u re  2 ) .
The rem ainder o f  t h i s  su b se c t io n  w i l l  c o n c e n tra te  on expand­
ing  each o f  th e  elem ents in  th e  model as they  r e l a t e  to  t h i s  
s p e c i f i c  r e s e a rc h .
This in t ro d u c to ry  s e c t io n  i s  s t a t e d  in  very g e n e ra l  
te rm s. The th r e e  re se a rc h  problems a re  b road  g en e ra l  s t a t e ­
ments concern ing  th e  fundamental q u e s t io n s  o f  e q u i ty  th e o ry  
as i t  r e l a t e s  to  compensation a d m in is t r a t io n  and each, t h e r e ­
fo re ,  has i t s  own unique q u a l i t y .  Follow ing th e  s ta tem e n t o f  
each re s e a rc h  problem a re  b r i e f  comments about th e  p ro b lem 's
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Research Design Overview
C onditions S e le c te d  
f o r  t h i s  s tudy_____
Range of P o s s ib le  
R elevant C o n s id e ra tio n s
Research Problems
(1) E valua tion
(2) Form ulation
Five Major Research 
Hypotheses and 
R e la ted  Subhypoth­
eses
Hypotheses :
(1) Major Hypoth­
eses
(2) Subhypotheses
I n f i n i t e  U niverse —% Universe
Q u e s t io n n a ire s
Perform ance
T r i a l s
P o s s ib le  Hypotheses 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  :
(1 )  Research 
H ypothesis?
(2) O p e ra t io n a l  
H ypothesis?
(3) S t a t i s t i c a l  
H ypothesis?
Data C o l le c t io n  6-
F in i t e ?  
I n f i n i t e ?
C ond itions?
Methods?
In s tru m en ts?
D e s c r ip t iv e St a—
t i s t i c s
I n f e r e n t i a l S t a—
t i s t i c s
S t a t i s t i c a l
In fe re n ce
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  & 
T ab u la tio n ?  
A n a ly t ic a l  P roc­
e sse s?
Research Research I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ?
R e su lts ------ ) D ecision ^-------- E v a lu a tio n ?
In fe re n ce?
F igure  2. Diagram o f  th e  r e le v a n t  r e s e a rc h  design  c o n s id e ra ­
t io n s  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y . A d e t a i l e d  d e s c r ip t io n  and 
r e l a t e d  d is c u s s io n  are  in  C hapters  I I I  and IV.
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purpose, th e  g en e ra l  re se a rc h  method to  be employed f o r  t e s t ­
in g , and th e  r e l a t e d  t e s t i n g  m easures. A ll of th e s e  m a tte rs  
a re  d isc u sse d  aga in  in  Chapter I I I  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l .
Research Problems
Problem 1: A change in  hourly  pay m oderates employee p e r f o r ­
mance .
Purpose: To (1) t e s t  eq u i ty  t h e o r y 's  p r e d ic t io n  th a t
employees seek to  r e s t o r e  ba lance  to  an i n ­
e q u i ta b le  s i t u a t i o n ,  and (2) t e s t  the  r e l a ­
t io n s h ip  between pay and perform ance v a r i ­
a b le s .  The purpose , t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  to  
examine w hether pay and perform ance are 
r e le v a n t  in  c o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  exchange 
p ro cess  fo r  th e  employee.
Method: By a l t e r i n g  pay fo r  one ex p e rim en ta l group a
d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  perform ance of t h a t  group 
shou ld  be o b se rv a b le .  During t r i a l  p e r io d s  
th e  pay w i l l  be 110 p e rc e n t ,  130 p e rc e n t  and 
115 p e rce n t  o f th e  normal pay.
Measure: A known amount o f  pay shou ld  moderate
employee perform ance. Performance was 
measured in  terms o f  bo th  q u a l i ty  and 
q u a n t i ty .
Problem 2: Employee p e rce iv ed  in e q u i ty  in  hourly  pay i s
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  moderated employee a t t i t u d e s .
Purpose: The o b je c t iv e  o f  t h i s  problem i s  l im i te d  to
a s s e s s in g  i n e q u i t i e s '  p o t e n t i a l  f o r
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m oderating  employee a t t i t u d e s .  I t  i s  specu­
la t e d  t h a t  employee p e rc e iv e d  in e q u i t i e s  may 
" s p i l l  over"  and be r e f l e c t e d  in  f e e l in g s  
about th e  jo b .  I t  i s ,  however, beyond th e  
scope o f  th e  p re se n t  r e s e a rc h  to  p r e c i s e ly  
measure t h i s  c o n je c tu re .
Method: The survey  was conducted a t  th e  end o f  each
o f  th e  f iv e  t r i a l  p e r io d s .
Measure: A change in  pay may produce d i f f e r e n t  a t t i ­
tudes  in  th e  r e s p e c t iv e  groups on th e  b a s i s
of p e rc e iv e d  e q u i ty .
Problem 3: An in c re a s e  in  hou rly  pay f o r  one employee group,
when not accompanied by a change in  hou rly  pay fo r
ano ther  employee group doing th e  same jo b ,  w i l l  be 
p e rc e iv e d  by th e  group w ith  u n a l te r e d  pay as a 
d ec rease  in  pay.
Purpose: The purpose o f  th e  r e s e a rc h  problem i s  to
examine th e  m oderating e f f e c t s  o f  an in c re a se  
in  O th e r 's  outcomes on P erson . This r e p re ­
s e n t s  an e f f o r t  to  t e s t  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of 
Person and com parator O ther.
Method: In c rease  th e  pay f o r  one group b u t n o t th e
o th e r ,  measure th e  perform ance f o r  bo th  
groups, and compare f o r  p o s s ib le  d i f f e r e n c e s .
Measure: Q u a li ty  and q u a n t i ty  perform ance were
measured along w ith  p o s s ib le  a t t i t u d e  
changes.
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In e q u i ty ,  as d isc u sse d  e a r l i e r ,  in v o lv es  a p e rc e p t io n  
by the  employee of th e  f a i r n e s s  o r  j u s t i c e  o f  h is  rewards 
r e l a t i v e  to  th e  rewards o f  o th e rs  he has chosen fo r  comparison 
purposes.
Problem e v a lu a t io n  was conducted th rough  a review of 
r e l a t e d  re se a rc h  d ea lin g  w ith  e q u i ty  th e o ry , and has in  p a r t ,  
r e s u l t e d  in  the  fo rm u la tio n  of th e  problem s ta te m en ts .
Hypotheses
F ive s p e c i f i c  hypo theses and t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  minor 
hypotheses a re  p re se n te d  in  C hapter I I I  o f  t h i s  s tudy .
Universe
In an a b s t r a c t  sen se  th e  u n iv e rse  may be co n s id ered  
s e p a r a te ly  from th e  sample as th e  design diagram su g g e s ts .  
P o p u la tio n  l i m i t s  a re  determ ined by th e  p ro b le m a tic  s i t u a t i o n ,  
th e  hypo theses , and n a t u r a l ly  by th e  a v a i l a b le  re so u rc e s .  
Homogeneity o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f :
1. F ac to rs  o f  t im e , p la c e ,  c o n d i t io n s  and o th e r  th in g s  
im p lied  by th e  above p o p u la tio n  l im i t  s ta te m e n t .
2. Employees who a re  w h ite  c o l l a r ,  work f o r  th e  same 
f irm , in  s im i la r  geo g rap h ica l  and environm ental 
su rro u n d in g s , and who perform l i k e  ta s k s  fo r  ea rn ­
ing  a l iv in g .
Aside from th e  p reced in g , th e  p o p u la tio n  i s  unknown in  s t a ­
t i s t i c a l  te rm s. The d e te rm in a t io n  of t h i s  in fo rm atio n  i s  one 
o f  th e  c h ie f  fu n c t io n s  of s t a t i s t i c s .  The p o p u la t io n  (u n i ­
ve rse )  i s  i n f i n i t e  and th e r e f o r e  sampling i s  n ec essa ry .
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Data C o l le c t io n
Procedures  f o r  d a ta  c o l l e c t i o n  g r a v i t a t e d  around th e  
work ta s k s  and number of t r i a l s  employed in  th e  s tu d y . Work 
ta s k s  are  th e  normal work r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  th e se  employees. 
There were f iv e  t r i a l s  fo r  t h i s  ex p e r im en ta l  p e r io d .  The 
d a te s  and hours  of th e  t r i a l  p e r io d s  were th e  same fo r  a l l  
g roups. The second, t h i r d ,  and fo u r th  t r i a l s  were d i f f e r e n t  
f o r  th e  two ex p erim en ta l groups in  t h a t  e x t r a  pay was awarded 
to  th e  members of one ex p e rim en ta l  group. The d a ta  c o l l e c t i o n  
and o th e r  p rocedu res  were i d e n t i c a l  f o r  a l l  t r i a l s  and f o r  a l l  
g ro u p s .
In s tru m en ts  f o r  d a ta  c o l l e c t i o n  are  des igned  to  a s s e s s  
perform ance and a t t i t u d e .  An a t t i t u d i n a l  survey  was adm inis­
t e r e d  to  a l l  groups a f t e r  every  t r i a l  p e r io d .  Perform ance 
m easures were a lso  c o l le c te d  f o r  each group fo r  a fo u r  hour 
p e r io d  b e fo re  and a f t e r  th e  ex p e r im en ta l  in te rv e n t io n .
S t a t i s t i c a l  V e r i f i c a t io n
The s t a t i s t i c s  used fo r  t h i s  s tudy  a re  d iv id e d  in to  
two g ro u p in g s . D e s c r ip t iv e  s t a t i s t i c s  such as ave rages , p e r ­
cen tag es  and frequency counts  a re  p re s e n te d  fo r  th e  obvious 
e x p la n a to ry  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I n f e r e n t i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  used fo r  
t h i s  s tudy  a re  an a ly ses  o f  v a r ia n c e s  and s e v e r a l  c o r r e l a t i o n a l  
s t a t i s t i c a l  te c h n iq u e s ,  and were used , assuming th e  sam pling 
was r e l i a b l e ,  to  make in fe re n c e s  about th e  p o p u la t io n .
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Research D ecision
E v a lu a tio n  and r e s u l t s  o f  th e  s tu d y  as w i l l  be d i s ­
cussed l a t e r  a re  dependent on th e  m ean ingfu lness  o f  th e  
d e s c r ip t iv e  s t a t i s t i c  and th e  power of th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  
i n f e r e n c e .
T h e o re t i c a l  Assumptions
For convenience th e  assum ptions of th e  s tudy  a re  
l i s t e d  Lelow in  a num erical sequence t h a t  im p lie s  no rank ing . 
Adams' (1963a, 1965) te rm ino logy  w i l l  be used whenever 
a p p l ic a b le .
1. Person s e l e c t s  a fe l lo w  employee w ith in  th e  same 
o rg a n iz a t io n  perform ing  s i m i l a r  ta s k s  as th e  
com parator O ther.
2. Person makes a c o g n i t iv e  comparison between In p u ts  
and Outcomes.
3. Person views perform ance and pay as In p u ts  and 
Outcomes, r e s p e c t iv e ly .
4. Assumptions t h a t  pay as a v a r ia b le  i s  not o v e r ly  
con tam inated  by o th e r  p o t e n t i a l l y  confounding 
v a r i a b l e s .
5. E xperim ental c o n d i t io n s  a re  assumed no t to  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from "normal" working 
c o n d i t io n s .
6. S u b je c ts  a r e  randomly s e l e c t e d  from i n f i n i t e  popu­
l a t i o n  and th e r e f o r e  r e s u l t s  can be g e n e ra l iz e d  
f o r  i n f e r e n t i a l  p u rp o ses .
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7. Adams' (1963a, 1965) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  o f  P e r s o n 's  
Inpu ts  and Outcomes a re  c o r re c t  and a re  not bound 
to  a s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n .
8. Person can c o g n i t iv e ly  m anipula te  Inpu t and Out­
come r a t i o s  to  cause f e e l in g s  of e q u i ty  and 
in e q u i ty .
Adm ittedly t h i s  assum ption l i s t i n g  i s  leng thy  and th e r e f o r e  
could  be co n s tru ed  to  be an example o f  th e  p o s s ib le  tenuous­
ness  of e q u i ty  th e o ry .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  view, which t h i s  
r e s e a r c h e r  h o ld s ,  i s  t h a t  th e  r e a l  meaning o f  th e s e  assump­
t io n s  i s  t h a t  e q u i ty  th e o ry  r e q u i r e s  a d d i t io n a l  work and 
refinem en t even beyond th e  modest e f f o r t s  of t h i s  s tu d y .
L im ita t io n s  o f  Study
Aside from th e  r a t h e r  s p e c i f i c  assum ptions l i s t e d  
above th e r e  a re  two fundamental c a te g o r ie s  of l i m i t a t i o n s  of 
any re se a rc h  e f f o r t .  These l im i t a t i o n s  a re  (1) th e  concep tua l 
fo rm at, and (2) th e  a n a ly t i c a l  methods used fo r  e v a lu a t io n  and 
in f e r e n c e .
1. Conceptual Format: The framework e s t a b l i s h e d  by
th o se  who c o n c e p tu a l iz e  th e  problem and i t s  scope 
may, and p robably  does, d e l im it  t h e i r  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
While t h i s  i s  necessa ry  fo r  c o n tro l  i t  o f te n  r e ­
s u l t s  in  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  g u id e l in e s  th a t  l i m i t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  problem d e f in i t i o n s .
2. A n a ly t ic a l  Methodology: Methodology i s  th e  com­
p o s i t e  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  methods chosen to  t e s t  some­
th in g .  The s t r u c t u r e  of th e  methodology i s  l a i d
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out in  th e  re se a rc h  design  and th e  tech n iq u es  
s e l e c te d  fo r  s t a t i s t i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and i n f e r ­
ence. In h e ren t in  a l l  t h i s  i s  an o th e r  grouping of 
assum ptions, th e  p r in c ip a l  one o f  which i s  t h a t  
phenomena can somehow be c a te g o r iz e d  in  q u a n t i t a ­
t i v e  (num erica l)  te rm s. Assuming th e  r i g h t  s t a ­
t i s t i c a l  techn ique  i t s e l f  i s  based  on an a l l - t o o -  
o f te n  f r a g i l e  s e t  of assum ptions.
These g e n e ra l  assum ptions, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  " T h e o re t ic a l  
Assumptions" l i s t e d  in  th e  p reced in g  s e c t io n ,  remind t h i s  
r e s e a r c h e r  and h i s  re a d e rs  a l ik e  o f  th e  f r a g i l i t y  o f  t h i s  
r e s e a r c h .
Need f o r  Research
To le g i t im iz e  a need i s  to  somehow a t t a c h  a value  to  
i t .  The purpose o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  i s  to  i d e n t i f y  why th e  p ro ­
posed r e s e a rc h  was conducted.
The fundamental and ad m itted ly  o v e r s im p l i f ie d  exchange 
p ro cess  has two p a r t i c i p a n t s :  th e  employee who p ro v id es  s k i l l
and e f f o r t ,  h e re in  c a l l e d  perform ance, and th e  employer who 
p ro v id es  pay. Compensation a d m in is t ra t io n  i s  th e  o rg an iz a ­
t i o n a l  means fo r  se e in g  th a t  th e  c o n t r ib u t io n s  o f  th e  two 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  brought to g e th e r  in  a m utua lly  a c c e p ta b le  
degree of e q u a l i ty .  Compensation a d m in is t r a t io n  b r in g s  a l l  
th e  a c t i v i t i e s  between th e  employer (a s  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  o f  th e  
o rg a n iz a t io n )  and employee (an in d iv id u a l )  to g e th e r  to  focus 
on the  fo rm a lized  exchange p ro cess  o f  paying and perform ance.
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The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  two, pay and perform ance, 
p re s e n t ly  appears to  be only as p r e c i s e  as th e  p h rase  ”a f a i r  
d a y 's  pay fo r  a f a i r  d a y 's  work." However, th e  l i t e r a t u r e  
concerning pay and i t s  m u lt i tu d e  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  very r i c h ;  
u n fo r tu n a te ly  i t  la ck s  su b s tan ce  f o r  th e  p r a c t i t i o n e r  and 
te a c h e r .  Pay, performance and t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
do o f f e r  a f e r t i l e  s o i l  fo r  th e  r e s e a r c h e r .  The q u e s t io n s  
r e l a t i n g  to  such re se a rc h  can be reduced to  th r e e  e lem entary  
q u e s t io n s  :
1. What i s  pay?
2. What i s  performance?
3. What i s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i f  any, between pay and 
perform ance?
Compensation a d m in is t r a t io n  seeks to  b r in g  perform ance 
and pay in to  congruence. I f  t h a t  a d m in is t r a t iv e  p ro c e s s  i s  
e f f e c t i v e  then  a b a lan ce  i s  ach ieved  where th e  " f a i r "  amount 
of pay i s  d e l iv e r e d  f o r  a " f a i r "  amount o f  perform ance.
Balance in  t h i s  c ircum stance  i s  where expected  perform ance 
occu rs  and in  tu rn  i s  fo llow ed by th e  expected  pay. S aid  
an o th e r  way, b a lan ce  i s  where eq u i ty  e x i s t s .  E qu ity  i s  a 
value laden term and c a r r i e s  w ith  i t  c o g n i t iv e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
—eq u ity  e x i s t s  in  th e  eyes o f  th e  b eh o ld e r .  E quity  i s  bo th  
a s o c ia l  and in d iv id u a l  phenomenon. Imbalance may e x i s t  in  a 
compensation system , and when i t  does i t  i s  viewed as in e q u ity .  
In eq u ity  has th e  same in d iv id u a l  p e rc e p tu a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as 
e q u i t y .
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As m entioned e a r l i e r  pay and perform ance a re  r e l a t i v e  
to  one an o th e r  and p o s s ib ly  to  o th e r  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  v a r i a b le s .  
Pay i s  w ithou t a doubt im p o rtan t,  as i s  perform ance, b u t taken  
s e p a ra te ly  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  meanings and uses a re  of l im i te d  
scope. What i s  needed i s  a means fo r  r e l a t i n g  pay and p e r f o r ­
mance. Equity  theo ry  p ro v id es  such a framework and seems to  
go beyond a sim ple f i r s t  o rd e r  o f  m agnitude.
This re se a rc h  p ro v id es  a f u r t h e r  t e s t  of Adams' (1963a, 
1965) th eo ry  o f  e q u i ty ,  as a p p l ie d  to  th e  s p e c ia l  case  of an 
induced wage in e q u i t y . For th e  pu rposes o f  t h i s  r e se a rc h  
wage in e q u i ty  e x i s t s  when " in p u ts "  a r e  n o t in  what i s  p e r ­
ce ived  as an " e q u i ta b le "  ba lance  w ith  outcome (p ay ) . In 
m o tiv a tio n  term s t h i s  p e rc e iv e d  im balance r e s u l t s  in  a d r iv e  
to  r e s to r e  b a la n c e .  Balance i s  r e s to r e d  by th e  employee 
through th e  m an ip u la tio n  of perform ance o r  outcome. In  an 
hourly  wage s i t u a t i o n  employees norm ally  p e rc e iv e  th e  amount 
o f  pay as a g iven : t h e r e f o r e ,  h i s  o p t io n s  tak e  on a s in g u la r
d i r e c t io n .  Perform ance can be a l t e r e d ,  e i t h e r  in c re a se d  to  
compensate f o r  p e rc e iv e d  overpay, o r  d ec reased  fo r  p e rc e iv e d  
underpay .^
Summary
The p reced ing  d is c u s s io n  has been an a ttem pt to  i n t r o ­
duce th e  concep ts  and t h e i r  r e l a t e d  assum ptions in  a re se a rc h  
c o n te x t .  Pay, perform ance, and a t t i t u d e s  r e p re s e n t  th e
^Other o p t io n s ,  l e s s  o v e r t ,  would be t o  em otiona lly  
d i s t o r t  f a c t s .  Such a d i s t o r t i o n  i s  a r e le v a n t  c o n s id e ra t io n  
b u t i s  beyond th e  scope o f th e  p r e s e n t  r e s e a rc h .
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e s s e n t i a l  v a r i a b l e s  in  t h i s  s tu d y .^  The r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t  has 
involved  an examination of  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and a de te rm ina­
t i o n  of  t h e  e x ten t  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a l l  w i th in  th e  frame­
work of  Adams' eq u i ty  th eo ry .
A g en e ra l  r e s e a rc h  model was p r e s e n te d  and d is c u s se d  
to  show how a l l  th e  invo lved  v a r i a b l e s  would be examined.
The next ch a p te r  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  
concerned w ith  eq u i ty  theory  in  th e  co n tex t  of  pay and p e r ­
formance. This  review shows the  development o f  eq u i ty  th eo ry  
and p ro v id e s  th e  r e a d e r  w ith  th e  r e s e a r c h  con tex t  f o r  t h i s  
s tudy .
Pay was de f ined  as money p r e s e n te d  as a reward t o  th e  
employee f o r  a given performance. Performance was d e f in e d  as 
t a s k  accomplishment as measured in  terms o f  q u a l i t y  and quan­
t i t y .  A t t i t u d e s  a re  th e  f e e l i n g s  employees have as th e  r e s u l t  
o f  p e r c e p t io n s  about e q u i ty .  Equity  d e s c r ib e s  th e  employee 's  
p e r c e p t io n  of  f a i r n e s s  and r e s t s  on th e  comparison by Person 
of  h i s  outcomes over  in p u ts  t o  O th e r s '  r a t i o  o f  outcomes over  
i n p u ts  a l l  as p e rce iv e d  by Person.
CHAPTER I I  
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Chapter  I I  i s  a review of  r e l e v a n t  eq u i ty  theory  l i t e r ­
a tu re  and i s  d iv id e d  in to  th r e e  major s e c t i o n s .  The f i r s t  
s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a comprehensive review of  J .  Stacy Adams' 
e m p ir ic a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  eq u i ty  th e o ry .  This f i r s t  s e c t i o n  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  o rg an ized  on a ch ro n o lo g ic a l  b a s i s  and in c lu d es  
a summary o f  each of  h i s  f i v e  exper im en ta l  r e p o r t s ,  beg inn ing  
w ith  h i s  f i r s t  experiment in 1962 and conclud ing  w ith  h i s  l a s t  
c o n t r ib u t io n  in  1965. L a te r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  and in  o th e r  
p la c e s  where a p p r o p r i a t e ,  a l l  o f  Adams' experiments  w i l l  be 
d is c u s se d  in  more d e t a i l .  The second s e c t i o n  o f  Chapter  I I  
c o n s i s t s  o f  summaries o f  c o n t r i b u t io n s  t o  e q u i ty  theory  made 
by r e s e a r c h e r s  o t h e r  than  Adams. By n e c e s s i t y  t h i s  s e c t io n  
in c lu d e s  an a ly se s  o f  Adams' c o n t r ib u t io n s  as viewed by o t h e r s ,  
and in  some ca ses  p r e s e n t s  d isagreem ents  and c r i t i c i s m s  not 
only w ith  Adams' r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s  bu t  a l s o  w i th  eq u i ty  as a 
th eo ry .  The purpose of  th e  t h i r d  s e c t i o n  i s  to  "b r ing  t o ­
g e th e r "  o r  merge those  m a te r i a l s  p r e s e n te d  in  th e  f i r s t  two 
s e c t io n s  i n t o  a comprehensive s t r u c t u r a l  e q u i ty  model; by 
n a tu re  t h i s  l a s t  s e c t i o n  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l .
Equity  th eo ry  i s  one of  th e  p r i n c i p a l  fo rm u la t ions  
r e l e v a n t  t o  f i n a n c i a l  compensation. Equity  t h e o r i e s  have been
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p resen ted  by Jaques (1961),  Patchen (1961),  Homans (1961),  
and Adams (1963a, 1965). This study focuses  on Adams' s t a t e ­
ment o f  eq u i ty  t h e o r y , P r i o r  to  expanding on o t h e r s ' formu­
l a t i o n s  and c o n s id e r a t i o n s  of  equ i ty  theory  i t  w i l l  be u se fu l  
to  review th e  approach of  Adams and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  to  in e q u i ty  
t h e o r y . 1 A major p o r t io n  of t h i s  s e c t io n  emphasizes Adams' 
development of  eq u i ty  theory .
Equity  i s ,  according t o  Adams (1963a, p .  422) a pe rva ­
s iv e  concern of  a l l  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  Equity  i s  p r e s e n te d  as 
being  more e l e g a n t  than  a s imple economic d e f i n i t i o n  would 
allow, and has in  i t s  make-up c o n s id e r a t i o n s  t h a t  focus on 
the  psychology of  th e  in d iv id u a l  and on h i s  s o c i a l  env i ron ­
ment. In some r e s p e c t s  eq u i ty  has t h e  u n d e s i r a b le  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  f o r  r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t s  because i t  appears  to  be a con­
cept  t h a t  encompasses th e  world and a l l  i t s  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
Because of  e q u i ty  t h e o r y ' s  comprehensiveness,  Adams and o th e r s  
have tended to  d e f in e  i t  as in e q u i ty  which i s  presumed to  have 
a g r e a t e r  s p e c i f i c i t y  f o r  r e se a rc h  purposes .
Adams (1963a, p. 422) g ives  S to u f f e r ,  Suchman, DeVinney, 
S ta r ,  and Williams (1949);  Za lezn ik ,  C h r is te n se n ,  and 
R o e th l i s b e rg e r  (1958); Jaques (1956, 1961, 1964); Homans
(1961); and Patchen (1961) c r e d i t  f o r  se e in g  t h a t  eq u i ty  
theory  encompasses more than economic c o n s id e r a t i o n s .  In a l l  
f a i r n e s s  i t  should  be noted t h a t  in  each s tu d y ,  where eq u i ty
^Adams (1963) uses  " in e q u i ty  theory"  to  denote h i s  
t rea tm en t  of  equ i ty  theo ry ,  a l though h i s  usage i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
"Equity" i s  s t i l l  thought  o f  as the  g e n e r ic  term.
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theory  was t e s t e d ,  economic c o n s id e r a t i o n s  were a focus of 
i n t e r e s t .  The obvious ex p lan a t io n  i s  t h a t  money, more spe­
c i f i c a l l y  pay, r e p r e s e n t s  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  means f o r  examining 
eq u i ty  theo ry .  In b r i e f ,  pay p ro v id es  a handy p o in t  o f  r e f e r ­
ence fo r  e v a lu a t in g  th e  r e levance  o f  the  eq u i ty  concept.  
T e s t i f y i n g  to  t h i s  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  most American r e s e a r c h e r s  
have accepted  pay as a means f o r  t e s t i n g  eq u i ty  th e o ry ,  of 
which Adams i s  a le ad in g  proponent.
Adams (1963a, p. 422) s t a t e s  t h a t  in e q u i ty  theory  has 
been developed from F e s t i n g e r ' s  (1957) theory  of  co g n i t iv e  
d issonance .  I t  i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  w h i le  Adams may have been 
s t im u la te d  by the  conceptua l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  and framework 
o f f e r e d  by th e  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  t h a t  eq u i ty  theo ry  i s  by 
no means a s p i n - o f f . ^  The idea  i s  ha rd ly  new nor i s  i t s  con­
f i g u r a t i o n .  What i s  in n o v a t iv e  i s  th e  r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t s  and 
th e  emergence of  new th in k in g  about eq u i ty  t h e o r y ' s  r e levance  
to  contemporary job behav io r .
S ec t io n  1: Review of  Adams' C o n t r ib u t io n s
The fo l low ing  d i s c u s s io n s  in  t h i s  s e c t io n  a re  con­
cerned e x c lu s iv e ly  with Adams' fo rm ula t ion  and t e s t i n g  of  
eq u i ty  th e o ry .  Comparisons t o  o t h e r  s t u d i e s  d i s c u s se d  l a t e r  
w i l l  be mentioned from time to  t ime to  a s s i s t  in  making the
As noted  above, o th e r  r e s e a r c h e r s  form ula ted  the  
eq u i ty  concept r e l a t i v e  to  pay and performance p lu s  o th e r  
c o n s id e r a t i o n s  p r i o r  to  1957. Examples of  t h i s  a r e  Jaques 
(1956),  Homans (1961),  and o th e r s  a l ready  mentioned in  th e  
above paragraph .  The p o in t  o f  t h i s  comment i s  not t o  e s t a b ­
l i s h  who was f i r s t  but r a t h e r  to  add suppor t  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
p e rv as iv en e ss  of  th e  eq u i ty  concept .
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e x p lan a t io n s  more r e l e v a n t .  The format w i l l  fo l low  a chrono­
l o g i c a l  sequence beginning  w ith  th e  1962 experiment o f  Adams 
and Rosenbaum.1 For th e  r e a d e r ' s  convenience each experiment 
w i l l  be s u b t i t l e d  w ith  th e  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  name and d a ted .
Adams and Rosenbaum (1962)
These experiments  covered a p e r io d  from th e  w in t e r  o f  
1960 to  l a t e  sp r in g  of  1961; th e  experiments  were t i t l e d  
"Experiment I" and "Experiment I I "  and each had i t s  r e s p e c t i v e  
h y p o th e s i s .  To avoid p o s s i b l e  confusion  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  w i l l  
fo l low  Adams and Rosenbaum's format as r e p o r te d  in  th e  r e f e r ­
enced a r t i c l e .
Experiment I : The independent v a r i a b l e  was pay and t h e  depen­
dent v a r i a b l e  was p r o d u c t i v i t y .  The h y p o th e s is  o f  Experiment 
I was "When a Person i s  p a id  by th e  hour h i s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  w i l l  
be g r e a t e r  when he p e r c e iv e s  h i s  pay as in e q u i t a b ly  l a r g e  than 
when i d e n t i c a l  pay i s  p e rc e iv e d  as e q u i t a b l e "  (Adams and 
Rosenbaum, 1962, p. 161). Twenty-two male s tu d e n t s  were h i r e d  
to  do in te rv ie w in g  work on a p a r t - t i m e  b a s i s  a t  $3.50 p e r  
hour.  Eleven of  t h e  s tu d e n t s  were t o l d  they were u n q u a l i f i e d  
and th e  remaining e leven  were t o l d  they  were q u a l i f i e d .  By 
in form ing  t h e  eleven they were u n q u a l i f i e d  Adams and Rosenbaum 
c r e a te d  a f e e l i n g  of  in e q u i ty  o r  d is sonance .  The h y p o th e s i s  
was su ppor ted .  The u n q u a l i f i e d  group produced s i g n i f i c a n t l y
^ I t  shou ld  be mentioned t h a t  Adams appears  to  have 
i n i t i a t e d  h i s  exper im enta l  e f f o r t s  to  s tudy  e q u i ty  th e o ry  with  
a 1961 experim ent,  however th e  r e s u l t s  were not  p u b l i s h e d  and 
only mentioned in p as s in g  by Adams and o t h e r s .  T h e re fo re ,  
t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  must begin  w i th  th e  1962 experim ent.
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more than  th e  q u a l i f i e d  group. Using nonparam etr ic  t e s t s  a 
s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  (X^ -  4 .55 ,  df  -  1) was r e a l i z e d .
I t  shou ld  be no ted  t h a t  Adams and Rosenbaum, by t e l l i n g  
e leven  o f  th e  s u b j e c t s  they  were u n q u a l i f i e d ,  may have c r e a te d  
problems of  i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  and in  e ssence  involved  s e l f ­
esteem c o n s id e r a t i o n s .  This p o i n t ,  and o t h e r s ,  have rec e iv e d  
c o n s id e ra b le  c r i t i c i s m  from o th e r  r e s e a r c h e r s  and w i l l  be 
e l a b o r a t e d  on l a t e r  in  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n .
Experiment 11: Experiment 11 was des igned  to  t e s t  o r  v a l i d a t e
th e  r e s u l t s  o f  Experiment 1 and to  add an o th e r  dimension by 
ex ten d in g  th e  p r e d i c t i o n s  of  eq u i ty  th e o ry  to  p i e c e - r a t e  work. 
Accordingly th e  h y p o th e s i s  f o r  Experiment 11 "was t h a t  whereas 
Ss o v e rp a id  by th e  hour would show g r e a t e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  than 
c o n t r o l s ,  Ss ov e rp a id  on a p ie c e  r a t e  would show l e s s  produc­
t i v i t y  than  c o n t r o l s . "  (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962, p. 163)
The r easo n in g  beh ind  t h i s  h y p o th e s is  appeared  to  be t h a t  
s u b j e c t s  ov e rp a id  by th e  hour would reduce  in e q u i ty  by i n ­
c r e a s in g  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  For Experiment 11 t h e r e  were t h i r t y -  
s i x  s u b j e c t s  d iv id e d  in to  two groups o f  e ig h te e n  s u b j e c t s  f o r  
hou r ly  and p ie c e  r a t e ;  bo th  of  th e s e  two groups were f u r t h e r  
su b -d iv id e d  in to  two groups o f  n ine  each and d e s ig n a te d  as 
c o n t r o l  and expe r im en ta l  groups. The t a s k ,  as  b e f o r e ,  was 
i n te rv ie w in g .  The h y p o th e s is  was s u b s t a n t i a t e d  through non­
p a r a m e t r ic  t e s t s .  An unexpected f i n d in g  was r e a l i z e d  in  t h a t  
t h e r e  was a lower p r o d u c t i v i t y  fo r  a l l  p i e c e - r a t e  workers ,  
both c o n t r o l  and exper im en ta l  groups,  as compared to  a l l  
hour ly  w orkers .  Adams and Rosenbaum (1962, p .  164) l a b e l
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t h i s  as a p o s s i b l e  " a r t i f i c i a l "  f i n d in g  and spend c o n s id e r ­
ab le  e f f o r t  in  t h e i r  d i s c u s s io n  s e c t i o n  e x p lo r in g  p o s s i b l e  
reasons  f o r  i t s  e x i s t e n c e .
R e la t iv e  to  th e o ry ,  t h i s  1962 a r t i c l e  s t a t e s  very 
c l e a r l y  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  co g n i t iv e  d issonance  to  equ i ty  
th eo ry .  In p o in t  o f  f a c t ,  Adams and Rosenbaum say t h a t  the  
hypotheses  a re  g en e ra ted  on the  b a s i s  of  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  
theory  and then  proceed  to  t e s t  t h e i r  p r e d i c t i o n s  u s ing  th e  
presumed g r e a t e r  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  e q u i ty  th e o ry .  T he i r  r e f e r ­
ences do not acknowledge Homans o r  o th e r s  then  working in  t h i s  
a r e a  o t h e r  than Arrowood (1961).  In most r e s p e c t s  Adams and 
Rosenbaum's 1962 e f f o r t s  were o r i e n t e d  towards examining cog­
n i t i v e  d issonance  r a t h e r  than  e q u i ty  th e o ry .
In summary Adams and Rosenbaum's 1962 s tudy  was con­
ducted  to  t e s t  t h e s e  p r e d i c t i o n s :
1. Overpayment on an hour ly  b a s i s  would r e s u l t  in  
i n c r e a s e d  p r o d u c t i v i t y ;  and
2. Overpayment on a p i e c e - r a t e  b a s i s  would r e s u l t  in  
l e s s  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
Two experiments  were conducted u s ing  c o l l e g e  s tu d e n t s  f o r  
conduc t ing  in te rv ie w s .  Both experiments  sup p o r ted  th e  p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  as based  on th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  e q u i ty  theo ry  in  t h a t  
s u b je c t  in p u t s  would be manipula ted  to  r e s t o r e  b a lance  o r  
e q u i ty .  C ondi t ions  o f  i n e q u i ty  were a r t i f i c i a l l y  c r e a te d  by 
th e  r e s e a r c h e r s  a t  th e  onse t  of  th e  s tudy .  C r i t i c i s m s  
le v e le d  a g a in s t  t h i s  s tudy  have l a r g e l y  focused  on th e  poor 
judgment by Adams and Rosenbaum in  c o n s t r u c t in g  t h e i r
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methodology.^ I t  should  be added t h a t  m ethodological  o r  
design problems have plagued a l l  eq u i ty  r e s e a r c h .  This i s  
d iscussed  in  o th e r  s e c t io n s  o f  t h i s  s tudy .
Adams (1963a)
Adams' f i r s t  s tudy in  1963 c o n ta in s  two i d e n t i f i a b l e  
bu t  i n t e r r e l a t e d  o b je c t i v e s :  to p r e s e n t  a more comprehensive
t h e o r e t i c a l  model o f  eq u i ty  and in e q u i ty ,  and to  reexamine 
and extend t h r e e  p rev io u s  experiments (Arrowood, 1961; Adams 
and Rosenbaum, 1962—hourly  s tudy ;  Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962— 
p i e c e - r a t e  s tu d y ) .  Adams (1963a) denominates th e se  s t u d i e s  as 
Experiments I ,  I I ,  and I I I  and h i s  e x ten s io n s  of  th e s e  s t u d i e s  
as Experiment IV. Adams' a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  t h r e e  p rev ious  
s t u d i e s  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  as th e  r ead e r  i s  g iven  a f a i r  id e a  o f  
how Adams shaped h i s  th in k in g  p r i o r  to  Experiment IV. R e su l ts  
from Experiments I - IV  genera ted  what Adams c a l l e d  a gene ra l  
theory  o f  in e q u i ty  (1963a, p. 435).
A problem of  th e  th r e e  p rev ious  s t u d i e s  was t h a t  they 
f a i l e d  to  d i s c r i m in a t e  between d i f f e r e n t  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  o f  
worker in p u t s .  P roduc t ion  was measured e x c lu s iv e ly  on a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  b a s i s  ( i . e . ,  how much was produced f o r  a given 
outcome) and t h e r e f o r e  no c o n s id e r a t io n  was given to  q u a l i t a ­
t i v e  in p u t s .  Adams (1963a) modified the  Adams and Rosenbaum
(1962) experiment by adding th r e e  open-ended q u e s t io n s .  Each
^ I t  should  be noted t h a t  Adams and Rosenbaum's 1962 
e f f o r t s  d id  in c o rp o ra te  measures to  overcome c e r t a i n  inade­
q uac ies  o f  Arrowood's 1961 s tudy .  Judging by th e  commentary 
surrounding  Adams and Rosenbaum's 1962 e f f o r t s  they were not 
e n t i r e l y  s u c c e s s f u l .
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q u es t io n  then became a q u a l i t y  measure and was based  on the  
number of  words w r i t t e n  down by the  in te rv ie w e r s  (who were 
th e  s u b je c t s  in  the  exper im ent) .  The more words, according  
to  Adams, the  h ig h e r  the  q u a l i t y .  R esu l ts  from Experiment IV 
suppor ted  th e  p r e d i c t i o n s  based on equ i ty  theo ry :  ove rpa id
in te rv i e w e r s  produced more words than e q u i ta b ly  p a id  i n t e r ­
v iewers .  The r e s u l t s  o f  the  Experiment IV were im press ive  as 
Adams r e p o r t s  a t -  1 .82,  p -  .05, o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  f o r  t h e  
eq u i ta b ly  p a id  s u b je c t  and a t -  2 .48 ,  p -  .02, t w o - t a i l e d  
t e s t .
In s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s  Adams' 1963a a r t i c l e  r e p r e s e n t s  a 
hodge-podge of  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s .  On pages 422 and 
423 c o g n i t iv e  d issonance ,  margina l  u t i l i t y  o f  wages, exchange 
theory  and eq u i ty  a re  mentioned; and u s u a l ly  in  i s o l a t e d  con­
t e x t  and s e t t i n g .  Equity  theory  i s  renamed in e q u i ty  theory  
and ass igned  th e  s t a t u s  as "a p e rv a s iv e  concern o f  i n d u s t r y ,  
l ab o r  and government" (1963a, p .  422). Adams' c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  
purpose f o r  the  1963a a r t i c l e  i s  to  p re s e n t  a th e o ry  o f  
in e q u i ty  t h a t  w i l l  h opefu l ly  p rov ide  an unders tand ing  and 
c o n t ro l  o f  th e  phenomenon. This  ambitious p r o j e c t  was p a r ­
t i a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l .  The experiments  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  Adams' 
e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s  but  h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  m eaningfulness  
f e l l  s h o r t  o f  t h e  mark o f  adding to  th e  subs tance  of  e q u i ty  
theo ry .  The more p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  o f  Adams' 1963a reexamina­
t i o n  of  e q u i ty  theory  le d  to  a broadening of  c o n te n t .  Equity  
theory  was t e s t e d  as a theory  in  i t s  own r i g h t  r a t h e r  than  as 
a means to  ev a lu a te  p r e d i c t i o n s  made on th e  b a s i s  of  c o g n i t iv e
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d issonance .  Furthermore, eq u i ty  theo ry  seemed to  become 
a l l i e d  more c lo s e ly  with exchange theory  than b e fo re .  This  
was f o r t u n a t e  because ,  l i k e  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  theo ry ,  
eq u i ty  theory  seems to  come c lo se  to  complying w ith  th e  p r e ­
r e q u i s i t e s  o f  a m o t iv a t io n  theo ry  which r e q u i r e s  t h a t  d i r e c ­
t i o n ,  am plitude and p e r s i s t a n c e  be c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  f o r  
com p le ten ess .
In summary, Adams' (1963a) e f f o r t  was to  extend and 
c l a r i f y  p rev io u s  eq u i ty  s t u d i e s .  Experiment IV of  th e  s e r i e s  
was focused on r e s o lv in g  th e  q u a l i t y  i s s u e  which had been 
r a i s e d  by c r i t i c s .  Improvement o f  q u a l i t y  of  h i s  p e r f o r ­
mance, w h i le  s im u l taneous ly  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  q u a n t i t y ,  was 
ano ther  means a s u b je c t  could reduce d issonance ,  o r  r e s t o r e  
e q u i l ib r iu m .
Adams (1963b)
Adams' second 1963 s tudy  (1963b, pp. 9-16) i s  a sum­
mary of  p rev io u s  r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t s  and was p rep a red  e s p e c i a l l y  
fo r  "A Symposium: P sycho log ica l  Research on Pay ."  As such
t h i s  r e p o r t  does l i t t l e  to  add to  t h e  a l ready  p r e v io u s ly  
ob ta in ed  r e s u l t s  a l though in  some p la ce s  Adams appears  to  have 
b e n e f i t e d  from o t h e r s '  a n a ly se s  o f  h i s  work. Adams summarizes 
h i s  p rev io u s  e f f o r t s  as an a t tem pt  " to  ex tend  the  im p l i c a t io n s  
o f  the  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance th eo ry  t o  a p r a c t i c a l  problem" 
(1963b, p. 15).  However, once again  Adams makes i t  very c l e a r  
t h a t  he i s  a t tem p t in g  to  t i e  pay to  performance. I t  shou ld  
be noted,  however, t h a t  in  fo u r  experim ents  r e p o r te d  in  th e
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two 1963 s t u d i e s  pay was not changed ( i . e . ,  the  independent 
v a r i a b l e  was no t  manipula ted)  which seems to  r e p r e s e n t  some 
incongruence i f  a s t a t i s t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between v a r i a b l e s  
i s  to  be dem onstra ted .  In s t e a d  th e  c o g n i t iv e  s t r u c t u r e  of  
the  Sub jec t  was m anipula ted ,  and was t h e r e f o r e  th e  presumed 
independent v a r i a b l e  which would a f f e c t  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  This 
r e p r e s e n t s  a source  of problems in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  r e s e a r c h  r e ­
s u l t s  w ith  t h e  most obvious be ing  th e  o f te n -e n c o u n te re d  ques­
t i o n i n g  of  Adams' i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  mentioned e a r l i e r .
Adams and Jacobsen (1964)
The 1964 s tudy  by Adams and Jacobsen (1964, pp. 19-25) 
a p p a ren t ly  was under taken to  e v a lu a t e  which of  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
e x p la n a t io n s  have to  do w ith  th e  i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  problems 
a l ready  mentioned. Andrews (1967) and o th e r s  have su g g es ted  
t h a t  i n e q u i ty  was not caused by d is sonance ,  as Adams and Adams 
and Rosenbaum had sugges ted ,  bu t  i n s t e a d  was th e  fu n c t io n  of  
an aroused job  i n s e c u r i t y .  Adams and Jacobsen (1964, p. 19) 
focus o p e r a t i o n a l l y  on p i e c e - r a t e  outcomes to  dem onstra te  work 
q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y  i n t e r a c t i o n  i n  t h e  r e d u c t io n  of  in e q u i ty  
o r  d issonance .  E x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  by Adams and Jacobsen was 
th e  assumption t h a t  p ie c e  work i s  th e  b e s t  means to  t e s t  th e  
q u a l i t y  i s s u e  (1964, p. 19).  A more powerful s t a t i s t i c ,  a 
3x2 F a c t o r i a l  Design was used to  t e s t  th e  h y p o th e s i s  in  th e  
1964 e f f o r t .  The t a s k  was a u d i t i n g  pages of g a l l e y  p ro o f  and 
was performed, as  u s u a l ,  by c o l l e g e  s tu d e n t s .  A r a t h e r  
complex coding system, dev ised  to  a s s i s t  in  e x p la in in g  th e
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s t u d y ' s  r e s u l t s ,  w i l l  not be inc luded  in  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n .  
Adams and J a c o b s e n 's  (1964, p. 22) s tudy r e s u l t s  suppor ted  
t h e i r  h ypo thes is  in  t h a t  d issonance  r e s u l t e d  i n  the  d i f f e r ­
ences of  q u a l i t y  performance among groups. Needless  to  say 
th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e s u l t s  c l e a r l y  support  th e s e  a u th o r s '  
ex p lan a t io n .
This s tudy  a l so  r e s u l t e d  in  an u n p re d ic te d  f in d in g  
(1964, p. 24).  H igh-d issonance  s u b je c t s  overcompensated in  
t h a t  they found more e r r o r s  than  were r e a l l y  t h e r e .  Adams 
and Jacobsen i n t e r p r e t e d  t h i s  f in d in g  as an index of  the  
s t r o n g  m o t iva t ion  in  th e  h ig h -d is so n an ce  group. Arrowood 
(1961) a l so  noted  much the  same th in g  in  t h a t  workers who 
p e rce iv ed  themselves to  be overcompensated worked a d d i t i o n a l  
h o u r s .
The p r a c t i c a l  im p l i c a t io n s  of Adams and Ja c o b s e n 's
(1964) f in d in g s ,  as w el l  as th o s e  of Arrowood (1961),  imply 
t h a t  overpayment by management need not n e c e s s a r i l y  i n c r e a s e  
l a b o r  c o s t s  p rov ided  management i s  p r im a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in  
p roduc t  q u a l i t y .  This  f i n d in g  a l s o  im p l ie s  t h e  o p p o s i te  f o r  
a management i n t e r e s t e d  p r im a r i l y  in  q u a n t i t y  performance.
Adams (1965)
" In eq u i ty  in  S o c ia l  Exchange" (1965, pp. 267-299) i s  
Adams' most comprehensive t r e a tm e n t  o f  eq u i ty  th eo ry .  While 
th e  1965 a r t i c l e  c o n ta in s  no a d d i t i o n a l  exper im en ta l  work i t  
i s  viewed as a s i z a b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  development of  
e q u i ty  theory .
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A unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Adams' 1965 work i s  t h a t  i t  
s i g n a l s  a d i s t i n c t  change in  Adams' conceptua l  base .  In 
e a r l i e r  works (1962, 1963a, 1963b, and 1964) Adams c l e a r ly  
bases  h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  premises on F e s t i n g e r ' s  (1954, 1957) 
concept of  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance .  Adams' 1965 work in s t e a d  
u t i l i z e s  Homans' (1950, 1953, 1961)^ concept of  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
j u s t i c e  as the  p o in t  o f  d e p a r tu re  in  developing a theory  of  
e q u i ty .  This i s  viewed as a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i o n  change fo r  
i t  a l lows e q u i ty  theory  to  be based  not only in  a h i s t o r i c a l  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  framework bu t  a l so  al lows an expansion o f  theory  
pa ram ete rs .  Before expanding on th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  new 
p o s i t i o n ,  ev idence f o r  th e  "sw itch"  i s  o f f e re d .  F igure  3 i s  
a s imple t a l l y ,  p e d e s t r i a n  as i t  might be ,  of  r e f e re n c e s  men­
t io n e d  in  Adams' 1965 work. U n fo r tuna te ly  space does not 
allow a more e x te n s iv e  survey r e l a t i v e  t o  the  contex t  of  each 
r e f e re n c e  and importance a t t a c h e d  by Adams. However shee r  
numbers shou ld  p rov ide  such i n d i c a t i o n  of  th e  magnitude of  
Adams' s h i f t  from F e s t i n g e r ' s  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  to  Homans' 
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  framework.
A d e v a s ta t in g  c r i t i q u e  of  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance was 
produced in 1961 as Tavis tock  Document No. 626 "Cognit ive  
Dissonance: A D is se n t in g  Voice ."  In th e  January ,  1964 i s s u e
of  th e  P sycho log ica l  B u l l e t i n  (Vol. LXI, No. 1) Chapanis and 
Chapanis u t i l i z i n g  d a ta  ob ta ined  f o r  the  Tavis tock  re p o r t
^There i s  a problem in  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e l a t i v e  to  
Homans' 1953 s tudy .  S evera l  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  in c lu d in g  Adams
(1965),  e r ro n eo u s ly  c i t e  th e  d a te  o f  th e  s tudy  as  1963.
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Homans 23 Zaleznik 4 Brame1
Thibant 13 Brehen 3 Conlon
Patchen 7 Clark 3 C roz ie r
Sayes 7 Cohen 3 Dickson
S te in e r 7 Adams & Jacobsen 3 Gebbard
Adams 6 Leventhal 3 Johnson
F e s t in g e r 6 Skinner 3 Kelly
S to u f f e r 6 Herzberg 2 Livernash
Jaques 5 Hyman 2 Newcomb
K i t t 5 P e te r s 2 P i l i s u k
Merton 5 Weick 2 R o e th l i sb e rg e r
Spector 5 Arrowood 1 Bogus
Adams & Rosenbaum 4 Blau 1 Vroom
Figure  3. References C i ted  by Adams (1965)
( s e n io r  au thor  N a t a l i a  Chapanis p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  p rep a r in g  
Document No. 626) a l s o  came to  neg a t iv e  conc lus ions  in  t h e i r  
ev a lu a t io n  o f  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance .  Inasmuch as Adams' 
a r t i c l e  appeared in  1965, i t  i s  not u n l ik e ly  t h a t  th e se  e v a l ­
u a t io n s  in f lu en c ed  h i s  tu rn ab o u t .  Whether t h i s  i s  t r u e  i s  
sp e c u la t io n .  The p r i n c i p a l  c r i t i c i s m s  of  c o g n i t iv e  dissonance 
as o u t l i n e d  by Chapanis and Chapanis (1964, pp. 1-22) are  
summarized:
1. C r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  design and a n a ly s i s  was d i r e c t e d  
toward a t  l e a s t  12 of  th e  major d issonance  s t u d i e s .
2. The a b s t r a c t i o n  le v e l  of c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  i s  so 
f a r  removed from r e a l i t y  as to  make t e s t i n g  v i r t u ­
a l l y  im poss ib le .  This seems to  be s u b s t a n t i a t e d
by th e  p reced ing  item one.
34
3. C ogni t ive  d issonance  a t  f i r s t  g lance  has an a l l u r e  
o f  s i m p l i c i t y  whereas in  a c t u a l i t y  i t  i s  an ex­
trem ely  complex concept .  The q u e s t io n  o f  how to  
reduce a m u l t i tu d e  of  s o c i a l  f a c t o r s  to  two simple 
s ta te m e n ts  i s  unreso lved .  This  paradox o f  s im p l ic ­
i t y ,  accord ing  to  Chapanis and Chapanis (1964,
p. 20) ,  i s  th e  downfall  o f  th e  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance
th eo ry .
Summarizing, c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  appears  to  be a paramount 
example o f  poor des ign ,  u n c o n t ro l l e d  and confounded v a r i a b l e s ,  
q u e s t io n a b le  i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y ,  and unproven as a th e o ry .  I f  
th e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  a re  v a l id ,  i t  i s  no sm all  wonder t h a t  Adams 
may have been s t i m u la t e d  to  r e o r i e n t  h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  base .
However t h e  purpose o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s  no t  to  examine 
the  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  theory  bu t  r a t h e r  to  ex tend ,  through 
s c i e n t i f i c  in q u i r y ,  Adams' fo rm u la t ion  o f  eq u i ty  th e o ry .  As 
Adams' 1965 work r e p r e s e n t s  h i s  most s o p h i s t i c a t e d  c o n t r ib u ­
t i o n  t o  th e o ry  i t  i s  used as  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  base  f o r  t h i s
s tudy .  This au th o r  i s  in  f u l l  agreement w i th  th e  use  of
Homans' d e f i n i t i o n  of  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  as t h e  l o g i c a l  an teced en t  
o f  e q u i ty  th eo ry .
From th e  beg inn ing  Adams examined p o s s i b l e  causes  and 
r e s u l t s  o f  i n e q u i t i e s  r a t h e r  than e q u i t i e s  which in  p a r t  had 
d e l im i te d  the  scope o f  v a r i a b l e s  under c o n s id e r a t i o n .  Fur­
thermore Adams has a t tem pted ,  in  a l l  r e s e a r c h ,  t o  con f ine  h i s  
e f f o r t s  t o  pay and performance. Both pay and performance a re  
o v e r t  b eh av io r s  t h a t  a r e  obse rvab le  and seem to  be
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of something ak in  to  Sk inner ian  th in k in g .  
R e la t iv e  to  c o g n i t iv e  p ro c e s se s  Adams' theory  i s  no weaker o r  
s t r o n g e r  than those  m o t iv a t io n  t h e o r i e s  p o s tu l a t e d  by o th e r s .  
L i t t l e  ha rd  d a ta  e x i s t  t h a t  e x p la in  th e  c o g n i t iv e  p ro c e s se s  
o f  p e r c e p t io n ,  dec is ion-m aking ,  and m o t iva t ion  o f  the  v a r io u s  
schoo ls  o f  p sy c h o lo g ica l  tho u g h t .  Some of  th e  problems Adams 
ex pe r ienced  (1963a, 1965) in  r e l a t i n g  inpu t  and outcome v a r i ­
a b le s  a r e  t r a c e a b l e  to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  from th e  beg inn ing  Adams 
adopted a s o c i a l - p s y c h o lo g ic a l  approach .^  This approach not 
only i n c o rp o r a te s  a g r e a t e r  range of  r e l e v a n t  s o c i a l  and 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  v a r i a b l e s  (a s  compared to  a wholly p sy ch o lo g i ­
c a l  approach) bu t  a l so  i n c o r p o r a t e s  th e  problems of  measuring 
th e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  o f  two s e t s  o f  v a r i a b l e s .  To e f f e c t i v e l y  
combine such a broad  range of  v a r i a b l e s  r e q u i r e s  some neces­
sa ry  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n :  Adams accomplishes  t h i s  by reducing
e v e ry th in g  to  a s imple t h r e e - p a r t  model. Adams a t tem p ts  to  
c o n t ro l  t h e  necessa ry  a b s t r a c t i o n  by lock ing  f i rm ly  on pay 
and performance.  Pay i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  hourly  and p ie c e  work 
w hile  performance i s  measured in  terms of  both q u a l i t y  and 
q u a n t i t y .  Adams’ i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  (1962a) d e a l t  only w i th  a 
q u a n t i ty  measure o f  performance a l though both  hour ly  and 
p iece-work methods of  pay were co n s id e red .  L a te r  s t u d i e s  
(1963a, 1964) inc luded  q u a l i t y  measures o f  performance.
^These problems were i d e n t i f i e d  by Weick (1967),  
Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) and o t h e r s .
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c h i e f ly  to  b e t t e r  exp la in  inpu t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open to  
P e r so n . ^
Three models may be used to  ex p la in  th e  concept of  
e q u i ty .  A c tu a l ly ,  th e re  a re  no r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  con­
t e n t  of  th e s e  models a l though t h e i r  c o n f ig u ra t io n s  a re  d i s ­
s i m i l a r .  The f i r s t  model i s  the  one form ula ted  by Patchen
(1961),  the  second model i s  t h a t  o f  Homans (1961) and th e  
t h i r d  i s  Adams' model o f  i n e q u i ty .  These r e s p e c t i v e  models 
w i l l  be p r e s e n te d  beginning  with  P a t c h e n ' s .  P a tc h e n ' s  (1961) 
model was c l e a r l y  developed on th e  b a s i s  of  F e s t i n g e r ’s (1957) 
c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  framework. P a t c h e n ' s  model (1961, p. 9 ) :
My p o s i t i o n  on dimensions
 23-1_______  comnared to  ______ r e l i e d  ________His ( t h e i r )  pay comparée t o  g ig  ( t h e i r )  p o s i t i o n  on
dimensions r e l a t e d  to  pay 
Homans' d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  (1950, 1953, 1961) model has an 
a r t i c u l a t e d  c h a r a c t e r  t h a t  in c lu d e s  a g r e a t e r  number of  
accouterments  than  P a tc h e n 's  model. Schem atica l ly  Homans' 
model :
A 's  rewards l e s s  A's c o s t s  B 's  rewards l e s s  B 's  c o s t s
A's inves tm ents  B 's  inves tm ents
Adams' (1965, pp. 280-281) model i s  used to  d e f in e  
in e q u a l i t y  and i s  more symbolic than  P a tc h e n ' s  o r  Homans' 
models; bu t  i t  s t i l l  c a r r i e s  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same message.
^ I t  should  be no ted  t h a t  th e s e  fou r  v a r i a b l e s :  hour ly
and piece-work  pay, and q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  measures of  p e r ­
formance, a r e  o f te n  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  in  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e t ­
t i n g  which adds g r e a t l y  to  th e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  of th eo ry .
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The co n ten t  and subs tance  in  Adams' model more c lo s e ly  resem­
b le  Homans', e s p e c i a l l y  when t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  d e s c r ip t i o n s  
and con tex t  a re  compared. Adams' (1965, pp. 280-281) model 
has t h r e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  which denote two d i f f e r e n t  in e q u i ty  
s i t u a t i o n s  and one eq u i ty  s i t u a t i o n :
Equity
In eq u i ty
In eq u i ty
Op _ Oa 
Ip l a
OE <  OaIp ^  la  
Op _ Oa
Ï5
where : 0
I
P
a
Outcomes 
Inputs  
Person 
Other
Homans' and Adams' outcomes (0) and in p u t s  ( I )  in  r a t i o  con­
f i g u r a t i o n s  a re  th e  sums of  such outcomes and in p u ts  as r e l e ­
vant t o  th e  exchange p ro ces s .  Note t h a t  th e  " I "  and "0" as 
o b se rv a b le  phenomena are  amenable to  dependent and indepen­
dent ass ignm ents .
In most r e s p e c t s  a l l  th e  models ( P a t c h e n ' s ,  Homans' and 
Adams') a re  very s im i l a r ^  al though P a tc h e n ' s  (1961, p. 14) 
model c o n ta in s  a c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  th e  f u tu r e  which i s  s t a t e d
as :
My pay now 
His ( t h e i r )  
pay now
compared to
My f u t u r e  p o s i t i o n  on 
dimensions r e l a t e d  to  pay 
His ( t h e i r )  p re s e n t  p o s i t i o n  
on dimensions r e l a t e d  to  pay
P a tc h e n ' s  1961 model i s  more focused than Homans' o r  
Adams' in  t h a t  th e  emphasis i s  on pay r a t h e r  than rewards 
(Homans) o r  outcomes (Adams). Also t h e  r a t i o  c o n f ig u ra t io n  i s  
d i f f e r e n t  in  t h a t  i t  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  "My pay" to  
"His ( t h e i r )  pay" as compared to  Homans and Adams r a t i o  of  
Outcomes (Rewards) to  Inputs  ( In v e s tm e n ts ) .  In essence  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  in  th e  c o n f ig u ra t io n  o f  how th e  comparison be­
tween two employees might be made by a given employee. The 
end r e s u l t  o f  use of  any of  th e  t h r e e  models would be the
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P a tc h e n 's  c o n s id e ra t io n s  r e p r e s e n t  (1) a c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  the  
fu tu re ,  and (2) an o r i e n t a t i o n  t h a t  i s  more d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  
to  dissonance and s a t i s f a c t i o n  as i s  evidenced by P a tc h e n 's  
(1961, p. 13) Hypotheses 1, l a ,  and 2 .^
N e i th e r  Homans nor  Adams are  o r i e n t e d  so c lo s e ly  as 
Patchen to  e x p la in in g  job s a t i s f a c t i o n  and d issonance .  Both 
Adams and Homans a re  look ing  at  a g en e ra l  case  o f  e q u i ty  ; 
Adams i s  u s ing  th e  eq u i ty  framework t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  magnitude 
o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between pay and performance, and Homans to  
exp la in  investment and rewards of  th e  t h r e e  models p r e s e n t ly  
under d is c u s s io n .
same. Both Homans' and Adams' models are  more g e n e ra l  than 
P a tc h e n ' s .  Patchen s p e c i f i c a l l y  denotes pay w hi le  Homans 
uses  rewards,  a more g e n e ra l  term and Adams u t i l i z e s  outcomes 
which i s  a l so  a more g e n e ra l  term. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  p o in t  
Homans' rewards might be s t a t u s ,  promotion or  pay, investments  
might be t r a i n i n g ,  s e n i o r i t y  and c o s t s  might be r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
o r  danger.  Adams' model agrees  w ith  Homans' in t h a t  outcomes 
could be s t a t u s ,  e t c . ,  and inp u ts  could  be s e n i o r i t y ,  e t c .  
However Adams, because o f  th e  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  Q r a t i o  i s  l e s s  
c l e a r  than Homans' on e x p la in in g  c o s t s .  Costs]- as i d e n t i f i e d  
by Homans, would be Inpu ts  f o r  Adams.
^These hypotheses  are  s t a t e d  by Patchen (1961, p. 13)
as :
Hypothesis  1. Wage comparisons which are  o b j e c t i v e l y  d i s s o ­
nant  w i l l  be judged  as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  by th e  person  who 
chooses such comparisons.
Hypothesis  l a .  Men who choose "upward" wage comparisons who 
are  s i m i l a r  in  s t a t u s  (same o ccupa t iona l  l e v e l ,  same p la ce  of
work, o r  same fam ily )  w i l l  more o f te n  be d i s s a t i s f i e d  with
such comparisons than w i l l  men who choose upward comparisons 
of  d i f f e r e n t  s t a t u s .
Hypothesis  2. Men who a re  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  s p e c i f i c  wage com­
p a r i so n s  w i l l  e x p la in  t h e i r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  in  terms of  a conso­
nance between r e l a t i v e  wage s ta n d in g  and r e l a t i v e  s ta n d in g  on
a t t r i b u t e s  r e l a t e d  to  pay; men who are  d i s s a t i s f i e d  with 
s p e c i f i c  comparisons w i l l  exp la in  t h e i r  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  in  
terms of  a d issonance  between r e l a t i v e  wage s ta n d in g  and 
s tan d in g  on a t t r i b u t e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  pay.
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Adams' e f f o r t s  a re  o u ts ta n d in g  because of  h i s  r ep ea ted  
a t tem pts  to  make s p e c i f i c  p r e d i c t i o n s  based  on e q u i ty  th e o ry .  
For example, Adams' d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n e q u i ty  o r
would p r e d i c t  t h a t  when Person i s  r e l a t i v e l y  underpaid  o r  
overpa id  t h a t  in p u t s  o r  outcomes w i l l  vary p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  w ith  
P e r s o n 's  p e rc e iv e d  in e q u i ty .  Three of  Adams' s t u d i e s  (Adams 
and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963; and Adams and Jacobsen,  1964) 
deal  with  t e s t i n g  some aspec t  of  th e s e  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  e i t h e r  by 
measuring q u a n t i t y ,  o r  q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y ,  as in  Adams and 
Rosenbaum's (1962) and Adams' (1963a) ,  as i t  r e l a t e s  t o  pay.
In h i s  exper im en ta l  e f f o r t s  Adams con f ines  h i s  p r e d i c t i o n s  to  
th e se  v a r i a b l e s  (pay and performance) and does not a t tem pt to  
in c o rp o ra te  a l a r g e r  range of  v a r i a b l e s .  Z a lezn ik ,  e t  a l . 
(1958) and Patchen (1961) both  a t tem pt  t o  in c o rp o ra te  a 
g r e a t e r  range o f  exper im en ta l  v a r i a b l e s .
Of c o n s id e r a b le  value to  compensation p r a c t i c e s  and 
p roduc t ion  c o n t ro l  i s  t h a t  Adams has dem onstra ted  Person w i l l  
a l t e r  h i s  i n p u t s  (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963a; 
and Adams and Jacobsen,  1964) r e l a t i v e  t o  outcome. Inpu ts  fo r  
Person are  outcomes fo r  th e  b u s in e s s  (perform ance) .  This  id e a  
i s  not o r i g i n a l  w ith  Adams and i s  adm it ted ly  borrowed from 
Jaques (1961) and Homans (1951, 1953, 1961). Adams' r e se a rc h  
e f f o r t s  have a l s o  demonstrated t h a t  Person does and w i l l  
manipula te  q u a n t i t y  versus  q u a l i t y  o r  v ice  v e r sa  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  a given outcome. As in  so many i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e r e  a re ,  un­
f o r tu n a t e ly ,  two s id e s  to  t h i s  i s s u e ,  and Adams' r e s e a rc h  
views only one. All  o f  Adams' e f f o r t s  examine overpayment.
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and none d ea ls  w ith  underpayment. The only i n c id e n t  o f  under­
payment, as r e p o r t e d  by Adams, i s  a s tudy  inv o lv in g  the  f i n d ­
ings  o f  Clark ;( 1958). C l a r k ' s  s tudy ,  accord ing  to  Adams, 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  under co n d i t io n s  of  in e q u i ty  induced by p e r ­
ce ived  undercompensation, not  only was th e  q u a n t i t y  p e r f o r ­
mance of b u n d le rs  reduced but  an o v e r a l l  r e d u c t io n  of s t o r e  
p r o f i t s  r e s u l t e d .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  r e se a rc h  ev idence as t o  th e  
moderating e f f e c t s  of  underpayment on performance i s  p r e s e n t l y  
la ck in g  in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l in g  with  e q u i ty  th e o ry .  Adams' 
reason  f o r  exc lud ing  undercompensation (1965, p. 286) was t h a t  
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  overcompensation would p rov ide  a more " s t r i k ­
ing" comparison. E v id en t ly ,  a s id e  from p re v io u s  r a t i o n a l e ,  
C lark  (1958) p rov ided  ample evidence  o f  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  under­
compensation performance.  Adams' c o n te n t io n  t h a t  undercom­
p en s a t io n  w i l l  a l s o  moderate in p u t  r e c e iv e s  some suppor t  from 
Patchen (1961) as i f  a c e r t a i n  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  i s  p e r m is s ib l e .
The op in ions  of  Jaques and Patchen may be addressed .  In h i s  
work on pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  Jaques (1961b, p. 26)^ no tes  t h a t  
undercompensation r e s u l t s  in  g en e ra l  symptoms o f  d i s s a t i s f a c ­
t i o n  such as g r iev a n ce s  o r  tu rn o v e r  o r  more d i r e c t  measures 
such as p roduc t ion  r e d u c t io n .  Couched in  Adams' te rm s ,  p e r ­
ce ived  u n f a i r  pay r e s u l t s  in  reduced performance.  Whether 
t h i s  r e d u c t io n  i s  a q u a n t i t y  o r  q u a l i t y  modera t ion  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  a s c e r t a i n  and, a t  th e  r i s k  o f  seeming t r i t e ,  i s  s i t u a t i o n a l .  
The p o in t  remains,  however, t h a t  P e r s o n ' s  in p u t  w i l l  be
^This i s  accord ing  to  Adams (1965)
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moderated. Homans' framework could  p o s s ib ly  p o s t u l a t e  th e  
same r e s u l t s .  However, Homans' (1953) study of  l e d g e r  c l e r k s  
and cash p o s t e r s  d id  not t i e  pay to  performance, bu t  i n s t e a d  
focused on f e l t  in e q u i ty .  Patchen (1961) p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  
undercompensation would r e s u l t  in  g r e a t e r  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
There i s ,  however, a very r e a l  problem in  d e f in in g  what con­
s t i t u t e s  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o r  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  Study r e s u l t s  
o b ta in ed  by Patchen suppor ted  th e  p r e d i c t i o n .  P a tc h e n ' s  r e ­
sea rch  l i k e  o th e r s ,  exc lud ing  Adams, d id  not c o n s id e r  measures 
r e l a t i n g  performance and pay.
Jaques makes an i n t e r e s t i n g  s p e c u la t io n  in  r eg a rd  to  
undercompensation t h a t  has a c e r t a i n  i n t u i t i v e  appeal when he 
no tes  t h a t  underpayment e l a s t i c i t y  i s  g r e a t e r  than  overcom­
p e n s a t io n  e l a s t i c i t y .  Jaques f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  
th r e s h o l d  fo r  undercompensation i s  a c t u a l l y  q u i t e  low. In 
Adams' terms t h i s  would i n d i c a t e  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t e r  s e n s i t i v i t y  
in  the  I and 0 r a t i o  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where a p e rc e iv e d  d isadvan­
tage  e x i s t e d .  Jaques e s t im a te d  t h a t  a 10 p e rc e n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
o f  undercompensation would r e s u l t  in  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o r ,  and 
again  in  Adams' te rm s,  a p o s s i b l e  10 p e rc e n t  r e d u c t io n  in  
performance (P e r s o n ' s  i n p u t ) .  Jaques e s t im a ted  t h a t  a 10 to  
15 p e rce n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  an overcompensation pay d i f f e r e n t i a l  
would be r eq u i re d  to  induce f e e l i n g  o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .
Adams (1965, p. 283) s t a t e s  t h a t  in p u ts  may be changed 
by Person to  r e s t o r e  b a lan c e .  Outcomes such as pay, advance­
ment, e t c . ,  a re  l e s s  amenable to  change and, by n a t u r e ,  r e ­
q u i r e  a longer  and more u n c e r t a in  t imeframe. I n p u ts ,  such as
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performance,  may be a l t e r e d  w i th in  a very s h o r t  t im e-span  and 
a re  l a r g e l y  c o n t r o l l a b l e  by Person.  Adams (1965, pp. 283-296)
i d e n t i f i e s  seven methods by which Person may r e a c t  to  p e r ­
ce ived  in e q u i ty :
1. A l t e r in g  in p u t s ,
2. A l t e r in g  outcomes,
3. Cogn i t ive  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  in p u ts  and outcomes,
4. Leaving th e  f i e l d ,
5. Person a c t in g  on Other ,
6. Person r e d e f in e s  comparator O ther ,  and
7. Choice among Modes of  In eq u i ty  Reduction.
Adams' s t u d i e s  have been l im i te d  to  da te  to  s i t u a t i o n s  i n ­
volv ing  a l t e r a t i o n  of  in p u ts  by Person and more s p e c i f i c a l l y  
to  c o n d i t io n s  in  which Person was in e q u i t a b ly  overpa id .  
S ym bolica l ly ,  t h i s  i s :
Op Oa 
î 5 > î i
Therefore  p a r t  o f  th e  f i r s t  i tem in  th e  l i s t i n g  above and a l l  
remaining i tems a re  s u p p o s i t io n s .  For the  p r e s e n t ,  d i s c u s ­
s io n s  w i l l  a l so  be s u b je c t  to  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t .
Person A l te r in g  His Inpu ts  
Person w i l l  a l t e r  h i s  in p u ts  accord ing  t o  h i s  p e r ­
ce ived  r e l a t i v e  comparisons w i th  O ther .  Inpu ts  (which a re  
d esc r ib ed  h e re  as job performance) w i l l  be decreased  i f  
P e r s o n ' s  outcomes are  d isadvantageous or  in c re a s e d  i f  o u t ­
comes a re  advantageous r e l a t i v e  to  O ther .  P e r s o n ' s  in p u ts  
may be dec reased  o r  in c re a se d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  q u a n t i t y  o r
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q u a l i t y  of  perfornamce.  Experiments by Adams and Rosenbaum
(1962), Adams (1963a) and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) were 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  des igned to  t e s t  input  moderation.  Adams (1965, 
p. 284) s t a t e s  t h a t  a l l  th e s e  s tu d i e s  suppor t  t h i s  co n ten t io n .  
A s i m i l a r  f in d in g  was a l so  r e p o r te d  by Arrowood (1961).  As 
noted e a r l i e r  a l l  th e se  r e fe ren c e d  experiments  d e a l t  with 
overcom pensa tion .
I t  i s  su g g es ted  t h a t  to  f u l l y  t e s t  th e  p r e d i c t i o n s  of 
inpu t  m anipu la t ion  as based on equ i ty  theory  t h a t  experimenta­
t i o n  should  a l so  be conducted invo lv ing  undercompensation.
This p r e s e n t  s tudy  has i n t e g r a t e d  w i th in  the  r e se a rc h  design 
a p o s s i b l e  means f o r  t e s t i n g  p r e d i c t i o n s  concerning  both  over­
compensation and undercompensation.^
Person A l te r in g  His Outcomes
Person may a l t e r  outcomes somewhat l i k e  in p u t s ,  a l ­
though w ith  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  by d ec reas in g  o r  in c re a s in g  
them depending on whether Person p e r c e iv e s  th e  in e q u i ty  as 
being  advantageous o r  d isadvan tageous .  Outcomes inc lude  pay, 
promotion, s t a t u s ,  o r  whatever Person views as  having value 
f o r  meeting h i s  needs.  Outcomes l i k e  in p u ts  a re  a l s o  eva lu ­
a ted  by Person comparing h i s  outcomes t o  th e  outcomes of 
comparator Other .  In c o n t r a s t  to  in p u t s ,  however, outcomes 
a re  not under th e  d i r e c t  c o n t ro l  o f  Person;  i n s t e a d  they  are  
p rov ided  by a source  e x t e r n a l  to  Person.  In the  usua l
^For a more d e t a i l e d  d is c u s s io n  of  th e  r e se a rc h  des ign ,  
p l e a s e  r e f e r  to  Chapter  I I I .
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s i t u a t i o n  an employee 's  performance ( i . e . ,  h i s  in p u t)  p r e ­
cedes even h i s  pay (which i s  one form of  outcome fo r  h im ) ; 
and the  d e te rm in a t io n  of  most outcomes i s  ves ted  in  management 
o r  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  What a l l  t h i s  means i s  t h a t  Person as 
an in d iv id u a l^  can be assumed to  r e a l i z e  t h i s  i s  a c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  of  h i s  environment : he e x e r c i s e s  l i t t l e  d i r e c t  c o n t ro l
over  the  outcomes and, consequen t ly .  Person a d j u s t s  to  a p e r ­
ce ived  in e q u i ty  by a l t e r i n g  h i s  in p u ts  to  th e  exchange. 
There fo re ,  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  o f f e r s  l i t t l e  about how Person 
d i r e c t l y  a l t e r s  outcomes. This  i s  a l s o  an ac cu ra te  r e f l e c ­
t i o n  of th e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h i s  m a t te r .  To f u l l y  c a te g o r i z e  
outcomes i s  beyond th e  scope of  t h i s  e f f o r t .  To adequa te ly  
exp lo re  t h i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  phenomenon would invo lve  a h e r o ic  
s e t  o f  assumptions and th e  acceptance  o f  a t  l e a s t  one o f  the  
many p sy c h o lo g ica l  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  a t tem pt  to  e x p la in  human 
behav io r .  To g ive  bu t  one example. Jaques (1956, 1961, 1970) 
uses  p s y c h o a n a ly t ic a l  theo ry  as h i s  frame of r e f e r e n c e  to  
exp la in  th e  p sy c h o lo g ica l  e f f e c t  of  o v e rcompensâtion (1956, 
p .  3, 113) and undercompensation (1956, p .  29) .  I t  seems 
a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  th e  p re s e n t  t o  assume only outcome manipula­
t i o n  i s  a r e a l i s t i c  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  r e s o lv in g  c o g n i t iv e  i n ­
equ i ty  and t h a t  i t  may be used by a given in d iv id u a l  in  a 
given s i t u a t i o n .
Of course  t h i s  exc ludes  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  in h e re n t  
to  o rgan ized  la b o r  o r  o th e r  o rgan ized  means employees might 
use as a group t o  a l t e r  t h e i r  outcomes.
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Person D i s t o r t i n g  His Inpu ts  and Outcomes C o g n i t iv e ly  
Adams (1965, p. 290) no tes  t h a t  Person may use  cogni­
t i v e  m an ipu la t ion  t o  reduce in e q u i ty .  Person may use cogni­
t i v e  m an ipu la t ions  on h i s  in p u ts  o r  outcomes w ith  equal  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  A c o g n i t iv e  change of in p u t s  and outcomes has 
to  do w ith  a l t e r i n g  th e  importance o r  re le v an ce  o f  f a c t u a l  
even ts  o r  da ta .  In e f f e c t  c o g n i t iv e  m a n ip u la t io n  invo lves  
changing th e  meaning which Person a t t a c h e s  to  o b j e c t i v e  r e a l ­
i t y .  Embodied in  t h i s  i s  p e rc e p t io n  and P e r s o n ' s  o p e ra t in g  
frame of r e f e r e n c e  which in  tu rn  dete rm ines  how Person in ­
t e r n a l i z e s  c e r t a i n  happenings and a c t s  ou t  c e r t a i n  b eh av io r s .  
Adams p o in t s  out r a t h e r  c l e a r l y  t h a t  c o g n i t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  are  
not u n r e l a t e d  to  r e a l i t y ,  and, indeed,  a re  w e l l  founded in  
f a c t s .  Examples o f  " f a c t s "  would be age, ed u ca t io n ,  t r a i n i n g ,  
s a l a r y  l e v e l  and o th e r  in fo rm at io n  i tem s t h a t  can be c l e a r l y  
documented.
Evidence i s  s o r e ly  lack ing  as  t o  how and when c o g n i t iv e  
m anipu la t ion  may occur  in  any given i n d i v i d u a l .  This  p rev io u s  
s ta tem en t  i s  in  agreement with  Adams (1965) and Weick (1967). 
For th e  t ime be ing  t h i s  c o n s id e ra t i o n  w i l l  u n f o r tu n a t e l y  have 
to  remain in  th e  realm o f  s p e c u la t io n s .
Person Leaving the  F i e l d  
"Leaving t h e  f i e l d "  means t h a t  Person s e v e r s  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s  with  th e  so u rce  caus ing  in e q u i ty .  This  may take  th e  
form o f  q u i t t i n g ,  be ing  ab sen t ,  o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g .  These a re  
r a t h e r  d ram atic  means fo r  d ea l in g  w ith  in e q u i ty  bu t  a re
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commonplace in  in d u s t ry .  Like c o g n i t iv e  m an ipu la t ion  of  i n ­
p u ts  and outcomes t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  s u p p o r t iv e  in fo rm a t io n ,  as 
i t  r e l a t e s  to  e q u i ty  th e o ry ,  fo r  th e s e  means of  in e q u i ty  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  A s tudy  by Patchen (1961) observed  t h a t  absen­
tee ism  was h ig h e r  among employees who f e l t  undercompensated, 
Patchen viewed absen tee ism  as a form of  w ithdraw al .
One c o n s id e r a t i o n  which d id  not  r e c e iv e  a t t e n t i o n  by 
Adams i s  t h a t  a Person may withdraw from an o rg a n iz a t io n  in  a 
c o g n i t iv e  manner—he becomes d i s i n t e r e s t e d  ye t  remains on the  
j o b , This  person  may not involve  an Other  f o r  comparative 
purposes  and may no t  be a f f e c t e d  by eq u i ty  c o n s id e ra t i o n s  
u n le ss  they a re  extreme.
Person Acting on Other  
Person may choose as a means of  i n e q u i ty  r ed u c t io n  a 
change in  th e  Other  who i s  then used fo r  comparative p u r ­
p o s e s ,^  P a tc h e n ' s  1961 s tudy  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i r e c t e d  i t s  p ro ­
cedures  so t h a t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  Other could 
be made. The comparator Other  f o r  P a t c h e n ' s  s tudy  was o f t e n  
a member o f  an o th e r  o rg a n iz a t io n .  The s e l e c t i o n  o f  Other 
o u t s i d e  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  has r e s u l t e d  in  some c r i t i c i s m ,  
n o tab ly  by Adams (1963a) ,  Adams (1965, p. 294) p o in t s  out 
the  change of  th e  comparator Other may be a d i f f i c u l t
An i n t e r e s t i n g  s id e  i s s u e  i s  t h a t  Person may r e d e f in e  
h i s  comparator f o r  many reaso n s .  For example, when a person 
i s  promoted he u s u a l ly  adopts  a new r e f e r e n c e  group. This 
seems to  be among o th e r  th in g s  a means f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a new 
eq u i ty  comparison, which in  tu rn  may become a source  f o r  both  
p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  p e r c e p t io n s  of  i n e q u i ty .
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accomplishment.^ Adams f e e l s  t h a t  th e  longer  a comparator 
Other has been used by Person fo r  th e s e  purposes  th e  more 
d i f f i c u l t  i t  i s  to  change. A change in  the  comparator Other 
o f t e n  r e s u l t s  i n  an "extremely u n s ta b le "  (1965, p. 294) 
s i t u a t i o n  u n le s s  th e  change was accomplished by a change in  
P e r s o n ' s  p e r c e p t io n .  There i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h i s  specu­
l a t i o n  i s  no t  c a r r i e d  f a r  enough f o r  two reasons .  F i r s t ,  i t  
ap p a ren t ly  assumes t h e r e  i s  a s i n g u l a r  comparator O ther ,  
w h i le ,  in  a c t u a l i t y ,  t h e r e  may be s e v e r a l  o r  many comparator 
Others w i th in  and w ithout  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n  as Patchen (1961) 
su g g e s t s .  I f  t h i s  were t r u e  then  th e  p rocess  o f  convers ion  
of  th e  comparator Other may not have such a p o t e n t i a l l y  un­
s e t t l i n g  c h a r a c t e r .  Second, in  a c u l t u r a l  environment t h a t  
v a l i d a t e s  a s p i r a t i o n s  " to  ge t  ahead" com peti t ion  would then  
seem to  n e c e s s i t a t e  co n s tan t  change in  a comparator Other.  
E i t h e r  Person or  Other w i l l  always be changing. The p o in t  
be ing ,  Adams' s u p p o s i t io n  seems to  be s e t  in  a s t a t i c  r a t h e r  
than  a dynamic co n tex t .
Choice Among Modes o f  In eq u i ty  Reduction 
Adams (1965, p. 295) uses  cho ices  of  modes f o r  two 
purposes :  f i r s t  to  summarize a l l  th e  p r e v io u s ly  d is c u s se d
means f o r  in e q u i ty  r e d u c t io n ,  and second to  i d e n t i f y  p ro p o s i ­
t i o n s  about c o n d i t io n s  t h a t  de termine P e r s o n ' s  choice  of  
modes n o t in g  t h a t  they  a re  seldom independent .  As th e s e  a re
^ I t  shou ld  be noted t h a t  Adams i s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  an ex­
change r e l a t i o n s h i p  where a t h i r d  p a r ty  such as management i s  
invo lved  and i s  more complex than  a s im ple  o ne - to -one  exchange.
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g u id e l in e s  fo r  p r e d i c t i o n  and a re  r e l e v a n t  to  a l l  of  Adams' 
(1965, pp. 295-296) work they a re  quoted  in  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y :
(a)  Person w i l l  maximize p o s i t i v e l y  v a le n t  o u t ­
comes and th e  valence  o f  outcomes.
(b) He w i l l  minimize in c r e a s in g  in p u ts  t h a t  a re  
e f f o r t f u l  and c o s t ly  to  change.
(c)  He w i l l  r e s i s t  r e a l  and c o g n i t iv e  changes in  
in p u ts  t h a t  a re  c e n t r a l  to  h i s  s e l f - c o n c e p t  and to  h i s  
s e l f - e s t e e m .  To th e  e x te n t  t h a t  any of  P e r s o n 's  o u t ­
comes a re  r e l a t e d  t o  h i s  s e l f - c o n c e p t  and to  h i s  s e l f ­
esteem, t h i s  p r o p o s i t io n  i s  extended to  cover h i s  o u t ­
comes .
(d) He w i l l  be more r e s i s t a n t  t o  changing cogni­
t i o n s  about h i s  own outcomes and in p u ts  than  to  
changing h i s  c o g n i t io n s  about O th e r ' s  outcomes and 
i n p u t s ,
(e )  Leaving th e  f i e l d  w i l l  be r e s o r t e d  t o  only 
when the  magnitude o f  in e q u i ty  exper ienced  i s  h igh 
and o th e r  means o f  reducing  i t  a re  u n a v a i la b le .  P a r ­
t i a l  w ithdraw al ,  such as absen tee ism ,  w i l l  occur  more 
f r e q u e n t ly  and under co n d i t io n s  of  lower in e q u i ty .
( f )  Person w i l l  be highly, r e s i s t a n t  to  changing 
th e  o b je c t  o f  h i s  comparisons. O ther ,  once i t  has 
s t a b i l i z e d  over  t im e, and in  e f f e c t ,  has become an 
anchor.
These p r o p o s i t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t  a c o n s id e ra b le  range of  p o t e n t i a l  
in f lu e n c e s  on b ehav io r .  S o c ia l ,  p sy c h o lo g ic a l ,  and economic 
beh av io r  (assuming they can be e f f e c t i v e l y  se p a ra te d )  a re  
e v id e n t .  Aside from p o in t in g  out  f u t u r e  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  r e ­
se a rc h ,  Adams' p r o p o s i t i o n s  may p rov ide  a degree of under­
s ta n d in g  as to  why h i s  theory  i s  p la c e d  in  a r e l a t i v e l y  
a b s t r a c t  in p u t  and o u tpu t  model.
Adams' conc lus ions  to  h i s  1965 a r t i c l e ,  which a re  
taken as h i s  conc lus ions  fo r  a l l  r e s e a r c h  on eq u i ty  theory  
as t h i s  i s  h i s  l a s t  p u b l ish ed  s tu d y ,  summarized s u c c in c t ly :  
i n j u s t i c e  u n d e r l i e s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  cases  of d i s ­
s a t i s f a c t i o n  and poor performance. Adams' conc lus ions  add 
to  th e  evidence su p p o r t in g  a need f o r  g r e a t e r  unders tand ing
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of  eq u i ty  compiled e a r l i e r  by Jaques ,  Homans, Patchen,
Thibant and o th e r s .
Summarizing t h i s  s e c t io n ,  s e v e r a l  s a l i e n t  p o in t s  con­
cern ing  Adams' c o n t r ib u t io n s  are  e v id e n t .  Equity theo ry  i s  
a s o c i a l  p sy c h o lo g ica l  theo ry  t h a t  invo lves  a Person,  who i s  
the  focus o f  i n t e r e s t  in  Adams' e q u i ty  r e se a rc h ,  th e  compara­
t o r  Other who i s  used by Person in  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a s ta n d a rd  o f  
f a i r n e s s ,  and c o g n i t iv e  p ro ces ses  o f  Person th a t  a re  symbol­
iz e d  by Adams in  h i s  input  and outcome r a t i o .  P e r s o n 's  cogn i­
t i v e  p ro c e s se s  a re  always seen e x e r t i n g  energy to  m a in ta in  or  
r e s t o r e  a s t a t e  o f  eq u i l ib r iu m .  When P e r s o n ' s  inp u ts  and 
outcomes a re  in  ba lance  then  eq u i ty  i s  p e rce iv ed  to  e x i s t  by 
Person.  Imbalance can come about when th e  r a t i o  of  P e r s o n ' s  
in p u ts  and outcomes i s  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  th an  the  input-outcome 
r a t i o  of  O ther .  Inpu ts  of Person may be performance, l o y a l t y ,  
g e t t i n g  to  work on time, e t c . ,  and u s u a l ly  a r e  not c o n t r o l l e d  
by th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  Person i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  in  terms of th e  
exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p .  This p r e s e n t  s tu d y ,  fo l low ing  th e  
l e a d  of  Adams and o th e r s ,  uses  performance as the  in p u t  v a r i ­
ab le  and pay as th e  p r i n c i p a l  outcome v a r i a b l e  fo r  Person.
Most of  t h i s  s e c t io n  has been a p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  how Adams 
went about t e s t i n g  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th in  the  framework o f  
e q u i ty  theo ry  and a summarization o f  the  r e s u l t s  he o b ta in ed .  
The next s e c t io n  co n ta in s  d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  th e  approaches which 
r e s e a r c h e r s  o th e r  than  Adams have used to  examine th e  pay and 
performance r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th in  th e  eq u i ty  theory  framework. 
The s e c t io n  beg ins  w ith  a review o f  works by Jaques,  Homans
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and Patchen which preceded  Adams' r e s e a r c h .  The main t h r u s t  
of each man's  r e s e a r c h  w i l l  be d e s c r ib ed  fo l lowed by some 
comments r e l a t i n g  h i s  work to  t h a t  o f  o th e r s .  Then a number 
of  more contemporary r e p o r t s  w i l l  be reviewed in  which a c tu a l  
experiments were conducted to  examine some element o f  eq u i ty  
theo ry .
S ec t ion  2: Review of  Em pir ica l  L i t e r a t u r e
Jaques
Jaques '  major work appears t o  be E q u i ta b le  Payment 
(1961),  and a long  w ith  h i s  o th e r  works, covers  a comprehensive 
spectrum of  c o n s id e r in g  a s p e c i f i c  type  o f  work t a s k  fo r  a 
given employee and h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  s o c i e t y .  Space l i m i t a ­
t i o n s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  be conf ined  to  Jaques '  con­
cerns  of  t h i s  s tu d y .  Jaques p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  every employee 
has an i n t u i t i v e  " c a p a c i ty  f o r  d i s c r i m in a t in g  ex pend i tu re"  
(1961, p .  18).  This  i s  Jaques '  way o f  d e s c r ib in g  Adams' i n ­
put to  outcome r a t i o .  Furthermore t h i s  c a p a c i ty  i s  r e l a t e d  
to  th e  i n d iv i d u a l  em ployee 's  a b i l i t y  to  hand le  th e  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  of  th e  work as s ig n ed .  F u l f i l lm e n t  of t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l ­
i t y  y i e l d s  a dynamic p sy ch o lo g ica l  e q u i l ib r iu m  i f  th e  economic 
f a c t o r  i s  r e a l i z e d .  Level o f  pay in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  employee 's  
cap ac i ty  and to  o th e r  work v a r i a b l e s  forms th e  psychoeconomic 
e q u i l ib r iu m  l i n k  between th e  i n d iv i d u a l  and th e  o r g a n iz a t io n .  
Jaques '  " f e l t - f a i r  pay" appears  to  r e f e r  to  an i d e n t i f i a b l e  
pay l e v e l  t h a t  i s  co n s id e red  by an i n d iv i d u a l  employee f o r  a 
given work t a s k .  I t  i s  n o ta b le  t h a t  the id e a  o f  f a i r  pay, as
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p e rc e iv e d  by t h e  i n d iv i d u a l  employee, i s  an expansive  concept 
accord ing  to  Jaques .  F a i r  pay i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  th e  number o f  
i n p u t s  from w i th in  th e  i n d iv i d u a l ,  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  and from 
t h e  s o c i e t y . ^
Jaques (1961) examines th e  id e a  o f  s p e c i f y in g  i n d iv i d ­
u a l  c a r e e r  pay curves through what he terms th e  " s t a n d a rd  pay­
ment and p ro g re s s io n  method." Analyzing pay h i s t o r i e s  o f  250 
male workers Jaques d e f in e s  a group of  n e g a t iv e ly  a c c e l e r a t e d  
pay curves between th e  ages of  twenty and s i x t y - f i v e .  As 
p l o t t e d  by Jaques th e  curves r i s e  r a p id ly  in  t h e  younger age 
ranges and slow down a t  o ld e r  ages. The pay curves  do show a 
g r e a t e r  r a t e  of  p ro g re s s io n  a t  h ig h e r  ea rn in g  l e v e l s .  A f te r  
smoothing th e  cu rves ,  which Jaques c a l l s  s t a n d a r d  e a rn in g s  
p r o g re s s io n s ,  th e  curves follow " th e  s igm oida l  p ro g re s s io n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  b i o l o g i c a l  growth" (1961, p. 185). This 
smoothed curve then  p rov ided  Jaques w ith  a b a s i s  f o r  h i s  pay­
ment th e o ry .  Jaques b e l i e v e s  h i s  s t a n d a r d  e a rn in g s  p ro g re s ­
s ion  r e p r e s e n te d  a c lo se  approximation to  th e  l i n e s  o f  growth 
of  " t im e-span  o f  d i s c r e t i o n "  in  i n d i v i d u a l  employees. B r i e f l y  
d e f in e d  th e  t im e-span  of  d i s c r e t i o n  i s  t h e  maximum p e r io d  of  
t ime during  which the  work as s ig n ed  by th e  s u p e r i o r  r e q u i r e s  
judgment in  h i s  job w ithou t  th e s e  a c t io n s  be ing  s u b je c t  t o  
th e  manager 's  review. This became, f o r  Jaques ,  a y a r d s t i c k  
fo r  comparison between job l e v e l s .  The re le v an ce  of  t h i s  to
J a q u e s ' f a i r  pay d e r i v a t i o n  does no t  focus on th e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c o g n i t iv e  m an ipu la t ions  ( i n  th e  n a t u r e  o f  r a t i o s )  
and th e  comparator Other  as does Adams.
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e q u i ty  theory  was t h a t  jobs  with  d i f f e r e n t  c o n te n t s ,  bu t  with 
the  same t im e-span  o f  d i s c r e t i o n ,  were p e rc e iv ed  by th e  
employee to  be e q u i t a b l e  r e l a t i v e  to  performance and pay. 
J aques '  assumption t h a t  in d iv id u a l  employees seek e q u i ty  of 
pay and performance w i l l  have a pay curve as determined by:
(a )  measuring th e  employee 's  p r e s e n t  t im e-span  of  d i s c r e t i o n  
and th e  e q u i t a b l e  pay fo r  t h a t  t im e-span ;  (b) p l o t t i n g  h i s ­
t o r i c a l  pay f o r  th e  employee; (c)  hav ing  management a s se s s  
employee performance; and, (d) management b r in g in g  pay and 
performance i n t o  e q u a l i t y .
Jaques '  e f f o r t s  have s t im u la te d  bo th  p s y c h o lo g i s t s  and 
compensation t h e o r i s t s ^  as w e l l  as Adams. Jaques '  e f f o r t s  
have been viewed as su p p o r t iv e  of  r e s e a r c h  on work s a t i s f a c t i o n  
and on c o g n i t i v e  d issonance  approaches t o  pay and performance. 
Jaques appears  to  be in agreement w i th  e q u i ty  thought in  t h a t  
a ba lan ce  o f  pay and performance a re  a l e g i t i m a t e  concern; 
however, t h i s  i s  a tenuous connect ion  as Ja q u es '  o r i e n t a t i o n  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  he g ive  more a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  id ea  o f  work i t ­
s e l f .  Jaques sees  work as p ro v id in g  a fundamental frame of  
r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  i n d iv i d u a l  and i t  i s  th e  work i t s e l f  t h a t  
i s  o f  th e  e s sen ce .  This p la ce s  bo th  pay and performance,  
which a re  pr imary  concerns fo r  Adams, in  a secondary p o s i t i o n .
No r e s e a r c h e r  can deny the  importance work may have 
bu t  i t s  meanings a re  not only d i f f i c u l t  to  a s s e s s  but  a re  
a l s o  h ig h ly  v a r i a b l e  w i th in  any given p o p u la t io n .
^See Weick (1966, p. 233), Smith (1964, p. 330-332) 
and B e lche r  (1965, p .  177, 233),  f o r  examples.
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I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  e v a lu a te  Jaques '  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  
p re se n t  eq u i ty  theo ry  as h i s  e f f o r t s  a re  q u i t e  unique.  Of 
s p e c i a l  va lue  i s  h i s  use of h i s t o r i c a l  da ta  f o r  determining  
f u tu r e  pay; bu t  o v e r a l l  h i s  theory  appears to  have marginal 
c a p a b i l i t y  in  de termining  a p o s s i b l e  connection  between pay 
and performance w ith  r e s p e c t  to  q u a n t i t a t i v e  measures.
Homans
Homans (1953) c a r r i e d  out a s tudy t o  determine the  
impact o f  s o c i a l  i n j u s t i c e  on worker d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and the  
r e s u l t s  were l a t e r  am p l i f ied  in  Homans' 1961 p u b l i c a t i o n .  
Homans (1953) concludes t h a t  a p e r s o n ' s  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  
determined by th e  r e s u l t s  o f  a p e r s o n ' s  como^rison o f  h i s  
in p u ts  and h i s  outcomes. The main p o in t s  o f  Homans' concept 
can be c a s t  in  Adams' (1965) te rm inology ,  as fo l low s:  the
p e rce iv ed  e q u i ty  o f  a p e r s o n ' s  pay i s  determined by the  
ba lance  o f  th e  in p u t  and outcome r a t i o ;  e q u i ty  in f lu e n c e s  th e  
w o rk e r 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and t h i s ,  in  t u r n ,  i s  r e f l e c t e d  back 
in t o  in p u ts  and outcomes. The c r u c i a l  element i s  th e  r e s u l t ­
ing  inpu t  and outcome r a t i o ;  and i t  i s  the  element most d i f f i ­
c u l t  to  a s s e s s  because i t  i s  a co g n i t iv e  ex p e r ien ce .
Homans' s tudy  invo lved  a number of  c l e r i c a l  workers 
who were p a id  th e  same pay s c a l e  bu t  who performed d i f f e r e n t  
t a s k s .  The ta sk s  were d e s c r ib e d  as cash p o s t e r s  and ledger  
c l e r k s .  Cash p o s t e r s  made e n t r i e s  o f  p a id  b i l l s  on customer 
account ca rds .  The cash p o s t in g  work was r a t h e r  monotonous 
and was cons ide red  to  be a p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  h o ld ing  th e  l e d g e r
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c le rk  p o s i t i o n .  Ledger c l e rk s  reco rded  address  changes, 
recorded  under and over payments (from cus tom ers) ,  and i n t e r ­
ac ted  w ith  o th e r  employees and customers on a r o u t in e  b a s i s .  
Ledger c l e r k s  h e ld  a h ig h e r  s t a t u s  than  cash p o s t e r s .  Inpu ts  
f o r  Person was s e n i o r i t y  and h ig h e r  s k i l l .  Homans concluded 
t h a t  approximate ly  75 p e rcen t  o f  th e  le d g e r  c l e r k s  f e l t  the  
s i t u a t i o n  was u n ju s t  and they shou ld  r e c e iv e  more pay. Im­
p l i c i t  in  Homans' conc lus ions  was t h a t  Person were le d g e r  
c l e r k s ,  w h i le  Other were cash p o s t e r s .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  
no te  t h e r e  was no reco rd in g  o f  how th e  cash p o s t e r s  f e l t  as 
equ i ty  theo ry  would p r e d i c t  t h a t  i n e q u a l i t y  would e x i s t  fo r  
both groups.
There a re  a number of  sm a l l  bu t  r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between Homans, Jaques and Adams t h a t  seem to  r e q u i r e  e l a b o ra ­
t i o n .  Homans’ approach to  i n e q u i ty  d i f f e r s  from Jaq u es '  in  
two s i g n i f i c a n t  ways: Homans has a comprehensive framework
of  d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e ,  and Homans b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Person i s  
consc ious ly  aware of  in e q u i ty .  Schem atica l ly  Homans' (1961) 
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  i s :
Person A 's  rewards minus A 's  c o s t s  _
A's  investm ents
Person B 's  rewards minus B ' s  c o s t s  
B ' s  investments
I f  th e  two r a t i o s  are  not  equa l ,  then  th e  person  who i s  d i s a d ­
vantaged may f e e l  anger o r  some o th e r  d e fens ive  mood, w hile  
th e  person who i s  advantaged may f e e l  g u i l t y  o r  some o th e r  
emotion. Homans did s p e c u la te  t h a t  a h ig h e r  t h r e s h o l d  ( h i s  
upward e l a s t i c i t y )  e x i s t e d  f o r  f e e l i n g s  of  g u i l t  as compared
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to  anger.  This p o s i t i o n  i s  suppor ted  by both  Jaques  and 
Adams. The second d i f f e r e n c e  between Jaques  and Homans a r i s e s  
from Ja q u es '  p sy c h o a n a ly t ic  o r i e n t a t i o n .  Jaques (1961) says 
f e e l i n g s  o f  i n e q u i ty  a re  f e l t ,  o r  a r e  unconsc ious ,  while  
Homans (1961) b e l i e v e s  he has dem onstra ted  a conscious aware­
ness of  i n e q u i t y .  Adams (1965) and Homans a re  in  agreement 
on t h i s  m a t te r .
There a r e  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between Homans' 
" D i s t r i b u t i v e  J u s t i c e "  and Adams' e q u i ty  th eo ry  o th e r  than  
Homans t a k e s  a comprehensive t h e o r e t i c a l  view. Although not  
as e x t e n s iv e ,  Homans' r e se a rc h  g e n e ra l ly  has th e  same o r i e n t a ­
t i o n  as Adams' e f f o r t s .  Homans views th e  c o g n i t iv e  i n t e r ­
a c t io n  as an in p u t  and outcome r a t i o ,  which has a s o c i a l  
p sy c h o lo g ic a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  a comparator Other  
and sees  rewards as coming from a t h i r d  p a r t y .
Perhaps a concluding  comment on th e  work of  Homans, 
Jaques and Adams should  r e i t e r a t e  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  
t h e i r  th e o ry  and t h e i r  conc lus ions  a re  minimal. Each i s  
a t te m p t in g  to  p rov ide  a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  r e c o n c i l i n g  pay and 
performance so as  to  enhance i n d u s t r i a l  f a i r n e s s .  Each f u l l y  
r e a l i z e s  he i s  d e a l in g  w i th  an a b s t r a c t  s o c i a l  concept c a l l e d  
f a i r n e s s ,  j u s t i c e  o r  e q u i ty  and each i s  a t te m p t in g  to  employ 
a (somewhat d i f f e r e n t )  methodology t o  make more co n c re te  th e  
e l u s iv e  i d e a l  o f  "w h a t 's  r i g h t . "  A review o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
approaches p ro v id es  s u b s t a n t i a l  te s t im ony  to  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  reduc ing  a s o c i a l  phenomenon to  an i d e n t i f i a b l e  and t r e a t ­
ab le  c h a r a c t e r .
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Clark
J .  V. C l a r k ' s  1958 study i s ,  as no ted  by P r i t c h a r d  
(1969),  a c c e s s i b l e  only through Adams (1965) and i s  t h e r e f o r e  
l im i t e d  to  what Adams r e p o r te d .  C l a r k ' s  s tudy  c o n s i s t e d  of  
two groups of  employees in  a grocery s t o r e  who performed 
checking and bund l ing  a c t i v i t i e s .  The checker  had h ig h e r  
s t a t u s ,  was b e t t e r  p a id ,  and was u s u a l ly  o ld e r  than  b u n d le rs .  
Clark i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  p sy c h o lo g ic a l ly  th e  b u n d le rs  were working 
f o r  th e  checkers .  I t  i s  assumed from t h e  in fo rm at io n  o f f e re d  
t h i s  was a commonly sha red  view h e ld  by bo th  b u n d le rs  and 
checkers .  Equity  problems would a r i s e  when th e  s t a t u s  system 
of  t h e  checker  and bund le r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was d i s tu rb e d .  For 
example a c o l l e g e  boy who was employed p a r t - t i m e  as a bund le r  
was p laced  in  a s i t u a t i o n  with  a younger bu t  f u l l - t i m e  checker.  
In e q u i ty  terms t h i s  means t h a t  th e  c o l le g e  boy bund le r  viewed 
h i s  in p u ts  as be ing  g r e a t e r  and outcomes l e s s  than  the  younger, 
l e s s  educated  checker .  Of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h a t  C l a r k ' s  
s tudy  i d e n t i f i e d  s t o r e  management as be ing  invo lved  in  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  checker  and b u n d le r .  Bundlers who 
p e rce iv ed  an in e q u i ty  reduced t h e i r  in p u ts  by slowing down 
p roduc t ion ;  t h i s  was an o v e r t  e f f o r t  to  r e s t o r e  b a lance  be­
tween inp u ts  and outcome which invo lved  management and bun­
d l e r s  but excluded th e  checker  who was th e  comparator Other 
(Adams' te rm s) .  While Clark  c o l l e c t e d  h i s  d a t a  by in te rv ie w ,  
l i k e  Homans (1953),  he a l s o  inc luded  a measure o r  o rg a n iz a ­
t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  in  t h a t  when no o r  l i t t l e  in e q u i ty  ex­
i s t e d  between checkers  and bund le rs  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  a given
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s t o r e ,  t h a t  s t o r e  m a in ta ined  a h ig h e r  average of  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
and p r o f i t  p r o f i l e .
Patchen
P atC hen 's  (1961) work was e x p l i c i t l y  des igned to  t e s t  
c e r t a i n  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  co g n i t iv e  d issonance  theo ry .
Patchen d e a l t  w i th  overpayment only t o  a small  degree and, 
l i k e  Clark  (1958),  focused most of h i s  e f f o r t s  on undercom­
p e n s a t io n .  Pa tchen ,  l i k e  Homans (1961),  p r e s e n t s  a framework 
f o r  s t r u c t u r i n g  r a t i o  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Patchen (1961, p. 14) 
p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  e q u i ty  i s  achieved when t h e  fo l low ing  two 
r a t i o s  a r e  in  b a lance :
My p o s i t i o n  on dimensions
My Pay    r e l a t e d  t o  pay______
His ( t h e i r )  Pay compared to  g ig  ( t h e i r )  p o s i t i o n  on
dimensions r e l a t e d  to  pay
As P a t c h e n ' s  s p e c i f i c  emphasis i s  on pay, as i s  Adams', h i s  
r a t i o  i s  worded d i f f e r e n t l y  than Homans'. R e la t iv e  to  Homans',
O
P a tc h e n ' s  r a t i o  i s  r e s t r u c t u r e d  bu t  th e  e f f e c t s  a re  th e  same, 
and n e i t h e r  c o n f ig u r a t io n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from Adams'. A unique 
a s p ec t  o f  Pa tC hen 's  paradigm i s  t h a t  h i s  approach in v o lv es  a 
concept o f  p o t e n t i a l ,  o r  f u t u r e ,  p e rc e iv e d  e q u i t a b l e  payment.^ 
They may be dem onstra ted  as:
My f u tu r e  p o s i t i o n s  on 
pay now on dimensions r e l a t e d  t o  pay
^In a d d i t io n  to  i t s  obvious resemblance to  expectancy 
m o t iv a t io n a l  th e o ry ,  P a tc h e n 's  approach has a d i s t a n t
5 8
P a tc h e n ' s  d a ta  for  s u b s t a n t i a t i n g  h i s  theory  were g a the red  
by in te rv ie w in g  employees in  a Canadian o i l  r e f i n e r y .  S k i l l e d  
and u n s k i l l e d  employees were asked to  name two persons  e i t h e r  
i n s i d e  o r  o u t s i d e  the  f i rm  whose ea rn ings  were d i f f e r e n t  from 
t h e i r s .  P a tc h e n ' s  r e s u l t s  g e n e ra l ly  show t h a t  th e  c l o s e r  th e  
s t a t u s  o f  th e  Person and Other and th e  g r e a t e r  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  
in  pay th e  g r e a t e r  i s  th e  p e rce iv ed  In e q u i ty .  This  i s  c o n s i s ­
t e n t  w ith  W eick 's  (1966) f in d in g s .  I t  does n o t ,  however, i n ­
d i c a t e  how th e  Person changes h i s  in p u t s  in  o r d e r  to  r e s t o r e  
congruence in  h i s  "system" but merely i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  d i s s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  e x i s t s .  This appears  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  c o g n i t iv e  
d issonance  th eo ry ,  and a l s o  g e n e ra l ly  su p p o r ts  a p r o p o s i t io n  
con ta ined  in  both  Adams' and Homans' eq u i ty  th e o ry .
Lawler and O 'Gara
Lawler and O'Gara (1967) i n v e s t i g a t e d  underpayment on 
the  b a s i s  of eq u i ty  th e o ry .  This s tudy  focused on d i s c r i m i ­
n a t in g  between measures o f  performance in  terms of q u a n t i ty  
and q u a l i t y  and on mechanisms of  in e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n .  Of 
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h i s  p r e s e n t  r e s e a r c h  i s  th e  use o f  sepa­
r a t e  measures f o r  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y .  Equity  theo ry  would 
p r e d i c t  in  a p e rce iv ed  s i t u a t i o n  of underpayment t h a t  Person 
would produce more q u a n t i ty  bu t  of a l e s s e r  q u a l i t y .  Lawler 
and O 'G a ra ' s r e s u l t s  su ppo r ted  t h i s  c o n te n t io n .  Lawler and 
O 'Gara a l so  a t tem pted  to  dem onstra te  t h a t  c e r t a i n  job
resemblance t o  F riedm an 's  Permanent Income H ypothes is .  Al­
though P a tc h e n ' s  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  o f  the  f u tu r e  may add e l e ­
gance to  h i s  fo rm ula t ion  i t  a l s o  adds y e t  an o th e r  s e t  of 
confounding v a r i a b l e s .
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  impacted on p e rce iv e d  in e q u i ty .  Conclusions 
r e s u l t i n g  from t h i s  e f f o r t  were mixed p r i n c i p a l l y  because a 
d i s s i m i l a r i t y  between in p u ts  and outcomes could not be d e t e r ­
mined. The problem, according  to  Lawler and O 'Gara, i s  t h a t  
equ i ty  theo ry  i s  appa ren t ly  unable to  p r e d i c t  a p r i o r i  whether 
a job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  an inpu t  o r  outcome. Simple-minded as 
i t  might seem, th e  ex p lan a t io n  may be t h a t  in the  eyes of  th e  
beho lder  Person d e f in e s  h i s  own unique con ten ts  f o r  inpu t  and 
outcome modes. This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  does not p r e s e n t l y  appear 
to  d e t r a c t  from equ i ty  theory  fu n c t io n in g  as a framework f o r  
compensation r e se a rc h .
Although each of  th e  p reced ing  s t u d i e s  has a b a s i s  in  
r e se a rc h  they a l s o  con ta in  l a r g e  elements of  theory  and p h i l o ­
so p h ic a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s ,  th e  fo l low ing  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  eq u i ty  
thought  r e p r e s e n t  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  approaches.  These 
approaches may be d iv ided  i n to  two groups: one group o f  r e ­
s e a r c h e r s  who have ev a lu a ted  e q u i ty  th eo ry ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  
th o se  p r e d i c t i o n s  made by Adams, through a d d i t i o n a l  e x p e r i ­
m enta t ion  c o n s i s t s  of  Weick (1967),  Lawler and O 'Gara (1967),  
Andrews (1967),  Goodman (1967),  Lawler, Koplin, Young and 
Fadem (1968),  Goodman and Friedman (1968) and o th e r s ;  the  
o th e r  group in c lu d es  Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) and P r i t c h a r d  
(1969) who have reviewed th e  r e se a rc h  of  o th e r s  w i thou t  add i­
t i o n a l  o r i g i n a l  exp e r im en ta t io n .  In the  ensuing  d i s c u s s io n s  
the  members o f  th e s e  r e s p e c t iv e  groups,  indeed i f  th e  f o r e ­
going reasons  a re  adequate f o r  group assignment,  w i l l  be 
d isc u sse d  on a ch ro n o lo g ica l  b a s i s .
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Although Lawler has made s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  
the  development o f  e q u i ty  theo ry  two of  h i s  e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s ^  
w i l l  be summarized only b r i e f l y .  The main emphasis he re  w i l l  
be p laced  in  L a w le r ' s  1968 a r t i c l e  where he c o n t r a s t s  eq u i ty  
and expectancy t h e o r i e s  and p r e s e n t s  h i s  conc lus ions  r e g a r d ­
ing th e  p r e d i c t i v e  va lue  of  eq u i ty  th e o ry .
The Lawler £ t  (1968) s tudy  d id  no t  m anipula te  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i n s t r u c t i o n s  so as to  avoid  th e  s e l f - e s t e e m  
problem s a id  to  e x i s t  fo r  th e  Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and 
Adams and Jacobsen (1964) studies.^ Lawler and O 'G a ra 's  1967 
s tudy c o n s i s t e d  o f  t a k in g  measures on work performance,  a t t i ­
tude and p e r s o n a l i t y  f o r  a l l  s u b j e c t s .  This  s tudy focused  on 
p ie ce  r a t e  and a l s o  in c o rp o ra te d  an underpayment c o n d i t io n  f o r  
pay.
The r e s u l t s  g e n e ra l ly  suppor ted  in e q u i ty  th e o ry .  Law­
l e r  and O'Gara a l so  i d e n t i f i e d  d i f f e r i n g  modes of  in e q u i ty  
red u c t io n  among th e  exper im en ta l  Ss. G enera l ly  they found 
t h a t  Ss with  h igh  p o ise  and s e l f - a s s u r a n c e  ten d  to  be low 
producers  and th o s e  Ss with  high m a tu r i ty  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
s c a l e s  tend  to  produce h ig h e r  q u a l i t y .
The Lawler,  Koplin,  Young and Fadem (1968) s tudy  i s  
unique in t h a t  i t  compared eq u i ty  to  expectancy th eo ry .
L i t t l e  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  here  o th e r  than  to  s t a t e  th e  p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  they  made on th e  b a s i s  o f  e q u i ty  and how w e l l  th e se
^The Lawler and O 'Gara (1967) and th e  Lawler,  Koplin,  
Young and Fadem (1968) s t u d i e s  w i l l  be b r i e f l y  summarized w ith  
a s p e c i a l  emphasis  on t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  unique c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
2 lb id .
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p r e d i c t i o n s  s to o d  up to  p r e d i c t i o n s  made on th e  b a s i s  o f  
expectancy th e o ry .  L aw le r 's  ^  (1968) experiment d iv id ed
n in e ty  s u b j e c t s  i n t o  two groups:  an o v e rp a id  group and an
e q u i t a b ly  p a id  group. According to  Lawler e t  aJ .  (1968),  
eq u i ty  th eo ry  would p r e d i c t  th o se  Ss who p e rc e iv e d  themselves 
as o v e rp a id  would dec rease  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and i n c r e a s e  q u a l i t y ;  
t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  was suppor ted  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  o f  th e  th r e e  
t r i a l s .  Expectancy theo ry  would p r e d i c t  t h a t  Ss would behave 
in  such a way as t o  maximize t h e i r  long range ga ins  ; ^ t h i s  
p r e d i c t i o n  was suppo r ted  f o r  t h e  t h i r d  t r i a l  on ly .  The r e ­
s u l t s  o f  th e  experiment was t h a t  e q u i ty  th e o ry  p r e d i c t i o n s  
were su p p o r ted  du r ing  th e  f i r s t  t r i a l  o f  the  t h r e e  t r i a l s ;  
expectancy th eo ry  was suppor ted  fo r  t h e  t h i r d  t r i a l  on ly .
Equity  th eo ry  p r e d i c t s  t h a t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  w i l l  dec rease  w hile  
q u a l i t y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  in  an o v e rp a id  s i t u a t i o n .  In Lawler 
e t  a l . (1968) t h a t  o ccu r red  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t r i a l  bu t  r ev e r se d  
i t s e l f  f o r  t h e  l a s t  t r i a l  r e l a t i v e  to  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Lawler 
e t  a l . (1968) c i t e s  th e s e  r e s u l t s  as suppor t  f o r  expectancy 
th e o ry .  One wonders about t h e  p o s s i b l e  impact o f  a l e a rn in g  
curve on t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  th e s e  r e s u l t s .
In a second s tudy  Lawler (1968) co n t in u es  th e  develop­
ment o f  a methodology f o r  comparing e q u i ty  and expectancy 
th e o ry .  S ix ty  c o l le g e  and n o n -co l le g e  s u b j e c t s  were h i r e d  to  
conduct in t e rv i e w s  in  t h r e e  two-hour t r i a l s .  They were d iv id e d  
i n t o  t h r e e  groups of  twenty s u b j e c t s  each: e q u i t a b ly  p a id
^A fte r  a thorough review of  th e  a r t i c l e  t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r  
i s  s t i l l  no t  c l e a r  as to  what t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  e n t a i l s .
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s u b j e c t s ,  u n q u a l i f i e d  overpa id  s u b j e c t s ,  and s u b j e c t s  over­
p a id  by c i rcum stance .  A ll  s u b je c t s  were p a id  an hourly wage 
of  $3.50. A ccord ing . to  Lawler e t  (1968) eq u i ty  theory 
would p r e d i c t  t h a t  a pe rce iv ed  overpayment would r e s u l t  in  
high q u a l i t y  and low p ro d u c t io n .  This i s  in  accordance with 
Adams' ^  aJ.  (1962) f in d in g s .  L aw le r ' s  f in d in g s  were t h a t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  were p r e s e n t  between th e  e q u i ta b ly  
p a id  and th e  u n q u a l i f i e d  group. Expectancy th e o ry ,  again  
accord ing  to  Lawler e t  (1968),  would p r e d i c t  t h a t  over­
payment in  an hou r ly  s i t u a t i o n  would not le ad  to  a h ig h e r  
q u a l i t y  o r  h ig h e r  p r o d u c t iv i t y  performance.  This p r e d i c t i o n  
was borne o u t .
Andrews' (1967) s tudy  involved n i n e t y - s i x  co l leg e  
s tu d e n t s  in  two t a s k s  a t  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  p i e c e - r a t e  l e v e l s .
The two t a s k s  were in te rv ie w in g  o th e r  s t u d e n t s ,  cons idered  by 
Andrews as  th e  i n t e r e s t i n g  t a s k ,  and checking d a ta  s h e e ts  
which was co n s id e red  th e  d u l l  t a s k .  The t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s  
t e s t e d  in  t h i s  experiment were t a s k  i n t e r e s t i n g n e s s ,  the  
e f f e c t  o f  p a s t  pay l e v e l  and d i f f e r e n t  p i e c e - r a t e  pay l e v e l s .  
Based p r i n c i p a l l y  on th e  f in d in g s  o f  Adams' p re v io u s  works 
(1962, 1963a, 1964) Andrews' r e se a rc h  found t h a t  e q u i ty  p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  were suppor ted  r e l a t i v e  to  underpa id  Ss who m ain ta ined  
eq u i ty  by in c r e a s in g  work q u a n t i ty  a t  the  expense of  q u a l i t y ,  
and overpa id  Ss who m ain ta ined  eq u i ty  by reduc ing  q u a n t i ty  and 
i n c r e a s in g  work q u a l i t y .  Andrews a l so  s u b s t a n t i a t e d ,  somewhat 
m arg ina l ly  however, t h a t  p a s t  pay ex p e r ien ce  a f f e c t e d  th e  
p re s e n t  meaning o f  pay. The hy p o th e s is  about t a s k  d i f f e r e n c e s
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a f f e c t i n g  eq u i ty  was not suppor ted  by the  d a ta .  This  l a s t  
f in d in g  seems to  deserve some e l a b o r a t io n .  Keeping in  mind 
t h a t  Weick (1964) f e l t  on th e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  
eq u i ty  p r e d i c t i o n s  about t a s k  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  a re  d i f f i c u l t  to  
make then p o s s ib ly  Andrews' (1967) f in d in g s  a re  no t  as nega­
t i v e  as they seem. P r i t c h a r d  (1969) tak es  a s i m i l a r  view. 
Based on Adams (1965) one could  a l s o  s p e c u la te  t h a t  th e  Ss 
s e l e c t e d  ano the r  mode of in e q u i ty  r e d u c t io n .  This p o s i t i o n  
seems f e a s i b l e  a l though i t  would au to m a t ica l ly  p o in t  out  a 
p o s s i b l e  problem in  Andrews' (1967) r e sea rch  des ign .
P r i t c h a r d  (1969) f e e l s  th e  most s a l i e n t  f in d in g  of 
Andrews' (1967) s tudy i s  t h a t  underpaid  p i e c e - r a t e  employees 
do produce more than  normal o r  ov e rp a id  p i e c e - r a t e  workers .  
Because o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  problems (accord ing  to  P r i t c h a r d  (1969, 
p .  194) Andrews used a m u l t ip le  t  t e s t  i n s t e a d  of  an a n a ly s i s  
of  v a r ia n c e )  th e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  p a s t  wage impact on p r e s e n t  pay 
was not s u b s t a n t i a t e d .  In r ega rd  t o  overpayment i t  appears 
t h a t  i t  was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than  underpay. I t  
should  be added t h a t  underpay q u a n t i t y  p roduc t ion  was s i g n i f i ­
c a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  than normal o r  overpa id  p i e c e - r a t e  pay.
In conc lus ion  Andrews' (1967) s tudy asked some provoca­
t i v e  q u e s t io n s  t h a t  remained unanswered c h i e f ly  as th e  r e s u l t  
of  inadequa te  r e se a rch  des ign  and s t a t i s t i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n .
I t  i s  r e g r e t t a b l e  t h a t  no one p ick ed  up on what may have been 
a p r i n c i p a l  problem o f  Andrews' s tudy :  the  pay th r e s h o ld s
were too i n s i g n i f i c a n t  to  produce th e  p r e d i c t e d  r e s u l t s .
Jaques (1961) and Adams (1965) e a r l i e r  i d e n t i f i e d  th e
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importance of t h i s  f a c t o r  and both  cons idered  i t  a t  l en g th .
I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  sugges ted  t h a t  th e  r e s u l t s  f o r  a l l  o f  Andrews' 
p r e d i c t i o n s  may have been more dramatic  i f  t h e r e  had been a 
g r e a t e r  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  p i e c e - r a t e s .
Friedman and Goodman (1967) s t a t e  w ith  j u s t  cause t h a t  
c e r t a i n  r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e s  were not c o n t r o l l e d  in  th e  Adams 
and Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) experiments .  
These r e s e a r c h e r s  p o in t  out t h a t  in  the  e a r l i e r  Adams and 
Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) s t u d i e s  the  S ' s  
p e r c e p t io n s  o f  h i s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  were ignored .
The Friedman and Goodman s tudy invo lved  f i f t y - f o u r  
s tu d e n ts  who were h i r e d  on an hour ly  b a s i s  o f  $3.50 f o r  i n t e r ­
viewing t a s k s . The Ss were d iv id e d  in to  an exper im en ta l  group 
and a c o n t ro l  group. In g e n e ra l ,  t h i s  s tudy fo l lowed th e  un­
q u a l i f i e d n e s s  m an ipu la t ions  and th e  experim enta l  des ign  of  the  
Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) 
s t u d i e s ,  but two new sources  o f  d a ta  were used: a l l  s tu d e n ts
completed a demographic q u e s t io n n a i r e  t h a t  in c lu d ed  p a s t  work 
exper ience  and an in te rv iew  q u e s t io n n a i r e  which g a th e re d  in ­
formation on t a s k  d i f f i c u l t y .
R e su l t s  o f  th e  Friedman and Goodman s tudy  in d ic a t e d  
th e r e  were no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  u n q u a l i f i e d  
c o n t ro l  and experim enta l  groups.  However t h e r e  was a s i g n i f i ­
can t  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  q u a l i f i e d  c o n t ro l  and experim enta l  
groups. Friedman and Goodman sp e c u la te d  t h a t  p re -e x p e r im e n ta l  
cognizance about q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  t a s k  d i f f i c u l t y  and th e  Ss'
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p e rc e p t io n  of  experim enta l  m an ipu la t ion  are  r e l e v a n t  co n s id ­
e r a t i o n s  and were not e r r o r  v a r ia n c e s .
The purpose of  Friedman and Goodman's s tudy  was to  
focus "on th e  o p e r a t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  wage in e q u i ty  
theory  and not th e  theory  i t s e l f "  (1967, p. 414).  S ta t e d  
ano ther  way, Friedman and Goodman's s tudy was an e v a lu a t io n  
of  Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams and Ja c o b se n 's  (1964) 
examination o f  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  in  terms of  wage in e q u i t y .  
Friedman and Goodman's conc lus ion  appears  to  be t h a t  Adams 
and Rosenbaum and Adams and J a c o b s e n 's  f in d in g s  a re  s i t u a t i o n  
s p e c i f i c .  There appear t o  be s e v e r a l  conc lus ions  in  Friedman 
and Goodman's experiments  t h a t  a re  d i f f i c u l t  to  p la ce  in  p e r ­
s p e c t i v e .  Friedman and Goodman changed th e  o p e r a t io n a l  p ro ­
cedures  f o r  t h e i r  experiment and t h e r e f o r e  d id  not t r u l y  
r e p l i c a t e  th e  p rev ious  Adams' ^  s tudy .  Two d i s s i m i l a r i ­
t i e s  may be mentioned: Friedman and Goodman p a id  s u b j e c t s  on
an hour ly  b a s i s ,  bu t  the  Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams 
and Jacobsen (1964) were p i e c e - r a t e  s t u d i e s  and only one of  
th e  s t u d i e s  (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962) had hourly  pay; 
secondly ,  Friedman and Goodman u t i l i z e d  a d i f f e r e n t  means fo r  
d i s c r i m in a t in g  between c o n t ro l  and experiment groups r e l a t i v e  
to  q u a l i f i e d n e s s .  N ev e r th e le s s ,  Friedman and Goodman o f t e n  
approach t h e i r  e v a lu a t io n  as i f  t h e i r  s tudy  was s i m i l a r  to  
Adams' work.
In conc lus ion  Friedman and Goodman added to  the  fund 
of  knowledge r e q u i r e d  f o r  th e  con t inued  development of  eq u i ty  
theory  by p o in t in g  out th e  need f o r  a h ig h ly  c o n t r o l l e d
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design  i f  q u e s t io n s  concerning i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  a re  to  be 
avoided.
Goodman and Friedman (1968) dea l  w i th  overpayment of  
hour ly  co n d i t io n s  on job performance,  t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  between q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y  o f  job performance and th e  
impact o f  known p ro d u c t io n  r a t e s  on e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n  s t r a t e ­
g i e s .  Unlike the  1967 s tudy  only u n q u a l i f i e d  s tu d e n t s  were 
used as s u b j e c t s .  There were s i x  expe r im en ta l  groups which 
u t i l i z e d  a t o t a l  o f  s e v e n ty - th r e e  male s t u d e n t s .
Goodman and Friedman (1968) c r e a t e d  the  image of  over ­
pay by u n q u a l i f i e d n e s s  m an ipu la t ion  as in  th e  Friedman and 
Goodman (1967) s tu d y .  Four expe r im en ta l  groups were p a id  the  
hour ly  $3.50 r a t e ,  and two exper im en ta l  groups were p a id  $2.50. 
Q uan ti ty  d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  o v e rp a id  q u a l i f i e d  group as 
compared to  t h e  underpa id  q u a l i f i e d  group d id  not appear to  
be s i g n i f i c a n t  a l though  they  were in  t h e  p r e d i c t e d  d i r e c t i o n .  
In th o se  c o n d i t io n s  where p ro d u c t io n  r a t e s  were known th e r e  
was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  p roduc t ion  v a r ia n c e  than  where produc­
t i o n  r a t e s  were unknown.
In g en e ra l  t h e  Goodman and Friedman experiment sup­
p o r te d  Adams' in e q u i ty  p r e d i c t i o n s .  However, as  was noted  
in  the  d i s c u s s io n s  concerning  th e  Friedman and Goodman (1967) 
s tudy ,  th e  p rocedures  were somewhat changed aga in .  Goodman 
and Friedm an 's  (1968) f in d in g s  a r e  a l s o  i n c o n s i s t e n t  with th e  
"overpa id  by c i rcum stance"  group in  th e  Lawler e t  s tudy .  
Goodman and Friedman argue with r ea so n ab le  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  
p e rc e iv e d  in e q u i ty  by th e  Ss in  th e  Lawler e t  (1968) study
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was a c t u a l l y  not p e rce iv e d  as  being u n f a i r  inasmuch as they 
were p a id  a s t a n d a rd  government r a t e .  Moreover Lawler e t  a l . 
d id  not e l im in a t e  q u a l i f i e d  Ss.
Aside from th e  Friedman and Goodman (1967) s tudy ,  th e  
Goodman and Friedman (1968) and Goodman and Friedman (1971) 
reviews g e n e ra l ly  appear  to  suppor t  Adams' p r e d i c t i o n s  con­
cern ing  i n e q u i ty  th e o ry .  The f r e q u e n t ly  encoun te red  i s s u e  o f  
whether c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  i s  adequate  o r  inadequa te  i s  
n o t ic e a b ly  l a c k in g  in  th e  l a t e r  Goodman and Friedman (1968, 
1971) r e p o r t s  j u s t  as i t  i s  in  Adams (1965).  This i s  f o r t u ­
n a te  in  t h a t  i t  reduces  th e  in h e re n t  com plica t ion  of  the  exami­
n a t io n  and e v a lu a t io n  chore when two complex concep ts  are  
invo lved .  This  rev iew er  had the  f e e l i n g  t h a t  in  t h e i r  1967 
s tudy  Friedman and Goodman were e v a lu a t in g  Adams' ex tens ion  
o f  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  v i s - a - v i s  in e q u i ty  theo ry  p r e d i c t i o n s  
r a t h e r  than e v a lu a t in g  in e q u i ty  th e o ry  in  and of  i t s e l f .  Cog­
n i t i v e  d issonance  e x i s t s  as i n t e r e s t i n g  and ch a l le n g in g  theory  
in  i t s  own r i g h t ,  as does eq u i ty  th e o ry .  Admittedly th e  two 
have g r e a t  s i m i l a r i t i e s  which i s  a c r e d i t  t o  both  b u t  then so 
does eq u i ty  theory  and exchange th e o ry .  The comment made 
e a r l i e r  s t i l l  s t a n d s  in  t h a t  Goodman and Friedm an 's  work has 
added to  eq u i ty  th e o ry .
Dimick (1973) uses a r a t i o n a l e  much l i k e  t h a t  employed 
by Lawler (1968b) b u t  develops an in n o v a t iv e  methodology fo r  
comparing e q u i ty  and expectancy: a computer-based s im u la t io n
compares th e  e f f e c t s  o f  v a r io u s  pay p o l i c i e s  on a given popu­
l a t i o n .  Pay p o l i c i e s  a re  th e  independent v a r i a b l e s ;  pay c o s t s
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(an o f t e n  n e g le c te d  f a c t o r )  and performance a re  the  dependent 
v a r i a b l e s ;  and th e  r a t i o  of  performance to  pay i s  an index of  
pay e f f i c i e n c y .  Four dec is ion  r u l e s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  ad m in is t ra ­
t i v e  concerns a re  used as c o n s t r a i n t  c o n d i t io n s :  " (1)  no con­
s t r a i n t ,  (2) d ec reases  in  pay p r o h ib i t e d ,  (3) r a i s e s  l im i te d  
to  4 p e rc e n t  to  10 p e r c e n t ,  and (4) bo th  (2) and ( 3 ) . "  The 
s im u la t io n  model i s  s e t  up to  r e p r e s e n t  a twenty yea r  t ime­
frame to  f u l l y  examine the  l o n g i tu d in a l  e f f e c t s  o f  va r ious  
pay p o l i c i e s .  The r e s u l t s ,  fo r  th e  purposes  of  t h i s  s tudy ,  
a re  t h a t  expectancy theory  and e q u i ty  l e d  to  p a r a l l e l  recom­
mendations. Assuming th e re  i s  an adequate b a s i s  f o r  comparison 
of L aw le r ' s  (1968b) conc lus ions  Dimick 's  a s s e r t i o n  tends  to  
reduce th e  meaningful d i f f e r e n c e  between expectancy and eq u i ty  
t h e o r i e s .
Wiener (1970) s p e c i f i c a l l y  des igns  an experim enta l  
methodology to  examine the  p o s s ib le  " s e l f - e s te e m "  problem t h a t  
many r e s e a r c h e r s  had noted  in th e  s t u d i e s  o f  Adams and Rosen­
baum (1962) and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) and Adams (1963a). 
Wiener (1970) s e t  up two co n d i t io n s  o f  in e q u i ty  and a co n t ro l  
co n d i t io n  f o r  e q u i ty .  Input overcompensation co n d i t io n s  were 
c r e a te d  by t e l l i n g  s u b je c t s  they were u n q u a l i f i e d  bu t  would 
r e c e iv e  th e  s ta n d a rd  pay of  $2.00 p e r  hour.  Outcome overcom­
pen sa t io n  was c r e a te d  by t e l l i n g  the  S u b jec ts  they were q u a l i ­
f i e d  f o r  th e  t a s k  and would be p a id  $3.00 an hour which was 
h ig h e r  than  th e  s ta n d a rd  pay. Within each of  th e se  co n d i t io n s  
( in p u t  overcompensation and outcome overcompensation) o n e -h a l f  
of  th e  S u b jec ts  were induced to  b e l i e v e  they  were invo lved  in
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the  development of mental a l e r t n e s s  t e s t s  which were def ined  
by Wiener as the  "e g o -o r ien te d "  performance. The o th e r  sub­
j e c t s  were induced to  b e l i e v e  they  were working on a psycho- 
l i n g u i s t i c  p r o j e c t  which was d e f ined  by Wiener as a " ta s k -  
o r ie n te d "  performance. There were n i n e t y - s i x  c o l l e g e  s tu d e n ts  
employed as s u b je c t s  and were d iv ided  i n t o  s i x  groups: fou r
experim enta l  groups and two c o n t ro l  groups. There was one 
t r i a l  seventy  minutes in  d u r a t io n .^
Wiener (1970) came to  two conc lus ions  as based on h i s  
experiment:  F i r s t ,  in p u t  overcompensation was no t  proved to
produce dissonance o r  p e r c e p t io n s  of in e q u i ty .  Wiener i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  h i s  f in d in g s  as s u b s t a n t i a t i n g  o th e r  r e s e a r c h e r s '  con­
c lu s io n s  t h a t  in e q u i ty  was r e a l l y  a case of  devalued s e l f ­
esteem on th e  p a r t  o f  the  s u b j e c t .  Second, outcome overcom­
p en s a t io n  was somewhat t e n t a t i v e l y  proven to  suppor t  Adams' 
in e q u i ty  p r e d i c t i o n s .  Wiener,  however, d id  not view th e se  
f in d in g s  as co n c lu s iv e .  Aside from th e  f in d in g  on outcome 
overcompensation f o r  hour ly  pay Wiener was in  agreement with 
Friedman and Goodman (1967),  Weick (1967) and o th e r s  in  t h a t  
th e  s e l f - e s t e e m  problem probab ly  confounds Adams' f in d in g s .
In t r u t h ,  Wiener (1970) f e l t  t h a t  h i s  f in d in g s  demonstrate  a 
lack  of  suppor t  f o r  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  in e q u i ty  theo ry .
The p reced ing  d i s c u s s io n s  have cen te red  on s e l e c t e d  
r e sea rch  t h a t  i s  thought to  have a d i r e c t  b e a r in g  on t h i s  
p re s e n t  re sea rch  e f f o r t .  I t  i s  n o t ,  however, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
^The m a jo r i ty  o f  t h i s  paragraph c lo s e ly  fo l lows the  
a b s t r a c t  of  the  Wiener r e p o r t ,  see  page 191.
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of  t h e  t o t a l  thought genera ted  by Adams' e f f o r t s .  The r e ­
mainder o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  summarizes f i v e  au tho rs  who ev a lu a te  
eq u i ty  by comprehensively reviewing th e  p ro g re s s  made up to  
t h e  time of  t h e i r  p u b l i c a t i o n s :  Opsahl and Dunnette (1966),
Weick (1966) and Goodman and Friedman (1971).  In g en e ra l  
terms a l l  o f  t h e s e  au tho rs  agree  as to  th e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  have 
been produced as a r e s u l t  of  co n t in u in g  e q u i ty  r e s e a r c h  and 
the  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h a t  r e s e a rc h .
Opsahl and Dunnette (1966)
These au th o rs  focus on th e  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  was o r i e n t e d  
towards dem onstra t ing  the  r o l e  of  money (pay) in  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
to  o n - th e - jo b  beh av io r .  I t  i s  t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  m a jo r i ty  
o f  l i t e r a t u r e  and re se a rc h  has l a r g e l y  ignored  th e  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  o f  wage and s a l a r y  p r a c t i c e s  t o  job beh av io r .  The 
th e o r i e s  and s t u d i e s  s e l e c t e d  by Opsahl and Dunnette on the  
b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  presumed c a p a b i l i t y  t o  " i l l u m in a t e  p o s s i b l e  
e f f e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  compensation f o r  inducing  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t  
in  th e  job  s e t t i n g ,  ' t h e y '  ignore  th o se  t h e o r i e s  and s t u d i e s  
r e l a t e d  to  money's e f f e c t s  in  induc ing  employees to  ta k e  jo b s ,  
p e r s i s t  in  them, o r  to  leave  them (1966, p. 9 4 - 9 5 ) . "  Opsahl 
and D u n n e t t e ' s  approach i s  f i r s t  t o  co n s id e r  money as a 
g e n e ra l i z e d  cond i t ioned  r e i n f o r c e r ,  a n o t ion  which drew con­
s id e r a b l e  su p p o r t  from th e  l i t e r a t u r e  of  exper im en ta l  psy­
chology. T h e i r  conc lus ions  (1966, p. 97) agree  w i th  Adams 
(1965) in  t h a t  th e  meaning of  money f o r  a given i n d iv i d u a l  
r e q u i r e s  a d d i t i o n a l  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  Considerably  more
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in fo rm at io n  w i l l  be r e q u i r e d  to  a c c u r a te ly  i d e n t i f y  " the  
r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  money as  a m o t iv a to r  o f  be­
h av io r  in  in d u s t ry "  (1966, p.  9 7 ) .^
P a ra p h ra s in g  Opsahl and Dunnette ,  the  p r i n c i p a l  p rob­
lem in  c u r r e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  compensation c o n s id e r a t i o n  i s  th e  
d e te rm in a t io n  of  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  money on worker b ehav io r .
Opsahl and Dunnette ev a lu a ted  many d i f f e r e n t  approaches to  
t h i s  problem among which was an e x te n s iv e  review of  eq u i ty  
theory  r e s e a r c h  c a r r i e d  out by Homans (1961),  Jaques (1961),  
Patchen (1961),  and Adams (1963a, 1965). The emphasis of  
t h i s  immediate d i s c u s s io n  w i l l  be concerned w ith  Adams as i t  
i s  h i s  approach to  eq u i ty  th eo ry  t h a t  i s  th e  immediate concern 
o f  t h i s  s tu d y .
Opsahl and Dunnette (1966, p .  113) base  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  
on co n c lu s io n s  reached  e a r l i e r  by Vroom (1964) and Weick (1965) 
and ho ld  t h a t  Adams' in e q u i ty  th eo ry  r e q u i r e s  improvement in  
two major  a r e a s ;  (1) in e q u i ty  theo ry  f a i l s  to  s p e c i f y  modes 
of  in e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n  a person  may choose in  a given s i t u a ­
t i o n ,  and (2)  t h e  l a rg e  number of  v a r i a b l e s  w i th  complex 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  e x i s t  w i th in  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  framework
As a  p o in t  o f  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  Adams does not p l a c e  money 
in  t h i s  r o l e  as a m o t iv a to r ;  i n s t e a d  he p la c e s  money in  th e  
c o n tex t  o f  t h e  exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p  where i t s  value i s  d e t e r ­
mined in  th e  con tex t  o f  what i s  to  be exchanged. This  p l a c e ­
ment however should not  be confused w ith  t h e  symbolic r o l e  
t h a t  Vroom (1964) p la c e s  money r e l a t i v e  to  h i s  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  
va lence  theo ry  (nor  Gellerman (1963) f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ) .
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of  e q u i ty  t h e o r y . ^  In response  to  t h e  f i r s t  need f o r  improve­
ment (which i s  Weick's  c r i t i c i s m ) ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  de fense ;  
Adams (1965) i n d i c a t e s  t h e r e  a r e  a number of  modes t h a t  may 
be chosen by Person to  r e s o lv e  an in e q u i t a b l e  s i t u a t i o n .  
However Adams' r e s e a r c h  was a t te m p t in g  to  dem onstra te  only  
th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  pay and performance and as such i s  so 
s t a t e d .  Other  modes of  r e s o l u t i o n  remain to  be t e s t e d ,  and 
e x i s t  f o r  th e  p r e s e n t  as t h e o r e t i c a l  s p e c u la t i o n s .  I f  Weick 
i s  implying e q u i ty  theory  i s  p r e s e n t l y  incomplete  then  he has  
agreement on t h i s  m a t te r .
The c a l l  fo r  th e  second needed improvement (which de­
r iv e s  from Vroom's (1964, p. 171) c r i t i c i s m  concerning th e  
l a rg e  number of  v a r i a b l e s )  i s  a l s o  j u s t i f i e d .  Adams has a l so  
acknowledged t h i s .  Recognit ion  of  t h i s  problem has in f lu e n c e d  
th e  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  which i s  one o f  a t tem p t ing  to  f i r s t  
measure th e  r e l a t i v e  meaning o f  pay and performance; however, 
even t h i s  commonsense approach has exper ienced  a complexity .
Opsahl and Dunnette (1966, p. 113) see  Adams' work as 
a commendable i n i t i a l  e f f o r t  in  s o lv in g  an ad m it ted ly  l a r g e  
problem f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  compensation. T he i r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  
e x i s t i n g  d e f i c i e n c i e s  and problems in  e q u i ty  r e s e a rc h  i s  
p r e s e n t l y  c o r r e c t .  Because o f  t h e i r  o r i e n t a t i o n  Opsahl and 
Dunnette have taken a more comprehensive view o f  compensation
^ S i g n i f i c a n t l y  th e s e  a u th o rs  d i s c u s s  (p.  I l l )  th e  s e l f ­
esteem problem which had been p o in te d  out by o th e r s ,  bu t  
r a t h e r  than viewing i t  w ith  any g r e a t  alarm, they approach i t  
as a s o lv a b le  m ethodologica l  problem. I t  should  be mentioned 
t h i s  view i s  sha red  by Adams (1965, p .  46) .
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than does Adams' in e q u i ty  r e sea rch ;  however t h i s  i s  an ambi­
t i o u s  view and i s  beyond th e  scope o f  Adams' r e se a rch  or  t h i s  
p r e s e n t  r e s e a rc h .
Weick (1966)
Weick's  (1966) examination of  eq u i ty  th eo ry  i s  more 
focused than Opsahl and D un n e t te ' s  (1966) as i t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
r e l a t e s  to  Adams' fo rm ula t ion  of in e q u i ty  th eo ry .  He begins  
w ith  an e x c e l l e n t  and simple p r e s e n ta t i o n  of what equ i ty  i s  
and how i t  o p e ra te s  and then  proceeds to  d is c u s s  the  problems 
as he sees  them w ith  th e  p r i n c i p a l  focus be ing  on Adams' la ck  
o f  c l a r i t y  in  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of  terms. These d i s c u s s io n s  w i l l  
g e n e ra l ly  fo l low Weick 's  p r e s e n ta t i o n  format.  Weick i d e n t i ­
f i e s  c e r t a i n  "a m b ig u i t i e s  in  the  fo rm ula t ion  of  eq u i ty  theory"  
(1966, p. 415) ,  c h i e f  among th e se  being th e  u n c e r t a in ty  of  
what c o n s t i t u t e s  an in p u t ,  o r  an outcome, in  a given s i t u a t i o n .  
Unless t h i s  d i s c r im in a t io n  i s  c l e a r ,  accord ing  to  Weick, the  
p r e d i c t i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  e q u i ty  theory  i s  reduced.  Continuing 
w ith  t h i s  thought Weick (1966, p. 419) m a in ta in s  t h a t  w hile  an 
adequate d i s c r im in a t io n  may be made in  th e  l a b o ra to ry  such a 
d i s c r im in a t io n  may not be p o s s i b le  in  th e  work environment.  
Weick (1966, p. 420) i l l u s t r a t e s  h i s  co n ten t io n  through an 
analogy based  on th e  "sweat" a worker might produce as a r e ­
s u l t  of  e x e r t i o n ;  he a s s e r t s  t h a t  "sweat" may be an outcome 
o r  in p u t ,  depending on o n e ' s  p e r s p e c t iv e .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
see  th e  m e r i t  o f  t h i s  argument and analogy in  th e  con tex t  of  
th e  formal o r g a n iz a t io n  exchange t h a t  ta k e s  p la c e  between the
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worker and the  o r g a n iz a t io n .  P e r s p i r a t i o n  i s  a by-product o f  
work (performance) in  a given job and i t  i s  th e  work i t s e l f  
t h a t  i s  c l e a r l y  th e  inpu t  f o r  Person (Adams' te rm),  and pay 
i s  c l e a r l y  th e  outcome. In o th e r  words, in  Adams' t h e o r e t i c a l  
form ula t ion  in p u ts  and outcomes a re  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  and p e r ­
so n a l ly  d e f in e d .  While one cannot deny th e  e x i s te n c e  of o th e r  
forms of  i n e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n  (beyond more o r  l e s s  pay, o r  more 
or  l e s s  performance) p re se n t  r e se a rc h  has not been extended to  
examine them. To da te  Adams has  conf ined  h i s  e f f o r t s  to  con­
s i d e r a t i o n s  of  t h e  formal r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  i n d iv id u a l  
worker and th e  o r g a n iz a t io n .  Informal modes of in e q u i ty  
r e s o l u t i o n  a re  no doubt p re s e n t  and u t i l i z e d ;  b u t  a t  the  
p re s e n t  any comments about t h e i r  impact must be s p e c u la t io n s .  
This p a r t i c u l a r  c r i t i c i s m ,  l i k e  much of the  o th e r  c r i t i c i s m  
surrounding  modes o f  in e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n ,  i s  based on inform al 
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  phenomena, which as s t a t e d  b e fo r e ,  i s  beyond 
th e  p r e s e n t  development o f  th e  theory .
Weick's  (1966, p. 422) second problem has to  do with  
th e  in h e re n t  dynamics of m a in ta in in g  a b a lance  f o r  a given 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r a t i o .  The argument goes something l i k e  t h i s :  
i f  Person p e rc e iv e s  an imbalance when he compares h i s  in p u ts  
and outcomes to  O t h e r ' s  in p u ts  and outcome r a t i o ,  he w i l l  
i n i t i a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  to  b r in g  about a b a lance  ( e . g . , do away 
with  d is so n an ce ) .  I f  he i s  s u c c e s s fu l ,  then  what r e s u l t s  
could p o s s ib ly  c r e a t e  an imbalance fo r  O ther .  Of course 
Weick 's  argument assumes Other p e r c e iv e s  b a lance  with the  
i n i t i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Whether t h i s  i s  t r u e  o r  not depends on
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both Person and Other using each o th e r  as t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
comparator. This  may not be th e  case .  However assuming t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  does e x i s t  then  Weick i s  c o r r e c t  in  a s s e r t i n g  
th a t  an o s c i l l a t i o n  would be s e t  in  motion and t h a t  a p e r ­
p e t u a l  imbalance would r e s u l t . Adams' in e q u i ty  theory  
p r e s e n t l y  has no means to  r e s o lv e  such a problem of  i n t e r d e ­
pendence. I t  i s  sugges ted  t h a t  over  t ime,  assuming th e  cog­
n i t i v e  d issonance  theory  i s  c o r r e c t ,  some o th e r  form of  
d issonance mode w i l l  be engaged by Person an d /o r  Other to  
b r in g  about b a l a n c e .^
Weick (1966, p. 427) poses  an i n t e r e s t i n g  problem fo r  
eq u i ty  theory  in  th e  n a tu re  of  th e  s o c i a l  i s o l a t e .  In e f f e c t  
t h i s  e l im in a te s  Adams' comparator Other  and in s t e a d  p o s tu -
Ol a t e s  a s t ro n g  in f lu e n c e  of  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  i n t e r n a l  s ta n d a rd .  
The manner in  which Weick approaches t h i s  c o n s id e r a t i o n  i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a lack  o f  s o c i a l  impact on th e  pe rson .  This i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  accept  as i t  i s  obv ious ly  in  disagreement w ith  
the  id ea  of  s o c i a l  man. The e x i s te n c e  of  such a p e r s o n a l i t y  
would s u r e ly  be an excep t ion  to  th e  r u l e .  Adams's theory  i s
^This l i n e  of  thought comes c lo s e  to  a b a s i c  conten­
t i o n  of  in e q u i ty  and c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  th e o ry  in  t h a t  both  
Person and Other see  a need on the  p a r t  of  th e  i n d iv id u a l  to  
o b ta in  a c o g n i t iv e  s t a t e  o f  b a lan ce .  In e f f e c t  t h i s  need 
p rov ides  th e  b a s i s  fo r  d r iv e  t h a t  u s u a l ly  e x h i b i t s  i t s e l f  in  
a form of  o v e r t  behav io r .
p
This l i n e  of th in k in g  i s  a l s o  pursued by Jaques but  
in  a d i f f e r e n t  c o n te x t .  Jaques too p o s t u l a t e s  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
fo r  th e  in d iv i d u a l  an i n t e r n a l  s ta n d a rd  t h a t  i s  used to  d e t e r ­
mine th e  u n f a i r n e s s  o f  a s i t u a t i o n .  Adams a l s o  p o s t u l a t e s  
t h i s  in  h i s  r a t i o  which i s  a weighted average o f  in p u ts  and 
o u tp u ts  (1965, p. 281) but in  the  c o n tex t  o f  an i n t e r a c t i o n  
with  th e  comparator Other.
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a theory  of  how "normal" b ehav io r  might occur and not a 
theory  of abnormal behav io r ,
Weick (1966, p. 438) c o r r e c t l y  contends t h a t  p a r t  of 
the  problem of  working with  eq u i ty  theo ry  l i e s  in  Adams’ use 
o f  th e  r a t i o .  The r a t i o  adm it ted ly  i s  an o v e r ly  s i m p l i f i e d  
approach b u t  i t  does prov ide  a means f o r  reducing  th e  exchange 
concept from a broad  paradigm to  a more workable micro l e v e l .  
And a l though th e  micro l e v e l  i s  not f r e e  from c e r t a i n  ambigu­
i t i e s  i t  does p ro v id e  a means f o r  e q u i ty  theory  to  be s i t u a ­
t i o n  s p e c i f i c  which would seem to  lend  i t  some c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  
a s s i s t i n g  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p ro ces s  i s s u e s .
This  d i s c u s s io n  has cons ide red  Weick 's  (1966) major 
concerns o f  Adams' fo rm u la t ion  of  in e q u i ty  th e o ry .  Weick 's  
conc lus ion  o f  e q u i ty  t h e o r y ' s  u t i l i t y  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  too  soon 
to  determine i t s  va lue  as a theory  and t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  r e ­
sea rch  i s  r e q u i r e d ,  t h a t  e q u i ty  theo ry  r e q u i r e s  a c l o s e r  
" s c ru t in y "  (1966, p. 439),  t h a t  e q u i ty  theo ry  seems to  have 
use as a ra idd le-range th eo ry  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  b eh a v io r ,  and 
t h a t  i t  has guided  r e s e a r c h e r s  i n t o  u n f a m i l i a r  bu t  h ig h ly  
r e l e v a n t  problem a re a s .
Goodman and Friedman (1971)
Goodman and Friedman's  (1971) examination o f  Adams’ 
in e q u i ty  theo ry  p r e s e n t s  th e  most r e c e n t  comprehensive review 
o f  eq u i ty  th e o ry .  These au thors  (1971, p. 271, 274, 280, 285) 
tend  to  suppor t  Adams' in e q u i ty  theo ry  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a 
r a t h e r  complete review o f  the  r e s e a r c h  as  of  e a r l y  1971. This
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p o s i t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  in  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s  which w i l l  be 
enumerated s h o r t l y ,  i s  in  d isagreement w ith  Opsahl and 
Dunnette (1966) o r  Weick (1966) .^  The Goodman and Friedman 
review examines a number o f  e m p ir ic a l  s t u d i e s  t h a t  have t e s t e d  
in e q u i ty  t h e o r y ' s  p r e d i c t i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  r e l a t i v e  to  pay and 
performance r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Goodman and Friedman u t i l i z e  a 
format t h a t  beg ins  w ith  a s p e c i f i c  problem as i d e n t i f i e d  by 
ano ther  r e s e a r c h e r .  Goodman and Friedman then c i t e  evidence 
t h a t  agrees  or  d i s a g re e s  w i th  t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  f in d in g s  and 
c o n c lu s io n s .
Basic  to  th e  t e s t i n g  o f  in e q u i ty  theo ry  i s  th e  manner 
in  which performance i s  r e l a t e d  to  in e q u i ty  r e s o l u t i o n .  Al­
though methodologies  vary ,  th e  b a s i c  hypo thes is  r e l a t i n g  to  
th e  overpa id  hour ly  r a t e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  the  Ss w i l l  r a i s e  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t iv i t y  to  ba lance  th e  overpay c o n d i t io n .  Four s tu d i e s  
p rev io u s ly  d i s c u s se d  t e s t e d  t h i s  h y p o th e s i s  and g e n e ra l ly ,  but 
w ith  some r e s e r v a t i o n ,  suppor t  th e  in e q u i ty  th eo ry  p r e d i c ­
t i o n ;  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  o th e r  s t u d i e s  were unable  to  suppor t
2t h i s  h y p o th e s is ;  and two o th e r s  r e j e c t e d  th e  h y p o th e s i s .
As noted  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  Opsahl and Dunnette 
and Weick a re  in  s u b s t a n t i a l  agreement concerning  s t r e n g t h s  
and weaknesses of  Adams' in e q u i ty  th eo ry .  This  i s  reasonab le  
in  view of  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  in fo rm at ion  exchange between 
th e se  th r e e  r e s e a r c h e r s  when they  were co l le a g u e s  a t  t h e  Uni­
v e r s i t y  of  Minnesota in  1965-66. P ro f e s s o r  Goodman i s  now on 
th e  f a c u l ty  o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  of  Chicago and P ro fe s s o r  Friedman 
i s  on th e  f a c u l t y  a t  th e  Hebrew U n iv e r s i ty  of  Jerusa lem .
^Arrowood (1961),  Adams and Rosenbaum (1962),  Goodman 
and Friedman (1964) and P r i t c h a r d  (1964) suppor t  th e  p r e d i c ­
t i o n .  Valenzi and Andrews (1964),  Evans and Simmons (1969) 
and Anderson and S he l ly  (1970) could  not suppor t  the  p r e d i c ­
t i o n ,  and Lawler (1967) and Wiener (1970) r e j e c t e d  th e  p r e ­
d i c t i o n .
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Examination o f  t h e  nonsupporting s t u d i e s  in d ic a t e s  t h e r e  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in methodology to  w arran t  concern r e l a ­
t i v e  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  f in d in g s .  This  i s  in  agreement w i th  
Goodman and Friedman’s (1971) co n c lu s io n s .  This same p r i n c i ­
pa l  c r i t i c i s m  can a l so  be j u s t l y  l e v e le d  a t  th e  s t u d i e s  which 
suppor t  t h e  h y p o th e s i s  r e l a t i v e  to  t h e  p o s s i b l e  confounding 
c h a ra c t e r  o f  th e  p re v io u s ly  d isc u sse d  s e l f - e s t e e m  problem.
The g en e ra l  hypo thes is  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  underpaid  
hour ly  r a t e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  workers w i l l  decrease  t h e i r  i n ­
p u ts  to  ach ieve  a co g n i t iv e  b a lan ce .  In a d d i t io n  to  Adams 
(1963a) and Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and Adams and Jacobsen 
(1964) four  s t u d i e s  a t tem pt  to  t e s t  t h i s  h y p o th e s is .  Goodman 
and Friedman (1971) f e e l  t h e  nonsuppor t ing  experiment f a i l e d  
to  produce th e  necessa ry  in e q u i ty  c o n d i t io n s ;  i t  i s  s p e c u la te d  
t h a t  t h e  reason  f o r  lack  of  suppor t  was a fu n c t io n  of  too 
b r i e f  exper im en ta l  t imeframes.  I t  would appear  t h a t  f o r  th e  
p r e s e n t  t h e r e  i s  inadequa te  in fo rm a t io n  fo r  a de te rm ina t ion  
of  t h e  underpa id  hour ly  h y p o th e s is .
On th e  b a s i s  of  the Goodman and Friedman (1971) 
a r t i c l e  two conc lus ions  can be made about t h e  v a l i d i t y  of 
Adams’ in e q u i ty  theory  :
1. There i s  r e l a t i v e l y  c l e a r  e m p ir ica l  support  f o r  
th e  assumptions and hypotheses  der ived  from Adams' 
in e q u i ty  theory  by Goodman and Friedman (1971) 
which a re  s e t  f o r th  below in  b r i e f  form:^
^Obviously Adams and Adams e t  would support  th e s e  
f in d in g s  t h e r e f o r e  o th e r  s e l e c t e d  r e s e a r c h e r s  a re  used f o r
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a. Inequ i ty  i s  a source o f  p e r so n a l  te n s io n  
( P r i t c h a r d  e t  , 1970).
b .  The g r e a t e r  th e  p e rce iv ed  in e q u i ty  the  g r e a t e r  
th e  d r iv e  to  reduce i t  (Weick and N esse t t ,
1968).
c. Thresholds fo r  underpayment a re  l e s s  than 
th r e s h o ld s  fo r  overpayment (Leventhal e t  a l . ,  
1969b).
d. Person maximizes p o s i t i v e  outcomes in  the  
r e s o l u t i o n  p rocess  (Leventhal  and Michaels ,
1969).
2. There i s  t e n t a t i v e  em p ir ic a l  suppor t  f o r  the  
fo l low ing  hypotheses and assumptions:
a. Person w i l l  r e s i s t  changing th e  comparator 
Other (Weick and N esse t ,  1968).
b.  O verpaid-hourly  Ss w i l l  produce more than  
e q u i ta b ly  p a id  Ss ( P r i t c h a r d  e t  a d . ,  1970).
c. Underpaid-hourly  Ss w i l l  u t i l i z e  r e l a t i v e l y  
lower in p u ts  than e q u i ta b ly  p a id  Ss (Evan and 
Simmons, 1969).
The p reced ing  conc lus ions  a re  taken from Goodman and Friedman 
(1971) and from o th e r s  and r e p re s e n t  th e  most commonly agreed 
upon f in d in g  o f  in e q u i ty  theory  as i t  r e l a t e s  to  Adams' (1965) 
t h e o r e t i c a l  premises  and th e  scope o f  t h i s  s tudy .  This
r e f e r e n c e .  I t  should  be noted t h a t  in  some cases  th e se  r e f e r ­
enced r e s e a r c h e r s  do not suppor t  o th e r  p r e d i c t i o n s  made by 
in e q u i ty  th e o ry .
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e v a lu a t io n  i s  based on a review o f  r e l e v a n t  r e s e a r c h  and i s  
somewhat s e l e c t i v e .  Other exam inations  a re  d i sc u sse d  e l s e ­
where in  t h i s  s tudy .
S ec t io n  3: T h e o r e t i c a l  Model Used
f o r  t h i s  P re sen t  Equity  Research 
Based on t h e  f in d in g s  and d i s c u s s io n s  p r e s e n te d  in the  
preced ing  s e c t i o n ,  th e  fo l low ing  d ia g ra m a t ic  model appears to  
be an a p p ro p r ia te  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  Adams' (1965) in e q u i ty  
t h e o r y . 1 The purpose o f  th e  model i s  to  a t tem pt  to  i d e n t i f y  
and r e l a t e  d ia g ra m a t i c a l ly  a l l  of  th e  t h e o r y ' s  component p a r t s .  
I t  should  be no ted  t h a t  th e  m odel 's  des ign  i s  based  on a s in g u ­
l a r  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  pay and performance which i s  viewed as 
be ing  in  keeping w i th in  th e  scope o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s tudy .  Adams' 
terms a re  used wherever  a p p l i c a b le .
Bas ic  to  Adams' c o n c e p tu a l i z a t i o n  o f  in e q u i ty  i s  a 
t h r e e  p a r t  o r  t r i a d  r e l a t i o n s h i p :
OtherPerson
O rgan iza t ion
F igure  4. A T r iad  R e la t io n sh ip
Person i s  th e  focus of  i n t e r e s t  and h i s  o v e r t  b ehav io r  i s  th e  
s u b je c t  o f  i n q u i r y .  O ther  i s  t h e  i n d iv id u a l  used by Person 
f o r  comparative purposes .  Person uses  t h e  comparator Other
^Adams does not  p r e s e n t  such a model in  any o f  the  
p u b l i c a t i o n s  r e p o r t i n g  on h i s  examination and ex ten s io n  o f  in- 
e u q i ty  theory  t h e r e f o r e  t h i s  model has t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  p lu s  
o th e r s  normally in h e re n t  in  such an o f f e r i n g .
81
as a measuring s t a n d a rd  always comparing O t h e r ' s  inpu t  and 
outcome r a t i o  t o  h i s  own. Keep in  mind t h i s  comparison i s  
p e r c e p tu a l  and unique to  Person.  S ta t e d  p l a i n l y ,  t h i s  com­
p a r i s o n  may not be what could  be termed o b j e c t i v e  from 
a n o t h e r ' s  frame o f  r e f e r e n c e .  Person and Other e x i s t  in  an 
o rg a n iz a t io n  environment.  The o r g a n iz a t io n  i s  r e p r e s e n te d  
to  Person in  th e  form of  management which a l l o c a t e s  rewards 
(Outcomes f o r  Person)  and r e q u i r e s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( In p u ts  from 
P erso n ) .  The fundamental exchange a c t  t a k e s  p la c e  t h e r e f o r e  
between Person and management who, c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  embody the  
o r g a n iz a t io n .  Other i s  used by Person as a comparator  v e r i ­
fy ing  whether t h e  exchange between Person and Other  i s  equ i­
t a b l e ,  or  f a i r  o r  j u s t .
The exchange paradigm a l s o  encompasses th e  c o g n i t iv e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  of  Person and i s  r e p r e s e n te d  as a r a t i o  o f  o u t ­
comes to  i n p u t s . 1 The p r i n c i p a l  problem i s  one of  a r a t i o  
be ing  viewed as o v e r ly  s i m p l i s t i c .  Sym bol ica l ly  t h i s  r a t i o  
i s  :
Op £  Oa
Ip >  l a
(Person)  (Other)
F igu re  5. The B as ic  Exchange R e la t io n s h ip s
The purpose o f  t h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h a t  
Person views th e  r a t i o  o f  h i s  outcomes to  in p u t s  as  being  one 
o f  exchange in  t h a t  something i s  given ( t h e  in p u t )  and
^This sy m bo l iza t ion  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Adams, 
Patchen and Homans, and has been m ain ta ined ,  b u t  not  always 
suppor ted ,  by o th e r  r e s e a r c h e r s .
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something i s  r e c e iv ed  ( t h e  outcome) in  a ba lanced  exchange.
Such a r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  assumed to  e x i s t  f o r  a given s i t u a t i o n .  
Adams (1965, p. 281) views in p u ts  and outcomes as be ing  r e ­
s p e c t iv e  sums o f  in p u t s  and outcomes r e l e v a n t  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
exchange. In e f f e c t ,  th e  e q u i ty  of outcomes to  in p u ts  are 
p e rc e iv e d  s ta n d a rd s  t h a t  e x i s t  on a day- to -day  b a s i s  and 
fu n c t io n  as b e h a v io ra l  gu ides .  Inpu ts  and outcomes a re  sym­
b o l i c  and a re  m ain ta ined  c o g n i t i v e ly  by Person.
As im pl ied  by th e  "equal t o , "  " l e s s  t h a n , "  and " g r e a t e r  
than"  symbols th e  outcome t o  in p u t  r a t i o s  may e x i s t  in  any 
g iven  t ime in  a s t a t e  o f  b a lan ce  o r  imbalance. Any s t a t e  
(whether  in  ba lance  o r  imbalance) p ro v id es  th e  r e q u i s i t e  t e n ­
s io n  f o r  th e  d r iv e  n ec essa ry  to  e l i c i t  b eh a v io r .  In o th e r  
words, Person ,  even though in  a b a lance  s t a t e ,  w i l l  be m oti­
v a ted  to  demonstrate  b eh a v io r .  In th e  work environment Person 
w i l l  be m otiva ted  to  perform ( P e r s o n ' s  in p u t )  th o se  t a s k s  p e r ­
ce ived  to  be r e l e v a n t  f o r  ach iev in g  t h e  commonly unders tood  
outcome (pay ) .  I f  a s t a t e  of imbalance e x i s t s  where Person 
i s  r e c e iv in g  more (o v e r -p a id ,  outcome) o r  l e s s  (u n d e r -p a id ,  
outcome) he w i l l  be m o t iva ted  to  a l t e r  th e  o t h e r  p o r t i o n  of 
h i s  r a t i o ,  which in  t h i s  case  i s  performance.  Should t h i s  imbal­
ance e x i s t  then Person ex p e r ien ce s  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance .  The 
g r e a t e r  th e  d issonance  in  a given s i t u a t i o n  th e  g r e a t e r  the  
te n s io n  and, consequen t ly ,  th e  g r e a t e r  the  d r iv e  to  r e s t o r e  
b a la n c e .  Adams u t i l i z e s  c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  theo ry  as p ro ­
posed by F e s t in g e r  (1957) and Brehen and Cohen (1962).  The 
c o g n i t i v e  comparison of  th e  combined exchange theo ry  u t i l i z i n g
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Person and Other and c o g n i t iv e  d issonance  may be r e p re s e n te d  
s t r u c t u r a l l y  as :
P e r s o n 's  Cogni t ive  Comparison
Person
I n t e r n a l  
Pay Performance
(out  come) ( i  n p u t )
Comparison
Other
\
I n t e r n a l
Pay Performance
(outcome) ( i n p u t )
Comparison
Comparison
Figure  6 . A Model of  P e r s o n 's  Cogni t ive  Comparison
I m p l i c i t  in  th e  d i s c u s s io n s  a t  t h i s  p o in t  a re  th e  
fo l low ing  assumptions;
1. A comparison Other e x i s t s  and i s  i d e n t i f i e d  by 
Person ,
2. A comparison a c t u a l l y  tak es  p lace  between person 
and Other,
Person views th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between h im s e l f  and 
th e  o rg a n iz a t io n  as fundamentally  an exchange.
Pay and performance a re  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  as 
be ing  e i t h e r  inpu t  o r  outcome by Person,
There i s  a three-way r e l a t i o n s h i p  among Person,  
Other and o rg a n iz a t io n  and each has a r e l a t e d  and 
i d e n t i f i a b l e  r o l e  r e l a t i v e  t o  the  o th e r s .
3.
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6 . Person w i l l  a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  m a in ta in ing  o r  
r e s t o r i n g  c o g n i t iv e  b a lan ce .
These assumptions r e p re s e n t  t h e  p i l l a r s  o f  eq u i ty  
theory  and r e p r e s e n t  th o se  a sp ec ts  of  th e  theory  which r e c e iv e  
th e  g r e a t e s t  amount of  a t t e n t i o n  from r e s e a r c h e r s .  As i n d i ­
ca ted  in  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n s  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  the  m a jo r i ty  o f  
em p ir ica l  ev idence  tends  to  support  th e s e  assumptions.
P o ss ib ly  th e  l e a s t  documented and unders tood c h a r a c t e r  
o f  eq u i ty  theory  i s  th e  p rocess  of  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  th e  s t r u c ­
t u r a l  e lements .  P r i o r  to  ga in ing  an unders tand ing  of  th e  
p rocess  of eq u i ty  theo ry  th e r e  seems to  be a need fo r  g r e a t e r  
unders tand ing  o f  i t s  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r .  While th e  p rocess  
o f  eq u i ty  i s  beyond th e  scope of th e  p r e s e n t  e f f o r t  t h e r e  
appears t o  be enough in fo rm at ion  a t  hand to  warrant  a t e n t a ­
t i v e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  a s t r u c t u r a l  o rg a n iz a t io n  of equ i ty  
th eo ry .  The fo l low ing  diagram i s  a composite o f  th e  p rev ious  
two diagrams (F ig u re s  5 and 6 ) p lu s  a few embellishments f o r  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n . ^
This eq u i ty  model may assume a s t a t e  of b a lan ce ,  a 
s t a r t i n g  p o in t  of e q u i ty ,  o r  a s t a t e  of  imbalance. I m p l i c i t  
i s  th e  s i m p l i s t i c  no t ion  t h a t  a s t im u lu s  w i l l  be followed by 
a response .  The im portan t  p o in t  i s  t h a t  the  model always 
seeks e q u i l ib r iu m  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  based on th e  very funda­
mental assumption t h a t  ba lance  i s  n a t u r a l .  Another p o in t  o f
The r e a d e r  i s  urged to  keep in  mind t h a t  t h i s  eq u i ty  
diagram i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  o r i e n t e d  towards the  pay and p e r f o r ­
mance r e l a t i o n s h i p  which i s  th e  emphasis o f  t h i s  s tudy .
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Equity Model 
Pay/Performance C o n c i l i a t i o n
O rgan iza t ion  
(Management)
Person 1 _ . IV Other
Op f Comparison 
I P rocess  i
Oa
|As Compared With| As Compared With
Ip \------------------------------------/ l a
7
P e r s o n 's  P e rcep t io n  
of  Equity of  
" f a i r n e s s "  of  
exchange
Overt Job Behavior 
o f  Person R e la t iv e  
to  Performance
Figure  7. An Equity Model
re levance  i s  t h a t  th e  equ i ty  model always p ro v id es  f o r  t e n ­
s ion  as a m o t iv a to r  ( th e  "d r iv e " )  t o  e i t h e r  m a in ta in  ba lance  
o r  r e s t o r e  b a lance  should th e  ba lance  s t a t e  be d i s tu rb e d .  A 
s id e  b e n e f i t  from such an assumption i s  t h a t  th e  e q u i ty  model 
p rov ides  a conceptual format fo r  ana lyz ing  normal job  behav io r  
as w e l l  as abnormal behav io r .
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As mentioned e a r l i e r  the  p ro ce s s  of  th e  equ i ty  model 
was the  l e a s t  unders tood p a r t  o f  th e  th e o ry .  The comparison 
p ro ces s  between Person and Other  i s  a unique,  p robably  s i t u a ­
t i o n a l ,  b lend  of  economic and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
in h e re n t  in  th e  e q u i ty  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  To b e t t e r  unders tand  
t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i t  seems th e  most p ro d u c t iv e  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  
i f  a study of th e  exchange beg in s  w ith  th e  outcome to  inpu t  
r a t i o ;  and once t h i s  i s  more c l e a r l y  unders tood ,  r e se a rc h  
should  seek a g r e a t e r  und ers tan d in g  o f  th e  more com plicated  
exchange between th e  o r g a n iz a t io n .  Person  and Other .  The 
fo l low ing  exper im en ta l  p rocedures  have been des igned to  
examine more c l o s e ly  two v a r i a b l e s  in  th e  outcome to  in p u t  
r a t i o .  Pay ( P e r s o n ' s  outcome) as  th e  independent v a r i a b l e  i s  
m an ipu la t ion  by th e  r e s e a r c h e r  ( o r  management) t o  b r in g  about 
a  change in  performance (P e r s o n ’s o u tp u t ) ,  th e  dependent v a r i ­
ab le .  As a response  to  p re s e n t  e v o lu t io n  of  eq u i ty  th e o ry ,  
performance i s  measured in  terms of  bo th  q u a n t i t a t i v e  (produc­
t i o n )  and q u a l i t y .  This  examination  i s  then  couched in  terms 
of  both  overpay and underpay c o n d i t io n s  which h o p e fu l ly  w i l l  
ex tend  t h e  meaningfulness  of  th e  i n q u i r y .  Measures of  job 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  a re  a l so  o b ta in e d  in  an a t tem pt  t o  i d e n t i f y  
o th e r  p o s s ib ly  e x i s t i n g  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  may be impact ing  on 
th e  exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p  between performance and pay. Re­
s t a t e d  in  a s imple f a sh ion  th e  r e s e a r c h  des ign  in ten d s  to  
i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  fo l low ing  r e l a t i o n s h i p s :
PERFORMANCE, ATTITUDE -  f(PAY)
CHAPTER I I I  
EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
Chapter I d e s c r ib e d  what t h i s  s tudy  in ten d ed  to  exam­
ine .  Chapter I I  examined what has been done r e l a t i v e  to  
eq u i ty  theory  as viewed by Adams and s e l e c t e d  o t h e r s .
Chapter I I I  d e s c r ib e s  th e  methodology o f  t h i s  s tudy  and how 
i t  was used. The r e s u l t s  and conc lus ions  a re  p r e s e n te d  in  
the  f i n a l  two c h a p te r s .
The r e s e a r c h  des ign  of  t h i s  s tudy  i s  based  on th e  theo ­
r e t i c a l  founda t ion  and em p ir ica l  f in d in g s  d isc u s se d  in  the  
p rev ious  ch ap te r  and i s  o f f e r e d  as a v i a b l e  e f f o r t  to  extend 
Adams' theo ry  o f  in e q u i ty .  This exper im en ta l  des ign  was used 
to  c o n t ro l  an e m p i r i c a l  f i e l d  s tudy in v o lv in g  w hi te  c o l l a r  
employees of  a medium-sized manufactur ing  f i rm  in  Oklahoma 
C i ty ,  Oklahoma.
Chapter  I I I  i s  d iv id e d  in to  fou r  s e c t i o n s :  f i r s t ,  a
b r i e f  s ta tem en t  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  invo lved  and th e  c o n d i t io n s  
of exper im enta l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  fo l lowed by an overview of  
the  complete experiment ; the  second s e c t i o n  i s  a d e s c r ip t i o n  
of th e  employees, t h e i r  work environment and th e  t a s k s  they 
perform; th e  t h i r d  s e c t io n  d e t a i l s  t h e  p rocedu res  used in  
c o l l e c t i n g  d a ta ;  and th e  hypotheses  to  be t e s t e d  a re  s t a t e d  
in  the  f i n a l  s e c t i o n .  A major h y p o th e s i s  and r e l a t e d  minor 
hypotheses a re  s t a t e d  f o r  T r i a l s  2, 3, 4, and 5.
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Sec t ion  1: V ar iab les  Examined and
I n te rv e n t io n  Condi t ions
The v a r i a b l e / s e t s  involved  in  t h i s  study are  pay, job 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  and performance a l l  p la ced  w i th in  the  framework 
o f  eq u i ty  th eo ry .  S p e c i f i c a l l y  th e  des ign  t e s t s :
1. Moderating e f f e c t  of  pay on performance,
2. Moderating e f f e c t  o f  pay on job  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
3. The p r e d i c t i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  eq u i ty  theory  as i t
r e l a t e s  to  the  p a y , performance and job s a t i s f a c ­
t i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Condi t ions  of  exper im en ta l  i n t e r v e n t io n  c o n s i s te d  of:
1. Hourly pay w i l l  remain th e  same fo r  one experimen­
t a l  group (E^) and th e  c o n t ro l  group (C i) ;
2. Hourly pay w i l l  be a l t e r e d  f o r  one experimenta l
group ( E2 );
3. Undercompensation as induced by experimenta l  con­
d i t i o n s  fo r  exper im en ta l  group E^;
4. Overcompensation as induced by experimenta l  con­
d i t i o n s  fo r  experim enta l  group E2 ; and
5. Moderating e f f e c t s  o f  pay d i f f o r i e n t a t i o n  in  a
"normal" work environment.
The re se a rch  des ign  can be b e s t  de sc r ib ed  as c o n s i s t i n g  
o f  seven s e q u e n t i a l  s t e p s .
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Step 1
The f i r s t  s t e p  c o n s i s t e d  of d e s c r ib in g  th e  s tudy and 
tak ing  P r e t r i a l  measures of performance and a t t i t u d e  f o r  l a t e r  
comparative purposes .  All  e l i g i b l e  employees were given a 
b r i e f i n g  about th e  s tudy  and were i n v i t e d  to  p a r t i c i p a t e .
(See Appendix E fo r  a t r a n s c r i p t  of th e  ex p lan a t io n  o f f e r e d  
during the  b r i e f i n g  c o n fe re n c e . )  Those who chose to  p a r t i c i ­
p a te  in  th e  s tudy were asked to  complete the  demographic ques­
t i o n n a i r e  (See Appendix A) and the  Job D esc r ip t io n  Index (JDI) 
(See Appendix A) and r e t u r n  them to  us p r i o r  to  le av in g  th e  
co n fe ren ce .^  Performance measures were taken fo r  th e  four  
hour p e r io d  p r i o r  to  th e  meeting.
Step 2
Step 2 r e p re s e n te d  th e  f i r s t  o f  f i v e  t r i a l s  t h a t  were 
conducted. Performance measures were taken and a JDI was 
f i l l e d  out by a l l  employees a t  th e  end of  th e  fou r  hour t r i a l .
Step 3
The t h i r d  s t e p  o f  th e  experiment again  invo lved  ta k in g  
performance and JDI measures.  This s t e p  c o n s t i t u t e d  T r i a l  2 
and was th e  f i r s t  t r i a l  where pay was a l t e r e d  f o r  one o f  the  
two exper im enta l  groups.  Pay was in c re a se d  by ten  p e rce n t  
pe r  hour f o r  fou r  hours  f o r  experim enta l  group Eg.
^So f a r  as i s  known only one person who a t t e n d e d  th e  
b r i e f i n g  conference  chose not to  p a r t i c i p a t e ;  s i x  o t h e r  em­
ployees  were absent  from work on th e  day o f  th e  b r i e f i n g  con­
fe ren ce ;  th u s ,  th e  f i f t y  p a r t i c i p a n t s  c o n s t i t u t e  n i n e t y - f i v e  
p e rcen t  of  a l l  e l i g i b l e  employees.
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Step 4
This s t e p ,  o r  T r i a l  3, was th e  same as T r i a l  2 except  
pay was in c re a s e d  by t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  f o r  th e  same exper im enta l  
group E2 -
Step 5
T r i a l  4 was again the  same as T r i a l s  2 and 3 except 
the  pay in c re a s e  fo r  exper im enta l  group Eg amounted to  f i f t e e n  
p e r c e n t .
Step 6
T r i a l  5 was th e  l a s t  t r i a l  and c o n s i s te d  only o f  ta k in g  
performance and JDI measures. There was no a l t e r a t i o n  in  th e  
pay of  any group.
Step 7
Step 7 c o n s i s te d  of t a k in g  performance and JDI measures 
as had been done in  th e  P r e t r i a l  S ess ions .  Following t h i s  a 
d e b r i e f in g  conference was he ld  du r ing  which a l l  employees were 
t o l d  o f  th e  g en e ra l  i n t e n t  of  th e  ex pe r im en t . Checks were 
d i s t r i b u t e d  to  a l l  employees in  th e  Contro l  group (C^) and 
th e  one exper im enta l  group (E%) who had not r e ce iv ed  any 
augmentation of t h e i r  pay during  T r i a l s  2, 3 and 4. This pay­
ment r e s t o r e d  the  equ i ty  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  fo r  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s .
The o b je c t i v e  of  th e  des ign  was to  examine th e  e f f e c t s  
o f  changing pay on performance ( o v e r t  job  behav ior)  and job 
s a t i s f a c t i o n .  The goal o f  the  des ign  was to  t e s t  th e  accuracy
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of p r e d i c t i o n s  made on th e  b a s i s  o f  Adams' (1963a, 1965) 
in e q u i ty  theo ry  in  an i n d u s t r i a l  environment.
S ec t ion  2; Employee, Task and Work 
Environment C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
The employees c o n s t i t u t i n g  the  p o p u la t io n  f o r  t h i s  
s tudy  were employed in  th e  P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  and Data P ro c ­
e s s in g  Departments a t  STAR Manufacturing Company, Oklahoma 
C i ty ,  Oklahoma.
P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  Department Employees
The P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  Department c o n s i s t s  o f  f i f t y -  
n ine  p e rso n s ,  under the  l e a d e r s h ip  of  th e  P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  
Manager: f o r ty - s e v e n  draf tsm en,  e ig h t  squad l e a d e r s ,  two
s e c r e t a r i e s  and one D ra f t in g  S u p e rv i s o r .^  Only th e  s e c r e ­
t a r i e s  a re  women.
The d raf tsm en a re  d iv id e d  in to  e i g h t  squads, each 
headed by a squad l e a d e r  who appears  to  be a h y b r id  f i r s t l i n e  
s u p e rv i s o r  and lead  man. The squad l e a d e r  works in  the  s e c ­
t i o n  a l l o c a t e d  to  h i s  squad. The p r o d u c t i v i t y  and q u a l i t y  
o f  o u tp u t  appears  t o  be th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  squad l e a d e r .  
His r o l e  i s  viewed as be ing  c r u c i a l  to  th e  e f f i c i e n c y  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  th e  P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  Department.
The draf tsmen themselves a re  c l a s s i f i e d  in  fo u r  g rades :  
S en io r  Draftsmen, Draftsmen, J u n io r  Draftsmen and Checker.
^P lease  r e f e r  t o  Appendix B f o r  Job D es c r ip t io n s  of  
d raf tsm en and s u p e rv i s o r s .
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The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  in  t h e i r  usua l  work ass ignments .  The 
fo l low ing  m a tr ix  i s  used to  show th e  number o f  draf tsmen by 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  made up th e  t h r e e  groups in  the  experiment
Draftsmen Draftsmen c r lT tsm M  Checker T o ta l
Control
Group (Cl)  0 8  1 3 12
Experimental
Group (E l )  1 9 3 1 14
Experimental
Group (E2 ) 3 7 1 3 14
Not P a r t i c i ­
p a t in g  2 3 2 0 7
T o ta l  6  27 7 7 47
Figure  8 . Occupational  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  Draftsmen
The D ra f t in g  Contro l  S uperv iso r  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  
s chedu l ing  and m on i to r ing  a l l  d r a f t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  w i th in  Pro­
duct ion  D ra f t in g .  This  a l s o  invo lves  co o rd in a t in g  d r a f t i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  w ith  S a les  S e rv ice ,  M a te r ia l  and P roduc t ion  Contro l  
and E ng ineer ing  s e c t i o n s  in  th e  p l a n t .
D ra f t in g  Department F a c i l i t i e s
The D ra f t in g  Department i s  lo c a te d  in  a s i n g l e  room 
(98 '  X 6 9 ' )  which i s  p a r t i t i o n e d  i n t o  seven s e c t i o n s  by 
d i v i d e r s  f i v e  f e e t  h ig h .^  Each o f  th e se  seven s e c t i o n s  i s  th e  
work a re a  o f  a s i n g l e  squad, except f o r  one l a r g e  s e c t i o n  
which p ro v id es  space f o r  two squads.  The a d m in i s t r a t i v e
^Refer  to  Appendix C fo r  la y o u ts  of  th e  d r a f t i n g  
department and keypunch room.
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o f f i c e s  are l o c a te d  ac ross  a h a l l  from th e  d r a f t i n g  room and 
open out i n to  th e  a rea .  Each draftsman has two d r a f t i n g  
t a b l e s ,  s i t s  on a swivel  s to o l  between those  t a b l e s ,  and has 
th e  most u p - to -d a te  equipment a v a i l a b l e  f o r  manual d r a f t i n g .  
The d r a f t i n g  a r e a  i s  f u l l y  ca rp e ted ,  w e l l  l i g h t e d ,  paneled  
and viewed by th e  exper im ente r  as be ing  n i c e ly  appoin ted .  The 
d iv id e r s  are  a l s o  pane led  except fo r  the  top  e ig h teen  inches 
which i s  g l a s s .
S oc ia l  Environment
Although t h i s  i s  not known f o r  c e r t a i n ,  most o f  the  
s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  dur ing  a c tu a l  working hours  appears to  
take  p la ce  w i th in  each squad. There i s  however a h igh degree 
of communication between squads dur ing  b re ak s ,  th e  lunch 
p e r io d  and a f t e r  work. A squad le a d e r  appears  to  take  an 
a c t i v e  p a r t  in  the  normal s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  p ro c e s se s .  The 
Squad Leaders ,  l i k e  th e  Draftsmen, s i t  between two d r a f t i n g  
t a b l e s .  There i s  ap p a ren t ly  no f ix e d  r o u t in e  fo r  th e  supe r io r -  
su b o rd in a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a Squad Leader and h i s  
draf tsmen. In  some squads th e  Squad Leader moves around from 
one d r a f t i n g  t a b l e  to  ano ther  (and between squads to  confer  
with o th e r  Squad Leaders)  w hile  in  o th e r s  he remains a t  h i s  
d r a f t i n g  t a b l e  and th e  Draftsmen come to  him.
While i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  r i sk y  to  s p e c u la te  about c l im a te  
in  a given department i t  does seem t h a t  th e  D ra f t in g  Depart­
ment could be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as having p o s i t i v e  Squad Leader— 
Draftsmen r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Each squad does appear  to  fu n c t io n
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as a cohesive group. Squads do compete with  one ano ther  
e s p e c i a l l y  where " tu rn  backs" (which a re  m is takes  made by 
d r a f t i n g  pe rso n n e l )  a re  concerned. However, documentation 
of  t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  i s  beyond th e  scope o f  t h i s  s tu d y .
Data P rocess ing  Employees
Employees t a k in g  p a r t  in  th e  experiment c o n s i s t e d  of  
a l l  ten  Data Conversion Opera to rs  ( i . e . ,  Keypunchers) employed 
by STAR: s i x  worked on th e  8  am -  5 pm s h i f t ,  and fo u r  on the
5 pm -  2 am s h i f t .  The age range o f  th e  a l l - f e m a l e  p o p u la t io n  
was from twenty to  t h i r t y - e i g h t .  These women performed the  
key punching and v e r i f y in g  t a s k s  normally a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  t h i s  
job .
F a c i l i t i e s
The room where a l l  of th e s e  women worked was f u l l y  
enc losed ,  measured 31' x 16' and was d eco ra ted  w ith  p an e l in g ,  
c a rp e t ,  a c c o u s t i c a l  t i l e  on th e  upper p o r t i o n  o f  th e  w a l l s  and 
c e i l i n g  and was p a in te d  in  p l e a s a n t  c o l o r s .  The keypunch 
machines were of  th e  newer, n o i s e l e s s  des ign .  In one corner  
o f  the  room a low p a r t i t i o n  (4 '  6 " in  h e ig h t )  s e p a ra te d  the  
Data Conversion S u p e r v i s o r ' s  desk from th e  machines.  The 
s u p e rv i s o r  did not  t y p i c a l l y  spend a g r e a t  dea l  o f  t ime a t  
he r  desk; i n s t e a d  she moved around th e  keypunch room o r  went 
t o  the  d a ta  p ro ces s in g  room ac ross  t h e  h a l l  from the  keypunch 
room.
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S o c ia l  Environment
The s o c i a l  environment of  the  keypunch room appeared 
to  be one o f  high in fo rm at ion  exchange and concern fo r  each 
o th e r ;  to  an o u t s i d e r ,  such as t h i s  exper im ente r ,  i t  seemed 
a r a t h e r  p l e a s a n t  work environment.  The Data Conversion 
Superv iso r  confirmed t h i s  impression  when she commented t h a t  
" the  g i r l s  g e t  along very w e l l ,  which i s  not usua l  in  most 
keypunch dep a r tm en ts ."
S ec t io n  3: Research Design and
Data C o l le c t in g  Procedures
The exper im enta l  des ign  (See F igure  9) r e p r e s e n t s  th e  
s t r u c t u r a l  o r g a n iz a t io n  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y .  Seven primary com­
ponents comprise t h e  design  as can be no ted  by reviewing 
F igure  9, and th e s e  are :
1. Time
2. T r i a l s  (T^ -  T5 )
3. Contro l  Group (C^)
4. Experimental  Group 1 (E^)
5. Experimental  Group 2 (Eg)
6 . P r e t r i a l  measures
7. P o s t t r i a l  measures
D e ta i l s  about each of  th e s e  components w i l l  inform th e  
r ea d e r  o f  th e  p rocedures  by which th e  da ta  were c o l l e c t e d  f o r  
t h i s  r e s e a r c h .  This ch a p te r  w i l l  conclude with  comments about 
how employees were chosen f o r  t h i s  s tudy  and about t h e  payment 
which was made fo r  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
TRIALS
T r i a l s P r e t r i a l T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 P o s t t r i a l
Time (Date) 6/19 6 / 2 0 6/24 6/27 7/1 7/3 7/5
Measures :
Performance Output Oo Ol ° 2 O3 O4 O5 0 6
Performance Q u a l i ty Qo Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Qs Q6
A t t i t u d e s  
Demographic Data
Ao
Do
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 Ae
Group
Contro l
Exper imenta l
Exper imenta l
E l
E r
0%
0%
Employees Pay Change During 
T r i a l s  in  P e rcen t
0%
0%
0%
0% 0%
0% 0%
0% 0%
0% 10% 30% 15% 0%
( i n c )  ( i n c )  ( i n c )
0%
0%
(O
G)
Fig u re  9. Overview of  S t r u c t u r e  f o r  th e  Research  Design
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Time and T r i a l s
A f te r  an e x te n s iv e  p e r io d  o f  development invo lv ing  
STAR management pe rsonne l  a mutual agreement was reached to  
i n i t i a t e  th e  experiment on June 18, 1974. The experiment was 
concluded on Ju ly  14, 1974, w ith  a d e b r i e f i n g  f o r  a l l  invo lved  
employees and STAR management. The fo l lo w in g  t ime schedu le  
summarizes th e  p r i n c i p a l  even ts  in  conduc t ing  th e  experiment:  
June 18: A ll  D ra f t in g  Department Squad Leaders were given a
thorough b r i e f i n g  as t o  what was p lanned  f o r  th e  experiment.  
The i n t e n t  o f  th e  experiment,  t h e  q u e s t io n n a i r e s  to  be used 
and the  Squad L e a d e r s ' r o l e  in  measuring th e  performance of  
draf tsmen were f u l l y  d iscussed .
June 19: At 4:30 p.m. an employee b r i e f i n g  was conducted in
th e  main conference  room at  STAR Manufacturing fo r  a l l  d r a f t ­
ing p e r s o n n e l . A f te r  a very g en e ra l  s ta tem e n t  about the  
s tudy ,  th e  mechanics o f  completing th e  two q u e s t io n n a i r e s  were 
ex p la in ed .  This  p r e s e n ta t i o n  was r eco rded  and a t r a n s c r i p t i o n  
i s  reproduced  in  Appendix D. The demographic and JDI ques­
t i o n n a i r e s  were completed by a l l  d raf tsm en a t t e n d in g  th e  
b r i e f i n g ,  except  th e  one who chose no t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  th e  
s tudy .
A second employee b r i e f i n g  f o r  a l l  keypunch pe rsonne l  
began a t  5:10 p.m. and had e s s e n t i a l l y  th e  same con ten t  as 
the  f i r s t .  Personnel  from both  th e  f i r s t  and second s h i f t s  
a t t e n d e d  t h i s  b r i e f i n g ;  a l l  keypunch p e r so n n e l  agreed to  p a r ­
t i c i p a t e  in  th e  s tudy .
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June 20: T r i a l  (T-1) was i n i t i a t e d  fo r  a l l  Ss a t  8:00 a.m.
The leng th  of  a l l  t r i a l s  was fo u r  hours ,  beg inning  a t  8:00 
in  th e  morning, and ending a t  12:00 noon of  the  same day. The 
Ss d id  not know of  th e s e  t r i a l s  as such and only knew t h a t  
they had been r e q u e s te d  to  complete a JDI j u s t  b e fo re  noon.
Nor d id  th e  Ss know t h a t  performance measures were be ing  taken 
f o r  t h a t  p e r io d .  Thj.s secrecy  was necessa ry  to  avoid  p o s s i b l e  
con tam ina t ion .  The JDI was adm in is te red  to  the  d r a f t i n g  p e r ­
sonne l  a t  11:30 a.m. and to  th e  keypunching personne l  a t  11:45 
a.m. On th e  average i t  took f i v e  minutes f o r  an i n d iv i d u a l  
employee to  complete t h e  JDI.
June 24: T r i a l  (T-2) began a t  8:00 a.m. w i th  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n
of a memorandum^ to  employees in  th e  two exper im en ta l  groups 
(E l  and Eg). The memo was enc losed  in  an in d iv i d u a l l y
addressed  envelope.  The memorandum announcing t h a t  a tempo-
2r a ry  pay in c re a s e  o f  t e n  p e rc e n t  pe r  hour fo r  fo u r  hours 
would be given to  c e r t a i n  named employees. The employees so 
named a c t u a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  exper im en ta l  group E2  and each of 
th e s e  persons  had a check a t t a c h e d  to  h i s  memo.
Beginning w ith  T-2 th e r e  were some q u e s t io n s  in  th e  
employees'  minds about some r e c e iv in g  pay and some n o t .  T-2 
was th e  f i r s t  t r i a l  to  b eg in  w ith  an in c re a s e  in  pay ( t e n  p e r ­
cen t )  which in  terms o f  s i z e  o f  check amounted to  $1.00 to
sample copy o f  t h i s  memorandum i s  p re s e n te d  in  
Appendix E.
^Or s t a t e d  ano the r  way th o se  s e l e c t e d  employees would 
r e c e iv e  110 p e rc e n t  pay f o r  fo u r  hours .
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$1.50. Both the  Draftsmen and Data Conversion O pera to rs  were 
cu r ious  about th e  obvious d i s c r im in a t io n  r e l a t i v e  to  who got 
pa id .  One Draftsman in  one of  th e  squads r e c e iv in g  pay ( i n  
th e  E2  group) asked why they r e c e iv e d  pay and some o f  the  
o th e r s  d id  no t .  The experim ente r  was asked t h i s  q ues t ion  
while  p as s in g  out th e  JDIs and responded by i n d i c a t i n g  i t  was 
probably  th e  r e s u l t  of some confusion  somewhere and he would 
t r y  to  do something about i t .  A Data Conversion O pera tor ,  
a l s o  a member of  th e  E2  group, asked why she had r e ce iv e d  pay 
and some of the  o th e r  g i r l s  had no t .  The exper im ente r  gave 
h e r  th e  same answer as he had given th e  Draftsman.
As s e v e r a l  Draftsmen were absen t  on June 19th ( th e  
employee b r i e f i n g )  they were not inc luded  in  th e  experiment.  
Management however f e l t  t h a t  they  should  be and as a r e s u l t  
they were b r i e f e d ,  asked to  f i l l  out q u e s t io n n a i r e s ,  and made 
to  f e e l  a p a r t  o f  th e  experiment.  T heir  d a ta  however had to  
be o m it ted  p r i o r  to  th e  a n a ly s i s  phase of  th e  experiment.
JDI q u e s t io n n a i r e s  were once again completed a t  11:30 
a.m. and 11:45.
June 27: T r i a l  (T-3) fo llowed t h e  same r o u t in e  as T-2 in
every p a r t i c u l a r  except th e  pay in c r e a s e  was t h i r t y  p e r c e n t .
I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  a f t e r  T-2 no Ss asked about the  
d i s c r im in a t io n  in  pay. In f a c t  t h e  jok ing  and g en e ra l  f r i e n d ­
l i n e s s  exp ressed  in  T-1 and T-2 by th e  Ss towards th e  e x p e r i ­
menter  n o t i c e a b ly  d e c l in e d  from t h a t  p o in t .  The only  q u es t io n  
asked from t h a t  p o in t  on was how many t imes do we ( th e  em­
p loyees)  have to  f i l l  out the  a t t i t u d e  q u e s t io n n a i r e .
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The Ss a l s o  did not know t h a t  pay in c re a s e s  f o r  E2  and 
no pay in c r e a s e s  f o r  Ej, was p rea r ran g ed  during  th e  experimen­
t a l  p e r io d .  For t h a t  m a t te r  th e  Ss d id  not know they  had 
been grouped as C^, Ei o r  Eg groups.
Ju ly  1: T r i a l  (T-4) was l i k e  T-2 and T-3 except t h a t  pay
in c r e a s e  f o r  th e  Eg group amounted to  f i f t e e n  p e r c e n t .
Ju ly  3: T r i a l  (T-5) was l i k e  T-1 in  t h a t  only the  performance
measures were taken and JDI ad m in is te red .
Ju ly  14: A f te r  a l l  employees had completed th e  JDI f o r  the
P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d ,  a d e b r i e f in g  s e s s io n  was scheduled  dur ing  
which a l l  employees were informed as to  what th e  s tudy  was 
about and what was hoped would be gained  from th e  s tudy .
Checks were g iven to  a l l  employees in  th e  c o n t ro l  group (C^) 
and th e  exper im en ta l  group (E^) to  show a p p r e c ia t io n  f o r  t h e i r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  s tudy .
Contro l  Group (C^)
The assignment of  p a r t i c i p a n t s  to  one o f  t h r e e  groups 
was made on the  b a s i s  and u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a t a b l e  o f  random 
numbers. Draftsmen were a s s igned  by squads to  one of  the  
th r e e  groups.  The second s h i f t  Data Conversion Opera tors  
were a s s ig n ed  to  Contro l  Group (C%) and the  f i r s t  s h i f t  Data 
Conversion O pera tors  were a s s igned  to  t h e  remaining two e x p e r i ­
mental groups on the  b a s i s  o f  th e  random number t a b l e .  The 
reason f o r  a l l  t h i s  was to  avoid  p o s s i b l e  con tam inat ion .  A ll  
th e  employees knew was t h a t  they  were p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  a s tudy 
on a t t i t u d e  b e ing  conducted by a t e a c h e r  from th e  U n iv e r s i ty
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of Oklahoma, and t h a t  they would r e c e iv e  a small  amount of
pay f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i n g .  The c o n t r o l  group (C^) was to  p rov ide
a b a s e l in e  f o r  comparing th e  changes brought about in  th e
exper im enta l  groups through exper im en ta l  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The
c o n s i s t e d  o f  twelve d r a f t i n g  pe rso n n e l  and fou r  keypunch
p e rso n n e l .  D ra f t in g  pe rso n n e l  in  were t o l d  t h a t  because
o f  the  unusual  number who chose to  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  th e  s tudy
t h a t  they  would not be asked to  f i l l  out q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  u n t i l
th e  very end of th e  experiment ( t h a t  i s  f o r  T r i a l s  1 -5 ) .  The
Cl was a l s o  t o l d  th e  d i s c r i m in a t io n  was made on th e  b a s i s  o f
a "drawing" and ex p la in ed  as f o l lo w s :^
"Because of  t h e  unexpected p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  s tudy  
and because we only need a s s i s t a n c e  from about two- 
t h i r d s  o f  you we j u s t  p icked  some squads to  p a r t i c i ­
p a t e  by drawing from a h a t .  The squads no t  be ing  
asked to  he lp  w i l l  be invo lved  in  th e  f i n a l  meeting 
and w i l l  r e c e iv e  your checks anyway."
For the keypunching pe rsonne l  t h e  above message was changed
to  in c lu d e  names r a t h e r  than  squads .  No c o n ta c t  was made w ith
the  Cl group a f t e r  t h i s  message u n t i l  the  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .
However performance measures were taken  f o r  t h i s  group j u s t
as they were f o r  both exper im en ta l  groups.
Exper imental  Group 1 (E i)
Measures of both performance and a t t i t u d e  were taken  
f o r  El group on a p e r  t r i a l  b a s i s .  The pay f o r  Ei group
This i s  a near  r ep ro d u c t io n  o f  th e  announcement made 
by th e  exper im en te r ;  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  su sp e c t  some v a r ia n ce  
in  the  e x p la n a t io n  because i t  was r e p e a te d ,  a f t e r  th e  o r i g i n a l  
s ta tem en t  p re s e n te d  to  th e  f i r s t  squad, t h r e e  t im es  to  two 
d i f f e r e n t  d r a f t i n g  squads and th e  second s h i f t  in  keypunching.
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members d id  not change a t  any t ime during  th e  s tu d y ;  however, 
t h i s  group was informed v ia  memoranda t h a t  c e r t a i n  work as so ­
c i a t e s  (who c o n s t i t u t e d  group E2 ) were r e c e iv in g  a d d i t i o n a l  
pay a t  T-2, T-3 and T-4. Equity  theo ry  would p r e d i c t ,  how­
eve r ,  t h a t  the  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  group E2  would be p e rc e iv ed  
as an i n e q u i ty  by group E^ and would, consequen t ly ,  a f f e c t  the  
performance of group E^. The f a i l u r e  to  r e c e iv e  t h e  add i­
t i o n a l  pay would be cons ide red  by E^ as a form o f  undercom­
p e n s a t io n .  Note t h a t  group E^ d id  not a c t u a l l y  have t h e i r  pay 
dec reased  bu t  were r e a c t in g  to  t h e  pay in c re a s e  awarded to  
group E2  f o r  T r i a l s  2, 3 and 4. A ctua l ly  dec re as in g  pay f o r  
group El  was cons ide red  i n f e a s i b l e  fo r  two reasons :  F i r s t ,
pay in  most o rg a n iz a t io n s  i s  reduced  only f o r  compell ing  
reaso n s ;  t h e r e f o r e  a r e d u c t io n  in  pay would c r e a t e  an u n l ik e ly  
s i t u a t i o n .  Secondly, STAR'S management was u n w i l l in g  to  ex­
p e r ie n c e  th e  p o t e n t i a l  problems t h a t  could  be caused by r e ­
ducing normal pay. Managers in te rv iew ed  concern ing  t h i s  s tudy 
ex p ressed  u n eas in e ss  about doing anyth ing  to  "a man 's  pay ,"  
e i t h e r  d e c re a s in g  or  in c r e a s in g  i t ,  bu t  fewer problems were 
expec ted  w i th  a temporary i n c r e a s e  in  pay.
Experimenta l  Group 2 (E2 )
Measures o f  both performance and a t t i t u d e  were taken 
f o r  each t r i a l .  Pay was in c r e a s e d  f o r  each employee in  E2  
on T r i a l s  2, 3 and 4 by a s t a t e d  pe rcen tage  i n c r e a s e  based  on 
th e  hourly  pay c u r r e n t ly  ea rned  by t h a t  employee. The i n ­
c rea sed  pay amounted to  te n  p e r c e n t  f o r  T r i a l  2, t h i r t y
103
p e rc e n t  f o r  T r i a l  3, and f i f t e e n  p e r c e n t  f o r  T r i a l  4. In 
T r i a l  2, when th e  inc rem en ta l  pay was te n  p e r c e n t ,  the  checks 
ranged from $1.00 to  $1.50 fo r  th e  fo u r -h o u r  t r i a l  p e r io d .
Pay was h e ld  "normal" fo r  T r i a l s  1 and 5. Equity  theory  would 
p r e d i c t  t h a t  performance fo r  E2  shou ld  i n c r e a s e  fo r  T r i a l s  2,
3 and 4; a t t i t u d e s  should  a l so  be a l t e r e d  f o r  T r i a l s  2, 3, 4 
and 5. This  in c r e a s e  in  pay r e p re s e n te d  overcompensation.
P r e t r i a l  Measures
P r e t r i a l  measures,  l i k e  the  p o s t t r i a l  measures, were 
in c o rp o ra te d  i n t o  th e  des ign to  add a g r e a t e r  element of  con­
t r o l .  The p r e t r i a l  measures c o n s i s t e d  o f  th e  demographic 
q u e s t io n n a i r e ,  th e  JDI q u e s t io n n a i r e  and th e  measures of  o u t ­
put and q u a l i t y  o f  performance.
Demographic Q u es t io n n a i re :  The Demographic Q ues t ionna ire  was
des igned to  g a th e r  b a s i c  d a ta  such as age, sex, educa t ion ,  
e t c . , about each S in  o rd e r  t o  be ab le  t o  c o n s t ru c t  a p r o f i l e  
of  th e  invo lved  Ss and to  a id  in  th e  a n a ly s i s .  Much of  t h i s  
in fo rm at io n  i s  adm it ted ly  a v a i l a b l e  in  p e r so n n e l  reco rd s ,  
however by a d m in is t e r in g  i t  a t  th e  o n se t  o f  th e  s tudy  the  
exper im en te rs  were more as su red  of  having c u r r e n t  in fo rm at ion .  
Also in c lu d ed  in  th e  demographic q u e s t io n n a i r e  was a s e c t io n  
des igned to  a s s e s s  th e  Ss pe rce ived  p r e s e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a ­
t i o n .  This  was taken from Smith e t  (1965) and i s  termed
the  Retirement D e s c r ip t iv e  Index (RDI). The complete RDI was 
not used and i n s t e a d  only th e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t u s  p o r t io n  was 
u t i l i z e d .
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Job D esc r ip t iv e  Index (JD I) :  The JDI was used to  a s s e s s  th e
a t t i t u d e  of  each S p r i o r  to  th e  s tudy .  I t  was subsequent ly  
inc luded  in  a l l  t r i a l s  and p o s t t r i a l  measures.  The JDI i s  a 
job s a t i s f a c t i o n  measure which uses  a t h r e e - p o i n t  s c a l e .  This 
simple bu t  im press ive  ins t rum ent  was developed by P a t r i c i a  
Smith and h e r  a s s o c i a t e s  a t  C orne l l  U n iv e r s i ty  and has been 
widely used in  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  r e se a rc h .  A more comprehensive 
d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  JDI i s  found in Appendix A.
Performance Measures: Performance measures f o r  th e  p r e t r i a l
p e r io d  were i d e n t i c a l  t o  those  taken  fo r  a l l  t r i a l s  and the  
p o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .  Performance was measured f o r  a l l  employees 
on th e  b a s i s  o f  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  o f  o u tp u t .  For d r a f t i n g  
pe rsonne l  performance measures were made on th e  b a s i s  o f  judg­
ment by t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  Squad Leaders.
Performance measures fo r  the  Data Conversion O pera tors  
a re  more o b j e c t i v e  and, q u i t e  ex p ec ted ly ,  r e a d i ly  q u a n t i f i e d :  
they a re  key s t r o k e s  p e r  hour and number o f  e r r o r s .  Keystroke 
i s  a common measure used to  determine th e  amount o f  ou tpu t  f o r  
a given keypuncher w i th in  a given t ime p e r io d .  Keystroke i s  
th e  t o t a l  number o f  t imes a Data Conversion Operator  punches 
a c h a r a c t e r  i n t o  a punch card .  Q ua l i ty  was measured on the  
b a s i s  o f  the  number o f  e r r o r s  a Data Conversion Operator  makes 
while  keypunching. T h is  e r r o r  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  through th e  v e r i ­
f i c a t i o n  p ro ce s s  o r  during  e d i t i n g  in  th e  machine room. V er i­
f i c a t i o n  e r r o r s  a re  i d e n t i f i e d  dur ing  th e  e d i t i n g  p ro ces s .
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P o s t t r i a l  Measures
P o s t t r i a l  measures were taken on a l l  Ss a f t e r  comple­
t i o n  of th e  s tudy .  They were i d e n t i c a l  t o  th e  t r i a l  measures 
and c o n s i s te d  of  th e  JDI q u e s t io n n a i r e  and the  measures of 
output  and q u a l i t y  o f  pe r fo rm ance .
Beyond the  fo rego ing  comments on th e  primary  components 
which comprise th e  exper im en ta l  des ign ,  some remarks should  be 
made about t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  personne l  fo r  the  s tudy  and the  
payments made to  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s .
Employee Sample
The sample invo lved  in  t h e  experiment c o n s i s t e d  o f  a l l  
bu t  seven P roduc t ion  D ra f t in g  draftsmen and a l l  Data Conversion 
O pera to rs .  Of th e  seven draf tsmen not p a r t i c i p a t i n g  four  were 
on a scheduled  v a c a t io n  and two were absent  on th e  day of  the  
i n i t i a l  b r i e f i n g .  One draf tsman e l e c t e d  no t  t o  t a k e  p a r t  in 
the  s tudy .  There were however seven draftsmen o u t s id e  of 
Produc t ion  D ra f t in g  who were not inc luded  in  th e  experiment.  
Management would no t  a u th o r iz e  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  the  seven 
because t h e i r  work was c h i e f l y  developmental in  c h a r a c t e r  and 
they p r e f e r r e d  not  t o  b o th e r  them. All  keypunch pe rsonne l  
were invo lved .  The sample s i z e  by group was:
Data
Draftsmen Conversion Totals /Group 
O pera to rs
Control  Group (C^) 12 4 16
Experimental Group 1 (E^) 14 3 17
Experimental Group 2 (E2 ) 14 3 17
Not P a r t i c i p a t i n g  7 -  7
Total 47 10 57
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The sample c o n s i s t e d  o f  n i n e t y - f i v e  p e rc e n t  o f  a l l  p ro d u c t io n  
draf tsmen and one hundred p e rce n t  o f  a l l  keypunchers;  o r  
e i g h t y - e i g h t  p e rce n t  o f  the  p e r so n n e l  employed in t h e s e  two 
j o b s .
One i s s u e  touched on e a r l i e r  in  S ec t io n  3 deserves  
s p e c i a l  mention. The performance measures f o r  keypunching 
have proven to  be adequate  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h i s  ex p e r im en t’s 
des ign  c r i t e r i a .  The n a tu re  o f  th e  d r a f t i n g  t a s k  r e q u i r e d  
t h a t  a s p e c i a l  performance measure system be dev ised .  The 
d r a f t i n g  t a s k  has a g r e a t  dea l  of in h e re n t  v a r i a b i l i t y  in 
terms of complexity  and t ime requ irem en ts :  no two jo b s  a re
a l i k e .  D e ta i l  work, o r  what the  layman would c a l l  th e  draw­
ing a c t i v i t y ,  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by extremes r e l a t i v e  to  time 
and com plexi ty .  In th e  D ra f t in g  Department th e  D ra f t in g  Con­
t r o l  S u p erv iso r  a s s ig n s  a given p r o j e c t  to  a draf tsman on th e  
b a s i s  of h i s  presumed s k i l l .  A S en io r  Draftsman i s  a s s ig n ed  
th e  most complex p r o j e c t s ,  a Draftsman l e s s  complex p r o j e c t s  
and a J u n io r  Draftsman the  s im p le r  p r o j e c t s .  The D ra f t in g  
C on tro l  S u p e rv iso r  makes an i n i t i a l  d e te rm in a t io n  of  how long 
each p r o j e c t  shou ld  ta k e  and a l though  he i s  n ea r ly  a c c u ra te  
in  h i s  e s t im a te  t h e r e  i s  some d isc repancy  between th e  Sched­
u l e r ' s  e s t im a te  and th e  a c tu a l  number o f  manhours used to  
complete the  p r o j e c t .  In a d d i t i o n  Draftsmen do not  engage in  
d e t a i l  work (o r  what a layman might c a l l  "drawing") a l l  the  
t ime. P a r t  of  t h e i r  time i s  spen t  in  c a l c u l a t i n g  and o rg a n iz ­
ing co n c e p tu a l ly  what must be done to  produce a f i n a l  s e t  o f  
drawings. Draftsmen a l so  compute sh ip p in g  l i s t s  which i s
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l e s s  time consuming than  o th e r  forms o f  d r a f t i n g  work; bu t  
sh ip p in g  l i s t s ,  too ,  vary with  r e s p e c t  to  th e  time and e f f o r t  
r e q u i r e d .  Another measurement problem a r i s e s  from th e  f a c t  
t h a t  a p r o j e c t  may r e q u i r e  days o r  weeks to  complete; th e  
D ra f t in g  Manager and Squad Leaders were convinced t h a t  i t  i s  
next to  im poss ib le  to  a c c u r a te ly  e v a lu a t e  a d r a f t s m a n 's  a c tu a l  
ou tpu t  du r ing  any four-hour  span.
Because o f  a l l  th e se  c o m p lex i t ie s  th e  exper im en te r  was 
c o n s t r a in e d  t o  r e ly  on th e  Squad L e a d e r ' s  assessment, o f  each 
em ployee 's  performance fo r  each fo u r -h o u r  t r i a l  p e r io d .  A 
s t a n d a rd iz e d  form was dev ised  and used f o r  t h i s  purpose  (See 
Appendix F ) . A b r i e f  t r a i n i n g  p e r io d  was he ld  p r i o r  t o  th e  
experiment t o  show th e  Squad Leaders how to  r eco rd  t h e i r  
assessm ents  on t h i s  form. Based on t h e  d i f f e r i n g  responses  
by a Squad Leader f o r  a given employee from one t r i a l  to  the  
next  t h e r e  was some meaning in  t h e i r  measurement. Should th e  
performance measures f o r  and Eg have not v a r i e d  then  th e r e  
would be some grounds fo r  doubting  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h i s  method 
of  measuring performance.  The v a l i d i t y  of  th e  measure was in  
l a rg e  p a r t  due to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a Squad Leader was e v a lu a t in g  
a s p e c i f i c  employee on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h a t  em ployee 's  p e r f o r ­
mance a r e p e a te d  number of t im es .  There was no comparison of 
one employee t o  an o th e r .  I t  i s  assumed th e  Squad L ead e r ’s p e r ­
ce p t io n  of what a given em ployee 's  l e v e l  o f  performance should  
be remained c o n s ta n t  f o r  t h e  tw e n ty - f iv e  day p e r io d  o f  the  
experiment.  This  reason ing  a l s o  seems a p p l i c a b le  in  a case 
where a Squad Leader may l i k e  o r  d i s l i k e  a given employee.
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Payment t o  P a r t i c i p a n t s
F in a l l y ,  some a d d i t i o n a l  comments a re  in o rd e r  about 
the  payments made to  a l l  employees who p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  t h i s  
experim ent .  Pay was given to  t h e  employees o f  th e  Eg group 
a t  th e  beg inn ing  of  T-2, T-3 and T-4 (a s  i n d i c a t e d  above).
The remainder  of  the  employees ( t h a t  i s  th o se  in  the  and 
groups)  r e c e iv e d  t h e i r  pay in  one check dur ing  the  f i n a l
in fo rm a t io n  meeting.  Pay was given in  th e  form o f  a check
from th e  U n iv e r s i ty  of Oklahoma p repa red  by th e  B u r s a r ' s  
O ff ic e .
Two reasons  may be advanced f o r  g iv in g  pay to  eve ry ­
one: f i r s t ,  management i n s i s t e d  t h a t  everyone be compensated
o th e rw ise  "hard  f e e l in g s "  might r e s u l t ;  and, second, the  ex­
p e r im e n te r  d id  not want th e  employees in  Groups E^ and 0% to  
f e e l  they  had been poorly  t r e a t e d  by t h e  U n iv e r s i ty .  From 
th e  o nse t  STAR management made pay fo r  everyone a c o n d i t io n  
f o r  a l low ing  th e  exper im ente rs  to  conduct t h e i r  s tudy .  T he ir  
r a t i o n a l e  was based  on th e  r e l e v a n t  id e a  (which i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  to  th e  n a tu re  of  t h i s  s tudy)  t h a t  "you d o n ' t  mess
around w i th  a man's  pay ."  In s e l l i n g  STAR management on the
idea  of  th e  experim ente r  conducting  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s tudy  th e  
m an ipu la t ion  of  pay was an obvious problem.
S ec t io n  4: Hypotheses S tatement
The fo l low ing  i s  a b r i e f  s ta tem en t  o f  th e  f i v e  major 
hypo theses  t e s t e d  by t h i s  experiment.  These hypotheses  a re
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designed to  t e s t ,  o r  to  extend,  Adams' theory  of  i n e q u i t y . ^  
Each major h y p o th e s is  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  a s p e c i f i c  t r i a l  in  the  
experiment and fou r  o f  th e se  hypotheses have s e v e ra l  minor 
hypotheses a s s o c i a t e d  with  them. In Chapter  IV each hypoth­
e s i s  w i l l  be r e - p r e s e n te d  and d isc u sse d  in  d e t a i l  r e l a t i v e  to  
th e  f in d in g s  of  t h i s  s tudy.
Hypothesis  1 (R e la ted  to  T r i a l  2):
A ten  p e rc e n t  in c r e a s e  in  th e  normal hour ly  pay f o r  Eg w i l l  
r e s u l t  in  p e r c e p t io n s  of in e q u i ty  fo r  groups Ej  ^ and E2 . 
l a — A ten  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  E2  w i l l  not r e s u l t  in  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  moderation in ou tpu t  o f  performance fo r  E2 .
l b —A ten  p e rc e n t  in c re a se  in  pay fo r  Eg w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a
moderate in c re a s e  in  q u a l i t y  o f  performance f o r  E2 .
I c —A ten  p e r c e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a
moderation of  employee a t t i t u d e s  fo r  E^ and E2 .
Hypothesis  2 (R e la ted  to  T r i a l  3):
A t h i r t y  p e r c e n t  in c re a se  in  t h e  normal hour ly  pay fo r  E£ w i l l  
r e s u l t  in  measurable d i f f e r e n c e s  among a l l  groups as compared 
to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  T r i a l  2 measures of  performance and 
a t t i t u d e s .
2 a—A t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  an 
in c re a s e  in  q u a l i t y  of performance f o r  E2 .
2b—A t h i r t y  p e r c e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  Eg w i l l  r e s u l t  
in  a measurable decrease  in  q u a l i t y  o f  performance
^ S p e c i f i c a l l y  th e se  hypotheses  a re  based on the  p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  as p r e s e n te d  in Adams (1963a) and Adams (1965).
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and an in c re a s e  in  ou tput  of performance fo r  E^.
2 c—A t h i r t y  p e rcen t  in c re a s e  in pay f o r  E2  w i l l  moderate 
a t t i t u d e s  f o r  E]^  and E2 .
Hypothesis  3 (R e la ted  to  T r i a l  4) :
A f i f t e e n  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  th e  normal hour ly  pay fo r  E2  
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  measurable d i f f e r e n c e s  among a l l  groups as 
compared to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  P r e t r i a l  measures of  performance 
and a t t i t u d e s .
3a—A f i f t e e n  p e rcen t  in c re a s e  in  pay fo r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  
a moderate in c r e a s e  in  both  q u a l i t y  and outpu t  o f  p e r f o r ­
mance fo r  E2 .
3b—A f i f t e e n  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay fo r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  
an ou tpu t  o f  performance f o r  E]^  t h a t  i s  g r e a t e r  than  th e  
g ro u p 's  o u tpu t  o f  performance in  T-1 but  l e s s  than  i t s  
ou tpu t  o f  performance in  T-3.
3c—A f i f t e e n  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay fo r  Eg w i l l  r e s u l t  in  
a q u a l i t y  o f  performance fo r  E^  ^ t h a t  i s  g r e a t e r  than  the  
q u a l i t y  of  performance in  T-3 bu t  l e s s  than  th e  q u a l i t y  
o f  performance in  T-1.
3 d—A f i f t e e n  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay w i l l  moderate a t t i t u d e s  
fo r  E^ and Eg.
Hypothesis  4 (R e la ted  to  T r i a l  5):
A r e s t o r a t i o n  of  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s  f o r  Eg w i l l  s t a b i l i z e  
performance and a t t i t u d e s  to  p re -ex p e r im en ta l  l e v e l s  f o r  E^ 
and Eg.
Ill
4a—A r e s t o r a t i o n  of  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s  f o r  E2  w i l l  
dec rease  q u a l i t y  of  performance to  p re -e x p e r im e n ta l  
l e v e l s  fo r  and E2 .
4b—A r e s t o r a t i o n  of  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s  f o r  E2  w i l l  
dec rease  ou tpu t  performance fo r  E^.
4c—A r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s  f o r  E2  w i l l
r e s u l t  in  a m o d i f ic a t io n  o f  a t t i t u d e s  f o r  E^ and E2  as 
compared w ith  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  measures in  T-4.
Hypothesis  5 (R e la ted  to  the  P o s t t r i a l  P e r i o d ) :
Performance l e v e l s  fo r  th e  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d  w i l l  be t h e  same 
as the  P r e t r i a l  performance measures f o r  a l l  groups.
With t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  des ign ,  th e  
f in d in g s  of  th e  s tudy  can now be p r e s e n t e d . 1
The hypotheses in  t h i s  s tudy e x p l i c i t l y  t e s t s  th o se  
p r e d i c t i o n s  made by Adams r e l a t i v e  to  what w i l l  happen to  
q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y  performance when pay i s  a l t e r e d .  Adams' 
in e q u i ty  theory  ho lds  t h a t  when pay i s  in c re a s e d  f o r  th e  E2  
group th a t  q u a n t i t y  performance fo r  E2  shou ld  d ec rease  and 
q u a l i t y  performance should  i n c r e a s e .  The o p p o s i t e  should  
occur f o r  th e  E^ group when th e  Eg g ro u p 's  pay i s  in c re a s e d .
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
Sec t ion  1
The purpose  of  S ec t ion  1 i s  t o  p r e s e n t  a demographic 
p r o f i l e  o f  t h e  p o p u la t io n  invo lved  in  t h i s  s tudy .  The o rg a n i ­
z a t io n  f o r  t h i s  s e c t i o n  was based  on th e  demographic q u e s t io n ­
n a i r e  which i s  inc lu d ed  in  Appendix A. The d a ta  p r e s e n te d  in  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  were analyzed through a conven t iona l  examination 
u t i l i z i n g  measures o f  c e n t r a l  tendency,  f requency counts  and 
p e r c e n ta g e s .
The average age of  th e  p o p u la t io n  in  t h i s  s tudy  i s  25 .7  
y ea rs  w ith  th e  m a jo r i ty  (38) be ing  under 28 y e a r s  o ld .  The 
age range was from 20 to  42 y e a r s .  For ty  males and 10 females 
made up th e  50 peop le  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  th e  s tudy .  The average 
len g th  o f  employment a t  STAR was 2 .1  y ea rs  with  a mode o f  one 
y ea r .  The median term o f  employment a t  STAR was 1 .3 .  The 
average le n g th  o f  te n u re  in  p r e s e n t  occupat ion  was 1.9 with  
6 6  p e rc e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u la t io n  working a t  t h e  same occupa t ion  a t  
which they were employed. F i f t y - f o u r  p e r c e n t  had not  worked 
a t  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  occupat ion  p r i o r  to  t h e i r  employment w i th  
STAR. R e la t iv e  to  t r a i n i n g  58 p e rce n t  had r ece iv ed  t r a i n i n g  
in  high sch o o l ,  8 6  p e rce n t  t r a i n i n g  in  vo - tec h  o r  p r i v a t e  tech  
sch o o ls ,  2  p e r c e n t  had some t r a i n i n g  in  t h e  armed f o r c e s ,
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2 p e r c e n t  had o n - th e - jo b  t r a i n i n g  a t  STAR and 80 p e rc e n t  ex­
p e r ie n ced  some o n - th e - jo b  t r a i n i n g  while  employed by f irms 
o th e r  than STAR. Seventy-two p e rce n t  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  were 
n a t iv e s  o f  Oklahoma, with  th e  average number o f  y ea rs  in  th e  
Oklahoma City a rea  fo r  a l l  employees be ing  10 .8 .  Only one 
person  in  th e  po p u la t io n  had not completed h igh  sc h o o l ,  2 1  
a t ten d e d  c o l l e g e ,  7 completed a j u n i o r  c o l l e g e  program and 
7 g rad u a ted  from a four  y ea r  co l l e g e .
R e la t i v e  to  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  p e rc e iv e d  f i n a n c i a l  
s i t u a t i o n  th e  average sco re  was 20.86 with  a median of  18.67 
and a mode of  18.01. The s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t i o n  was 9 .05 .  The 
mean sc o re  of  2 0 . 8 6  i s  l e s s  than  a n a t io n  wide average of
30.96 w i th  a s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  of  11 .06 .^  T h i r t y - f i v e  of  50 
Ss sco re d  below 22 on th e  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  q u e s t io n ,  and 
48 s c o re d  below 30. This i n d i c a t e s  the  s e l f - p e r c e i v e d  f i n a n ­
c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  of  t h i s  p o p u la t io n  i s  somewhat lower than 
normal. This  f in d in g  i s  f u r t h e r  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by th e  JDI Pay 
S ca le  which shows a 29.90 average w i th  a s t a n d a r d  d e v ia t io n  of  
14.53.  The grand mean f o r  a l l  t r i a l s  from th e  Pay Sca le  of 
t h e  JDI was 12.26 w ith  a range from 11.86 on the  P r e t r i a l  to  
14.00 on T r i a l  5. I t  should  be no ted  t h a t  o th e r  JDI s c a l e s  
as w e l l  as the  t o t a l  JDI sc o re  were lower than  th o se  s c o re s
This comparison shou ld  be approached w ith  ca u t io n  as 
th e  measurement p r o p e r t i e s  in c o rp o ra te d  in  t h e  average of
30.96 may lack  adequate documenta tion,  a l s o  th e  mean of  30.96 
was computed on a male r e t i r e e  p o p u la t io n .  See Smith, 
P a t r i c i a  Cain, Lome M. K enda l l ,  Charles  L. H ulin ,  The 
Measurement o f  S a t i s f a c t i o n  in  Work and R e t i r em e n t , Rand 
McNally & Company, Chicago, 1969, p .  82.
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der ived  from male p o p u la t io n s  in  2 1  p l a n t s  lo c a te d  ac ro s s  the  
United S t a t e s .  The grand mean fo r  a l l  t r i a l s  fo r  th e  Work 
Scale  was 30.97 as compared to  a mean of  36.57 fo r  th e  n a t io n  
wide sample. The Superv is ion  Scale  was 25.98 as compared to  
th e  norm of  41 .10 .  For Promotion the  grand mean was 14.10 
compared to  a norm o f  22.06 and f o r  Co-workers i t  was 23.78 
as compared to  a normal mean of  43 .49,  The t o t a l  JDI, which 
i s  th e  5 s c a l e s  added, was 109.35 fo r  th e  s tudy  p o p u la t io n  as 
compared to  173.12. The job s a t i s f a c t i o n  sco re s  taken  as a
whole o r  as s e p a r a t e  occu p a t io n a l  groups in d ic a t e  t h a t
Draftsmen and Data Conversion O pera tors  a re  l e s s  s a t i s f i e d  
with t h e i r  p re s e n t  work s i t u a t i o n  than  th e  average worker.
To summarize t h i s  p r o f i l e  th e  p o p u la t io n  invo lved  in 
t h i s  s tudy  c o n s i s t e d  o f  workers who were mostly under 28 
y ea rs ,  predominantly  male, o f  s h o r t  te n u re  w i th  th e  o rg an iz a ­
t io n  and were n a t iv e s  of  Oklahoma and th e  Oklahoma City  a rea .  
In a d d i t io n  th e  p o p u la t io n  lacked  e x ten s iv e  formal educa t ion ,  
which i s  de f ined  here  as s u c c e s s fu l l y  completing a f o u r  year  
co l leg e  program, had not exper ienced  much o n - th e - jo b  t r a i n i n g ,  
but who had re c e iv e d  most of  t h e i r  t r a i n i n g  in  vo - tech  or
p r i v a t e  v o ca t io n a l  sch o o ls .  The p o p u la t io n  as  a whole was
d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i th  t h e i r  work, s u p e rv i s io n ,  pay, promotion 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and co-workers as compared to  th e  n a t io n a l  
sample.
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Section 2
The purpose of  Sect ion  2 i s  to  p r e s e n t  s p e c i f i c  r e ­
sea rch  r e s u l t s  f o r  each of  the  major f i v e  hypotheses t h a t  
have p rov ided  th e  param eters  f o r  t h i s  s tudy .  For g r e a t e r  
s p e c i f i c i t y  each major hypo thes is  was r e s t a t e d  in  th e  form of  
s e v e r a l  minor hypotheses .  The o r g a n iz a t io n  of  Sec t ion  2 i s  
c o n s t ru c te d  around each of th e se  minor hypotheses .  Genera l ly  
the  format i s  one where f i r s t  th e  major hypo thes is  i s  s t a t e d  
followed by a number of  r e l a t e d  minor hypotheses .  A f te r  each 
minor h y p o th e s is  i s  a t a b l e  which p r e s e n t s  group mean s c o re s  
and F r a t i o s .  The p r i n c i p a l  s t a t i s t i c s  used to  examine the  
hypotheses in  t h i s  s e c t io n  a re  means, Analys is  of Variance 
(ANOVA) and M u l t i - a n a ly s i s  of Variance (MANOVA).
D iscuss ion  i s  minimized in  t h i s  s e c t io n  and i s  con­
f in e d  t o  th e  s p e c i f i c  s t a t i s t i c a l  f in d in g  under examination .  
E lab o ra t io n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  such f in d in g s  a re  r e se rv e d  
fo r  Chapter  V.
A s p e c i a l  comment i s  w ar ran ted  r e l a t i v e  to  how th e  da ta  
w i l l  be p r e s e n te d  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  While performance and 
a t t i t u d e  measures were taken f o r  Data Conversion Opera to rs  and 
Draftsmen as a s i n g l e  p o p u la t io n  only  t h e  d a ta  f o r  Draftsmen 
a re  p r e s e n te d .^  These numerical s c o re s  could  not be combined
Moreover the  n a tu re  o f  t a s k s  f o r  Data Conversion 
Opera tors  in t ro d u ced  extreme v a r ia n ce  w i th  a r e s u l t i n g  ex­
ce s s iv e  s t a n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  about th e  mean. This f e a t u r e ,  
when combined w ith  th e  d a ta  r e s u l t i n g  from Draftsmen p e r f o r ­
mance measures,  would have made any meaningful s t a t i s t i c a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  im poss ib le .
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f o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  w ithout  in t r o d u c in g  an ex c ess iv e  
amount o f  v a r ia n c e  thereby  confounding p o s s i b l e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e s u l t s .  The p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  in  
Sec t ion  2 i s  con f ined  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  Draftsmen so t h a t  a 
c l e a r e r  p i c t u r e  i s  p rov ided  fo r  th o se  con tem pla t ing  f u tu r e  
r e se a rch  of t h i s  n a tu r e .  The ex c ess iv e  v a r ia n c e  f o r  the  Data 
Conversion Opera to rs  r e s u l t e d  from an inadequa te  sample s i z e  
(n = 3 f o r  th e  and E2  groups) and d i f f e r i n g  t a s k s  performed 
during  a given t r i a l  p e r io d .  C le a r ly  the  problem could  have 
been overcome w ith  a l a r g e r  Data Conversion O pera tor  popula­
t i o n  and with  a g r e a t e r  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  of  th e  t a s k s .
In S ec t io n  2 the  r e s u l t s  a re  p r e s e n te d  s e q u e n t i a l l y  
fo r  each h y p o th e s is :  f i r s t  s t a t i n g  th e  h y p o th e s i s ,  then  p r e ­
se n t in g  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  d a ta ,  and conc luding  w ith  b r i e f  com­
ments on th e  f in d in g s .  While t h a t  method of  p r e s e n t a t i o n  
p ro v id es  th e  r e a d e r  w ith  the  necessa ry  in fo rm a t io n  to  ev a lu ­
a te  an i n d iv i d u a l  h y po thes is  s ta tem en t  i t  may not f a c i l i t a t e  
h i s  a c q u i r in g  an o v e r a l l  view of  th e  deve lop ing  t r e n d s  f o r  
the  seven t r i a l s .  The fo l low ing  graphs p re se n te d  as F igures  
10 through 12 w i l l  a id  in t h i s .  The p lo t  p o in t s  in  th e  graph 
are  group mean sc o re s  f o r  Draftsmen fo r  a l l  t r i a l s .  I t  shou ld  
a l s o  be no ted  t h a t  a 3 x 7 ANOVA f o r  a l l  t h r e e  groups and a 
2 x 7  ANOVA f o r  E^ and Eg groups d id  not i n d i c a t e  a s t a t i s t i ­
ca l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  q u a l i t y  of  performance o r  f o r  the  t o t a l  
JDI.
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S p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  should  be g iven  to  th e  method of 
r e p o r t i n g  in  S ec t io n  2. The f i r s t  p a r t  of  S ec t io n  2 co n ta in s  
t h r e e  graphs t h a t  were p l o t t e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  group mean 
s c o re s .  These group means a r e  f o r  each t r i a l  and each of  th e  
t h r e e  r e s p e c t i v e  groups: group E^, E2  and C^. Each p l o t
mark in  F ig u re s  10, 11 and 12 i s  fo r  a p a r t i c u l a r  t r i a l  and 
r e p r e s e n t s  th e  average sco re  f o r  q u a n t i t y ,  q u a l i t y  o r  t o t a l  
JD I . The purpose of  th e se  f i g u re s  i s  to  g ive  th e  r e a d e r  an 
overview p r i o r  to  read ing  th e  second p a r t  of  S ec t ion  2.
The t a b l e s  i n  S ec t ion  2 r e p r e s e n t  th e  d a ta  fo r  a g iven  
h y po thes is  and c o n s i s t  of  group mean s c o re s  ( th e  same as 
th o se  group mean sc o re s  in  F igures  10, 11 and 12 except they 
a re  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  a s p e c i f i c  h y p o th e s i s )  and F r a t i o s .
The F r a t i o s  r e p r e s e n t  a method of  comparing group mean sco re s .  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  F r a t i o  i s  one t h a t  dem onstra tes  an e f f e c t  o f  an 
independent v a r i a b l e  on th e  dependent v a r i a b l e .  The indepen­
dent v a r i a b l e  in  t h i s  s tudy i s  pay and th e  dependent v a r i a b l e s  
a re  q u a l i t y  performance, q u a n t i t y  performance and a t t i t u d e .
The la c k  of  a s i g n i f i c a n t  F r a t i o  i n d i c a t e s  t h e r e  was no d i f ­
f e re n c e  between group mean s c o re s ,  the reby  dem onstra t ing  no 
impact o f  th e  independent v a r i a b l e  on th e  dependent v a r i a b l e .
F r a t i o s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  fo r  between t r i a l s  and between groups 
measures.  The hypotheses a re  su p p o r ted  o r  not suppor ted  on 
the  b a s i s  o f  th e  between t r i a l s  F r a t i o s .
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Figure  10. Q u a l i ty  Group Mean Scores f o r  A ll  D ra f t in g  Groups 
f o r  All  T r i a l s
Examination of th e  t r e n d  l i n e s  i n d i c a t e  a c e r t a i n  
dynamic c h a r a c t e r  f o r  each group on th e  o r d i n a t e  s c a l e .  The 
group b eg in s  with  a 97.5  and a l though  i t  changes as much 
as 3 .3  between some su c c e s s iv e  t r i a l s ,  ends in  th e  P o s t t r i a l  
p e r io d  on 9 8 .2 .  The E^ group beg ins  i n  t h e  P r e t r i a l  w ith  a 
group mean sc o re  o f  103.9 and g e n e ra l ly  d ec re a se s  to  a 99.6 
in  th e  concluding  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .  During T-3 t h e r e  was an 
in c re a s e  from 100.4 in  T-2 to  102.3 bu t  a f t e r  t h i s  con t inued  
i t s  downward t r e n d .  Group E2  beg ins  in  the  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  
with 106.8 which was th e  h ig h e s t  l e v e l  o f  q u a l i t y  f o r  any 
group and beg ins  a downward t r e n d  to  T-3. At T-4 however th e  
E2  group average in c re a s e s  to  104.2 and co n t in u es  on to  a 
103.8 in  the  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .  There was c o n s id e rab le
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i n t e r a c t i o n  between groups as demonstrated by th e  c ro s s in g  
t r e n d  l i n e s .  Although was th e  most s t a b l e  in  n a tu re  i t  
could  a l so  be cons ide red  somewhat dynamic. All groups con­
cluded th e  s e r i e s  of  t r i a l s  in th e  same rank o rd e r  as they 
s t a r t e d  w ith  in  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .
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Figure  11. Quan ti ty  Group Mean Scores f o r  All  D ra f t in g  Groups 
f o r  A l l  T r i a l s
The group q u a n t i ty  mean sc o re  beg ins  w ith  93 .3 ,  the  
lowest o f  th e  t h r e e  means, and ends in  th e  P o s t t r i a l  w ith  a 
95 .0 .  movement on th e  o r d in a te  ax is  i s  dynamic fo r  a con­
t r o l  group and does not e x h i b i t  s t a b i l i t y  u n t i l  T-4. The 
t r e n d  l i n e  f o r  th e  beg ins  with a 100.7 group mean and a f t e r  
in c re a s in g  to  a 102.5 in  T-2, d ec reases  to  95.0 in  th e  P o s t ­
t r i a l ;  t h i s  dec rease  was not g rad u a l ,  having taken  p lace  in  
the  p e r io d  between T-3 and T-4. Group Eg began in  th e  P r e t r i a l
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p e r io d  w ith  a q u a n t i t y  group mean of  99 .3  and cont inued  w ith  
a g radua l  in c re a s e  t o  106.3 in  th e  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .  A minor 
decrease  in th e  E2  t r e n d  l i n e  d id  occur  f o r  T-4 and T-5. 
I n t e r a c t i o n  between t r e n d  l i n e s  d id  occur  f o r  3 o f  th e  7 
t r i a l s .
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Figure  12. T o ta l  JDI Group Mean Scores  fo r  D ra f t in g  Groups 
f o r  A ll  T r i a l s
The t o t a l  JDI group mean t r e n d  l i n e  f o r  began in  
the  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  with a 103.8 and ended w ith  104.5. There 
were no sco re s  f o r  T-1 through T-5 as was th e  c o n t ro l  group
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and d id  not take  th e  JDI fo r  those  t r i a l s .  The group was 
s t a b l e  over the  d u ra t io n  of  a l l  t r i a l s  i n d i c a t i n g  a l i t t l e  
a l t e r a t i o n  in  job  a t t i t u d e .  Group E2  began w ith  a group mean 
of  114.1 and cont inued  to  g e n e ra l ly  in c re a s e  over the  span of  
t r i a l s  ending with  a sco re  of  120.3. There was no i n t e r a c t i o n  
of  t r e n d  l i n e s  f o r  any groups dur ing  th e  7 t r i a l  p e r io d s .
F igures  10 through 12 p rov ided  an overview of th e  
behav io r  f o r  th e  t h r e e  groups over  the  time p e r io d  and encom­
pass  th e  7 t r i a l s  of the  s tudy as r e l a t e d  to  each of  th e  
t h r e e  dependent v a r i a b l e s .  There a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  of movement 
on th e  v e r t i c a l  ax is  f o r  groups E^ and E2  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  
q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  measures. There i s  a l s o  some movement 
f o r  Cl fo r  th e se  measures. Only E2  dem onstra ted  much change 
over t r i a l s  f o r  th e  t o t a l  JDI s c o re s  which was in  th e  n a tu re  
of  an i n c r e a s in g  fu n c t io n .
The remainder of Sec t ion  2 c o n s i s t s  of p r e s e n t in g  each 
h y po thes is  with  i t s  r e l a t e d  d a ta .  According to  commonly 
accepted  p ro to c o l  in  the  ANOVA f o r  a n a ly s i s  should an o v e r a l l  
t e s t  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  be lack ing  th e r e  i s  no need to  con t inue  
a n a l y s i s .  However t h e r e  a re  s e v e r a l  m edia t ing  reasons f o r  
co n t in u in g  th e  a n a ly s i s  even though th e  groups by t r i a l s  ANOVA 
for  q u a l i t y  performance and f o r  t o t a l  JDI were not s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The F r a t i o  fo r  th e  groups by t r i a l s  f o r  q u a n t i ty  performance 
was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .05 l e v e l  i n d i c a t i n g  a need f o r  more 
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s .  Another reason  fo r  con t inu ing  w ith  th e  
a n a ly s i s  i s  t h a t  a purpose of t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  to  prove o r  
d isp rove ,  through f i e l d  r e s e a r c h ,  Adams' theo ry  of i n e q u i t y .
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This purpose p r e s e n t s  s u b s t a n t i a l  o b l i g a t i o n  to  r e p o r t  the  
r e s u l t s  and to  p r e s e n t  such d a ta  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as might 
prove h e l p fu l  t o  o t h e r s .
P r e t r i a l  and T r i a l  1 P e r iods
As mentioned e a r l i e r  t h e r e  were no hypotheses  s t a t e d  
f o r  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  o r  T-1. However as d a ta  were c o l l e c t e d  
and i t  i s  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  the  s tu d y ,  th e  r e s u l t s  a r e  p r e ­
se n te d  f o r  comparison w ith  d a ta  from l a t e r  p e r io d s .
TABLE l l
Q uan t i ty  of  Group Performance in  th e  
P r e t r i a l  P e r io d  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
Cl 93.3
® 1
100.7
^ 2
99.3
F R a t io  (Between Groups) 1.837
The group mean q u a n t i t y  sc o re s  f o r  Draftsmen do not
i n d i c a t e  any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s .  The group mean sco re s
2f o r  Draftsmen i n d i c a t e  some d i f f e r e n c e ,  however th e  F r a t i o
The des ign  fo r  th e  t a b l e s  i s  t h a t  recommended by Mary 
E leanor  Spear  in  h e r  p u b l i c a t i o n  P r a c t i c a l  Char t ing  Techniques , 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1969.
^ S i g n i f i c a n t  F r a t i o s  w i l l  be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  a s i n g l e  
o r  double a s t e r i s k  mark. A s i n g l e  a s t e r i s k  i n d i c a t e s  s i g n i f i ­
cance a t  the  .05 l e v e l  and a double a s t e r i s k  i n d i c a t e s  s i g ­
n i f i c a n c e  a t  th e  . 0 1  l e v e l .
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of  1.837 i s  not s i g n i f i c a n t  which dem onstra tes  c o n s id e ra b le  
v a r ian ce  between groups to  th e  p o in t  t h a t  no meaningful d i f ­
f e rence  can be s a i d  to  e x i s t .
TABLE 2
Q u a l i ty  of  Group Performance in  the  
P r e t r i a l  P e r io d  fo r  Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
Cl 97.5
El 103.9
E2  106.8
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 1.574
Q u a l i ty  mean s c o re s  fo r  Draftsmen i n d i c a t e  t h a t  the  
P r e t r i a l  q u a l i t y  performances o f  a l l  groups are  s i m i l a r .  The 
F r a t i o  f o r  Draftsmen i s  not  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n d i c a t i n g  th e  be­
tween group means a re  not d i f f e r e n t .
TABLE 3
T o ta l  JDI Scores o f  Group Performance 
in  th e  P r e t r i a l  P e r iod  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
Cl 103.8
El 101.6
Eg 114.1
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 2.906
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P r e t r i a l  t o t a l ^  group mean sco re s  fo r  th e  Job Descr ip­
t i v e  Index (JDI) i n d i c a t e  no d i f f e r e n c e  between group means. 
P r e t r i a l  JDI means f o r  Draftsmen do i n d i c a t e  some d i f f e r e n c e s  
between group means. This i s  however not suppo r ted  by the  F 
r a t i o  of 2 .906.
TABLE 4
Q uanti ty  of  Group Performance in  th e  
T r i a l  1 P e r io d  fo r  Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
Cl 97.9
El 1 0 2 . 1
E2 98.9
F Ratio  (Between Groups) .834
There a re  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  quan­
t i t y  sc o re s  f o r  Draftsmen. On th e  s u r f a c e  t h e r e  appears to  
be a s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e  between group mean s c o re s  fo r  D r a f t s ­
men, but th e  low F r a t i o  of .834 i n d i c a t e s  no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
meaningful d i f f e r e n c e .  The cause of  t h i s  i s  th e  excess ive  
s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t i o n  about th e  mean w i th in  groups.
The " t o t a l "  r e p r e s e n t s  a summation o f  th e  sco res  of  
th e  f i v e  s c a l e s  of  th e  JDI: work, s u p e rv i s io n ,  pay, promo­
t io n  and co-workers .
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TABLE 5
Quality of Group Performance in the
Trial 1 Period for Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
Cl 100.8
El  99 .6
Eg 101.1
F R atio  (Between Groups) .443
T r i a l  1 q u a l i t y  mean sco re s  between d r a f t i n g  groups do 
not demonstrate  any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s .
TABLE 6
T o ta l  JDI Scores  of Group Performance 
in  the  T r i a l  1 Per iod  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups Group Mean Scores
102.7
Eg 114.0
F Rat io  (Between Groups) 3.313
The mean group sco re s  f o r  Draftsmen i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  job 
a t t i t u d e s  p e r  th e  t o t a l  JDI sc o re s  was g r e a t e r  f o r  th e  E2  a t  
t h e  beg inn ing  of  th e  s e r i e s  of  5 t r i a l s .  However th e  F r a t i o  
o f  3.313 i s  not s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  commonly accep ted  .05 l e v e l  
th e r e f o r e  i t  i s  concluded t h a t  no meaningful d i f f e r e n c e s  ex­
i s t e d  between d r a f t i n g  groups.
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In summary th e  P r e t r i a l  and T r i a l  1 sco re s  do not 
e x h ib i t  any meaningful d i f f e r e n c e s  between d r a f t i n g  groups.
The va r iance  e x i s t i n g  w i th in  groups appears  to  be c o n s id e rab le  
fo r  both p e r io d s  o f  measurement.
Beginning w ith  T r i a l  2 (T-2) pay as th e  independent 
v a r i a b le  was a l t e r e d  by in c re a s in g  i t  1 0  p e rcen t  fo r  
According to  Adams' fo rm ula t ion  of  eq u i ty  theory  t h i s  should  
produce c e r t a i n  p r e s c r ib e d  changes in  th e  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  
measures fo r  th e  two experim enta l  groups. The remainder o f  
t h i s  Sec t ion  i s  o rgan ized  on th e  b a s i s  o f  the  hypo thes is  
a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  th e  su ccess iv e  T r i a l  p e r io d s ;  f o r  each hypoth­
e s i s  i s  p re se n ted  a t a b l e  of r e l e v a n t  s t a t i s t i c a l  f in d in g s ,  
to g e th e r  with  some remarks r e l a t i n g  to  th e s e  f in d in g s .
T r i a l  2 P er iod  
Hypothesis 1 ( T r i a l  2)
A 10 p e rcen t  in c r e a s e  in  the  normal hou r ly  pay fo r  Eg w i l l  
r e s u l t  in  p e r c e p t io n s  of  in e q u i ty  f o r  groups E^ and E2 .
Minor Hypothesis  l a : A 10 p e rce n t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay f o r  E2  w i l l
not r e s u l t  in  a s i g n i f i c a n t  moderation in  ou tpu t  of  p e r f o r ­
mance fo r  E2  r e l a t i v e  to  E^.^
^The phrase  " r e l a t i v e  to  E^" (o r  " r e l a t i v e  to  Eg" in  
o th e r  i n s t a n c e s )  r e p r e s e n t s  an a d d i t i o n  to  th e  o r i g i n a l  
hypo thes is  s ta tem en t  as p re se n ted  in  Chapter  I I I .  These 
changes a re  made f o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  purposes .  This p r a c t i c e  
w i l l  con t inue  f o r  l a t e r  hypotheses accord ing  to  need.
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TABLE 7
Quantity of Group Performance in the
Trial 2 Period for Draftsmen
Groups
(T-1)
Group Mean 
T-2
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 97.9) 93.6 1.593
El ( 1 0 2 . 1 ) 102.5 .024
E2 ( 98 .9) 1 0 2 . 1 .942
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 4.311*
There was l i t t l e  change in  q u a n t i t y  performance f o r  a l l  
d r a f t i n g  groups in  T-2 as compared to  T-1 q u a n t i t y  measures 
f o r  E2 - The F r a t i o  f o r  Draftsmen of  4 .311 i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
th e  .05 l e v e l  i n d i c a t i n g  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a p o s s i b l e  d i f f e r ­
ence between groups.  The average q u a n t i t y  performance f o r  the  
E2  d r a f t i n g  group in c re a s e d  by 3.21 to  T-2 a s  compared t o  T-1 
and i s  not viewed as a s i g n i f i c a n t  modera t ion  in  o u tp u t .  
Hypothesis  l a  i s  not suppor ted .
Minor Hypothes is  l b : A 10 p e rcen t  in c re a s e  i n  pay fo r  E2
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a moderate in c re a s e  in  q u a l i t y  o f  performance 
fo r  E2  r e l a t i v e  t o  E^.
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TABLE 8
Quality of Group Performance in the
Trial 2 Period for Draftsmen
Groups (T-1)
Group Mean 
T-2
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 1 0 0 . 8 ) 97.5 6.766*
El ( 99 .6) 100.4 .114
E2 ( 1 0 1 . 1 ) 1 0 1 . 1 0 . 0
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 1.509
There was no change in  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  performance f o r  
Draftsmen from T-1 t o  T-2. None of  th e  F r a t i o s  are  s i g n i f i ­
cant except th e  one between t r i a l s  f o r  . On th e  b a s i s  o f  
th e se  f in d in g s  Hypothesis  lb i s  not suppor ted .
Minor Hypothesis  I c : A 10 p e rc e n t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay f o r  E2
w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a moderation o f  employee a t t i t u d e s  f o r  E^ and 
E2  r e l a t i v e  to  a t t i t u d e s  on T-1.
TABLE 9
T o ta l  JDI Scores of  Group Performance in  
the  T r i a l  2 P er iod  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups (T-1)
Group Mean 
T-2
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
El (102.7) 102.1 .010
Eg (114.0) 118.4 .696
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 8.952**
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There were moderations o f  th e  t o t a l  JDI mean s c o re s  
f o r  E2  Draftsmen w ith  the  E2  o c c u p a t io n a l  group e x p e r ien c in g  
a s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  in  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  The F r a t i o  f o r  D r a f t s ­
men of 8.952 i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  .01 l e v e l  i n d i c a t i n g  a con­
s i d e r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  between d r a f t i n g  groups. Inasmuch job 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  was no t  moderated from T-1 to  T-2; Hypothes is  Ic  
i s  not suppor ted .
T r i a l  2 was th e  f i r s t  t r i a l  where in e q u i ty  was i n t r o ­
duced in  th e  experiment by i n c r e a s in g  th e  pay f o r  E2  by 1 0  
p e rcen t  ( t h a t  i s  110 p e rce n t  of  normal pay fo r  t h e  4 hour 
t r i a l  p e r io d ) .  Hypothesis  l a  was suppor ted  in  t h a t  t h e r e  was 
not a s i g n i f i c a n t  in c re a s e  in  q u a n t i t y  performance f o r  E2 ; 
Hypothesis  lb ,  which was concerned w ith  q u a l i t y  performance 
f o r  E2 , was not  suppor ted ;  and Hypothesis  Ic  was not  suppor ted  
as the  t o t a l  JDI group sco re s  were not moderated r e l a t i v e  to  
T-1.
T r i a l  3 P e r io d  
Hypothesis  2 ( T r i a l  3)
A 30 p e rc e n t  i n c r e a s e  in  normal hour ly  pay fo r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  
in  measurable d i f f e r e n c e s  among a l l  groups as compared to  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  T r i a l  2 measures o f  performance and a t t i t u d e s .  
Minor Hypothesis  2 a : A t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay fo r
Eg w i l l  r e s u l t  in  an in c re a s e  in  q u a l i t y  o f  performance f o r  
E2  r e l a t i v e  to  E^.
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TABLE 10
Quality of Group Performance in
the Trial 3 Period for Draftsmen
Groups
(T-2)
Group Mean 
T-3
Scores
F Ra t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 97 .5) 1 0 0 . 0 2.587
El (100.4) 102.3 .427
E2 ( 1 0 1 . 1 ) 1 0 1 . 8 .237
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 1.352
Hypothesis  2a f o r  T-3 i s  not suppor ted  fo r  Draftsmen 
as based on th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e s u l t s  in  Table 10. The group 
mean sc o re s  f o r  E£ Draftsmen showed a .7 i n c r e a s e  over  T-2 
w ith  an i n s i g n i f i c a n t  between group F r a t i o  of 1.352. The 
F r a t i o s  f o r  between t r i a l s  were not s i g n i f i c a n t .
Minor Hypothesis  2 b : A 30 p e rce n t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay f o r  E2
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a measurable dec rease  in  q u a l i t y  o f  performance 
and an in c r e a s e  in  ou tpu t  of  performance f o r  E ^ . l
P lea se  no te  t h a t  f o r  Hypothesis  2b Tables 10 and 11 
a re  r e q u i r e d  as t h i s  hypo thes is  r e f e r s  to  bo th  q u a l i t y  and 
q u a n t i ty  measures.
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TABLE 11
Quantity of Group Performance in the
Trial 3 Period for Draftsmen
Groups
(T-2)
Group Mean 
T-3
Scores
F R at ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 93 .6) 1 0 0 . 0 .899
El (102.5) 102.3 .958
E2 ( 1 0 2 . 1 ) 103.9 .506
F Rat io  (Between Groups) 1.640
Based on th e  group mean sc o re s  and th e  F r a t i o s  in  
Tables 10 and 11, Hypothesis  2b i s  not  su ppor ted .  The group 
means a c tu a l ly  ten d  t o  move in  th e  wrong d i r e c t i o n  f o r  both  
th e  and E2  groups.  However the  change from T-2 t o  T-3 i s  
minor as in d i c a t e d  by th e  low between t r i a l  F r a t i o .
Minor Hypothesis  2 c : A 30 p e rce n t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay f o r  E2
w i l l  moderate a t t i t u d e s  fo r  E^ and E2 .
TABLE 12
T o ta l  JDI Scores of  Group Performance 
in the  T r i a l  3 P e r io d  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups (T-2)
Group Mean 
T-3
Scores
F Ra t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
El ( 1 0 2 . 1 ) 1 0 1 . 0 .027
E2 (118 .4 ) 116.0 .171
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 4.954*
131
The group mean f o r  t o t a l  JDI sc o re s  s l i g h t l y  decreased  
fo r  both d r a f t i n g  groups as compared to  T-2. The between 
groups F r a t i o  fo r  Draftsmen was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .05 l e v e l  
however th e  between t r i a l s  F r a t i o s  were not s i g n i f i c a n t .  As 
a t t i t u d e  was not moderated f o r  Hypothesis  2c i t  i s  not 
suppor ted .
T r i a l  4 Per iod  
Hypothesis  3 ( T r i a l  4)
A 15 p e rc e n t  i n c r e a s e  in  normal hourly  pay f o r  Eg w i l l  r e s u l t  
in measurable d i f f e r e n c e s  among a l l  groups as compared to  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  P r e t r i a l  measure of  performance and a t t i t u d e s .  
Minor Hypothesis  3 a : A 15 p e rcen t  i n c r e a s e  in  pay fo r  E2
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a moderate in c r e a s e  in  bo th  q u a l i t y  and ou tput  
o f  performance f o r  E2 .
TABLE 13
Q uanti ty  of  Group Performance in  th e  
T r i a l  4 P e r io d  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups
Quanti ty  Group 
( P r e t r i a l )  T-4
Mean Scores
F R a t io s  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 93 .3) 95.5 .379
El (100.7) 93.3 1 . 0 2 0
Eg ( 99 .3) 102.9 .301
F Ratios  (Between Groups) 2.144
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TABLE 14
Quality of Group Performance in the
Trial 4 Period for Draftsman
Groups
Q ua l i ty  Group Mean Scores
F R a t io s  
(Between T r i a l s )( P r e t r i a l )  T-4
Cl ( 97 .5 ) 98.4 .126
El (103 .9) 98 .3 .640
E2 (106 .8) 104.2 .286
F R a t ios  (Between Groups) 2.538
The q u a n t i ty  group mean sc o re  in c re a s e d  f o r  E2  D r a f t s ­
men. Q u a l i ty  performance f o r  E2  Draftsmen decreased .  
Hypothesis  3a i s  no t  suppor ted  as i n d i c a t e d  by a l l  F r a t i o s .
Minor Hypothesis  3b : A 15 p e r c e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  E2  
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  an ou tpu t  of performance fo r  E^ t h a t  i s  g r e a t e r  
than  th e  g ro u p 's  ou tpu t  o f  performance in  T-1 bu t  l e s s  than  
i t s  ou tpu t  o f  performance in  T-3.
TABLE 15
Summary of  Quan ti ty  of  Group Performance in  
th e  T-1, T-3, and T-4 P e r io d s  f o r  Draftsmen
T r i a l s Group Mean Scores F R a t ios  (Between T r i a l s )
T-1 1 0 2 . 1
T-3 102.3 .128
T-4 93.3 1.457
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Q uan t i ty  performance fo r  Draftsmen i s  v i r t u a l l y  un­
changed in  T-3 bu t  drops o f f  to  93 .3  in  T-4. There i s  mar­
g in a l  su p p o r t  f o r  Hypothesis  3b f o r  Draftsmen as based  on the  
group mean. Hypothesis  3b i s  not suppor ted .
Minor Hypothesis  3 c : A 15 p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  Eg
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a q u a l i t y  of  performance f o r  E^  ^ t h a t  i s  g r e a t e r  
than the  q u a l i t y  of  performance in  T-3 bu t  l e s s  than  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  performance in  T-1.
TABLE 16
Summary o f  Q ua l i ty  o f  Group Performance in  
th e  T-1, T-3 and T-4 P e r io d s  f o r  Draftsmen
T r i a l s Group Mean Scores F R a t io s  (Between T r i a l s )
T-1 99.6
T-3 102.3 .237
T-4 98.3 .802
There i s  m arginal  suppor t  o f  Hypothes is  3c f o r  E]^  
Draftsmen. The T-4 q u a l i t y  group mean i s  h ig h e r  than  t h a t  
f o r  T-3, which i s  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  of  e q u i ty  theo ry  p r e d i c t i o n .  
The F r a t i o  f o r  T-4 i s  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  commonly minimal 
accep tance  o f  .05. The Draftsmen group mean f o r  T-4 i s  h ig h e r  
than  t h a t  o f  T-1 which i s  o p p o s i t e  o f  what i s  p r e d i c t e d  
acco rd ing  to  the  h y p o th e s i s .  H ypothes is  3c i s  no t  suppor ted .
Minor Hypothes is  3 d : A 15 p e r c e n t  in c re a s e  in  pay w i l l
moderate a t t i t u d e s  fo r  E^ and Eg.
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TABLE 17
T ota l  JDI Scores of  Group Performance 
in  the  T r i a l  4 P e r io d  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups
(T-3)
Group Mean 
T-4
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
El ( 1 0 1 . 0 ) 102.3 .027
E2 (116.0) 121.3 .954
F R at io  (Between Groups) 8.816**
The in c r e a s e  o f  15 p e rc e n t  in  pay f o r  E£ r e s u l t e d  in  
an in c re a s e  in  T o ta l  JDI group mean sc o re s  f o r  Draftsmen as 
compared to  T-3. The F r a t i o  of  8.816 i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  
. 0 1  l e v e l  i n d i c a t i n g  a c l e a r - c u t  d i f f e r e n c e  between E^ and 
Eg d r a f t i n g  groups on a t t i t u d e .  The F r a t i o s  between t r i a l s  
are  not s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  E^ o r  Eg. Hypothesis  3d i s  not 
suppor ted .
T r i a l  5 P e r io d  
Hypothesis  4 ( T r i a l  5)
A r e s t o r a t i o n  of pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s  f o r  Eg w i l l  s t a b i l i z e  
performance and a t t i t u d e s  to  p re -ex p e r im e n ta l  l e v e l s  f o r  E^ 
and Eg.
Minor Hypothesis  4 a : A r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s
fo r  Eg w i l l  decrease  q u a l i t y  o f  performance to  p re -exper im en-  
t a l  l e v e l s  f o r  Ej and Eg.
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TABLE 18
Quality of Group Performance in the
T r i a l  5 P er iod  fo r Draftsmen
Groups
Group Mean 
( P r e t r i a l )  T-5
Scores
F Rat ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 97 .5) 98 .3 .041
El (103.9) 98.8 .306
E2 (106.8) 103.2 .384
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 1.541
The q u a l i t y  group mean s c o re s  fo r  Draftsmen a re  mar­
g in a l  fo r  T-5 as compared to  P r e t r i a l  q u a l i t y  s c o re s .  The F 
r a t i o s  of T-5 f o r  both o ccupa t iona l  groups c lo s e ly  resemble 
those  of  the  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  The F r a t i o s  f o r  between t r i a l s  
a re  not s i g n i f i c a n t .  On the  b a s i s  of  th e  d a ta  a n a ly s i s  
Hypothesis  4a i s  no t  supported .
Minor Hypothesis  4 b : A r e s t o r a t i o n  of  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s
f o r  E2  w i l l  dec rease  ou tpu t  performance fo r  E^ r e l a t i v e  to  T-4,
TABLE 19
Quanti ty  of Group Performance in  the  
T r i a l  5 P er iod  f o r  Draftsmen
Groups (T-4)
Group Mean 
T-5
Scores
F Rat ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Gl ( 95 .5) 95.5 0 . 0
El ( 93 .3) 93.3 0 . 0
^ 2
( 99.3) 102.3 .257
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 1.884
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A comparison of  Draftsmen q u a n t i t y  performance in  
T-5 to  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  in d i c a t e s  no change in  o u tp u t  o f  
performance f o r  T-5. The h y p o th e s is  i s  not suppor ted .
Minor Hypothesis  4c: A r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  pay to  P r e t r i a l  l e v e l s
f o r  E2  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a m o d i f ic a t io n  o f  a t t i t u d e s  f o r  E^ and 
E2  as compared w ith  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  measures in  T-4.
TABLE 20
Tota l  JDI Scores  o f  Group Performance in  
the  T r i a l  5 P e r iod  fo r  Draftsmen
Groups
(T-4)
Group Mean 
T-5
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
% (102 .3) 101.7 .006
Eg (121.3) 119.6 .133
F Rat io  (Between Groups) 7.088*
As compared to  T-4 the  t o t a l  JDI group mean s c o re s  fo r  
Draftsmen e x h ib i t e d  a minor dec rease .  The between group F 
r a t i o  of  7.088 i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  .05 l e v e l  f o r  Draftsmen. 
Hypothesis  4c i s  not suppor ted  as t h e r e  was no s i g n i f i c a n t  
changes between T-4 and T-5.
P o s t t r i a l  P er iod  
Hypothesis  5 ( P o s t t r i a l )
Performance l e v e l s  f o r  th e  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d  w i l l  be th e  same 
as the  P r e t r i a l  performance measures fo r  a l l  g ro u p s .^
^There were no minor hypotheses fo rm ula ted  f o r  th e  
P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .
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TABLE 21 
Q uan t i ty  of  Performance in  th e
P o s t t r i a l P er iod  fo r Draftsmen
Groups
Q uanti ty  Group Mean Scores 
( P r e t r i a l )  T-5 ( B e W ^ % a l s )
Cl ( 93.3) 95.0 .196
El (100.7) 95.0 .806
E2 ( 99.3) 106.3 .922
F R at io  (Between Groups) 3.190
TABLE 22 
Q u a l i ty  o f  Performance in  th e
P o s t t r i a l P e r io d  f o r Draftsmen
Groups
Q ua l i ty  Group 
( P r e t r i a l )  T-5
Mean Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl ( 97.5) 98.2 .086
El (103.9) 99.6 .616
Eg (106.8) 103.8 .597
F Ratio  (Between Groups) 2.240
Q uanti ty  performance fo r  a l l  d r a f t i n g  groups except 
E]^  was h ig h e r  f o r  t h e  P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d  as compared to  the  P re ­
t r i a l  measurement p e r io d  by a small  margin.  Comparing the  
P o s t t r i a l  to  th e  P r e t r i a l  th e  group had a h ig h e r  group mean, 
The F r a t i o s  fo r  bo th  o cc u p a t io n a l  groups were no t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
R e la t iv e  to  q u a n t i t y  performance H ypothes is  5 i s  not supported ,
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Q u a l i ty  performance f o r  a l l  groups^ in  th e  P o s t t r i a l  
p e r io d  i s  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  than t h a t  in  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  All  
F r a t i o s  la ck  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n d i c a t i n g  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  be­
tween groups and are  th e  same as the  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  Rela­
t i v e  to  q u a l i t y  performance, Hypothesis 5 i s  not supported .
TABLE 23
T o ta l  JDI Scores of  Group Performance in  
th e  P o s t t r i a l  P er iod  fo r  Draftsmen
Groups
( P r e t r i a l )
Group Mean 
P o s t t r i a l
Scores
F R a t ios  
(Between T r i a l s )
Cl (103.8) 104.5 . 1 2 1
El ( 1 0 1 . 6 ) 102.9 .118
F R a t io s  
(Between Groups)
(119.1) 120.3
5.777**
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The t o t a l  JDI group mean sco res  f o r  th e  P o s t t r i a l  
p e r io d  i n d i c a t e  a somewhat h ig h e r  l e v e l  of job  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
than  in  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  fo r  a l l  groups.  I t  i s  n o tab le  
t h a t  t h e  Ê2  group has a h ig h e r  group mean s c o re  in  th e  P o s t ­
t r i a l  p e r io d .  The F r a t i o  o f  5.777 fo r  between groups i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  .01 l e v e l .  This i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  between 
group a t t i t u d e s  may have c r y s t a l i z e d  over  th e  P r e t r i a l  to  
P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .  However as the  between t r i a l s  F r a t i o s  a re  
not s i g n i f i c a n t  the  a t t i t u d e  p o r t io n  of  Hypothesis  5 i s  not 
suppor ted .
^Q uali ty  performance fo r  a l l  groups was l e s s  except 
f o r  Cl Draftsmen which in c re a se d  by .7.
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Synthesis of Results for Section 2
Of th e  14 hypotheses t e s t e d  none were suppor ted  on the  
b a s i s  o f  between t r i a l s  F r a t i o s ,  A s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  of  the  
a n a ly s i s  appeared to  be t h a t  t h e  Eg g ro u p 's  q u a n t i ty  p e r f o r ­
mance was q u i t e  o f te n  c l e a r l y  in  th e  op p o s i te  d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  
equ i ty  theo ry  would p r e d i c t .
S ec t ion  3
S ec t io n  3 of t h i s  c h a p te r  i s  u t i l i z e d  to  h ig h l i g h t  
s e v e ra l  unique f in d in g s  of  t h i s  r e sea rch  and p rov ides  a more 
in  depth examination of  c e r t a i n  r e s u l t s  t h a t  have not been 
inc luded  in  S ec t ions  1 and 2, The s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  used 
f o r  t h i s  s e c t i o n  c o n s is te d  of  measures of c e n t r a l  tendency, 
and s imple c o r r e l a t i o n s  and t  t e s t s .  The t  t e s t s  were used 
mainly t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
fo r  a given v a r i a b le  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
The fo l low ing  t a b l e  r e p r e s e n t s  a c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  the  
" f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n "  from th e  demographic q u e s t io n n a i r e  
(Q u es t io n n a i re  1) with  th e  pay s c a l e  from each o f  t h e  seven 
JDIs ad m in is te re d  during th e  course  of  t h i s  s tudy .
140
TABLE 24
C o r r e la t io n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  F in a n c ia l  
S i t u a t i o n  with  JDI Pay Sca les  
All  Groups and All  T r i a l s ^
T r i a l  P er iods ControlCl%
and Experimental  
El
Groups
Eg
P r e t r i a l .367 .349 .061
T r i a l  1 ---------------- .494* .335
T r i a l  2 ----— — .586* .224
T r i a l  3 —  —  —  — .607* .094
T r i a l  4 -------- .679* .432*
T r i a l  5 ---------------- .578* .069
P o s t t r i a l .304 .567* .175
As mentioned e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  th e  mean sc o re  on 
f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  from Q ues t ionna ire  1 f o r  th e  t o t a l  popu­
l a t i o n  was 21.164 and i s  cons ide rab ly  lower than  the  n a t io n a l  
average on t h i s  same measure.  Cons ider ing  t h i s  a v a r i a b l e  and 
the  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  Pay Scale o f  th e  JDI f o r  each t r i a l  as 
v a r i a b l e s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them seems to  p ro v id e  i n ­
formation  not inc luded  in  e a r l i e r  an a ly se s .  The E^ group, 
which was aware o f  e x t r a  pay to  E2 , dem onstra ted  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p e rce ived  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  and th e  JDI 
pay s c a l e s  f o r  a l l  t r i a l s  except th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  On th e  
o th e r  hand th e  E2  group only had one s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n  
on T r i a l  4 (when the  e x t r a  pay was reduced from 30 p e rc e n t  to
No c o e f f i c i e n t s  a re  shown fo r  T r i a l s  1-5 i n c lu s i v e ,  
because the  JDI was not adm in is te red  to  th e  c o n t ro l  group 
dur ing  th e s e  p e r io d s .
141
15 p e r c e n t ) .  This  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  th e  group may have had a 
s e n s i t i v i t y  r e l a t i v e  to  the  e x t r a  pay f o r  Eg.
Summary o f  R esu l ts
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s tudy i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  p o p u la t io n  
fo r  t h i s  s tudy  was in  th e  20 to  30 y ea r  age range and were 
mostly male. As a p o p u la t io n  they a re  somewhat d i s s a t i s f i e d  
with th e  major a s p e c t s  of t h e i r  p r e s e n t  jo b s .  There were 14 
hypotheses none of  which were suppor ted  on th e  b a s i s  o f  be­
tween t r i a l s  t e s t i n g  by ANOVAS and MANOVAS. A dd it iona l  
examinations were conducted through th e  use of  c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  and o th e r  s ta n d a rd  s t a t i s t i c a l  te ch n iq u es .  The 
most unexpected r e s u l t  invo lved  the  Eg group: whenever th e
output  h y p o th e s is  was not m arg ina l ,  t h a t  g ro u p 's  p roduc t ion  
moved in  th e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n  from what had been p r e d i c t e d .
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of  t h i s  s tudy  was to  i d e n t i f y  and measure 
p o s s i b l e  moderating e f f e c t s  o f  em ployee-perceived  e q u i ty  and 
in e q u i ty  of  pay on worker performance and a t t i t u d e .  The th eo ­
r e t i c a l  model employed was Adams' theory  of  in e q u i ty  which 
u t i l i z e s  a c o g n i t iv e  r a t i o  of  outcome to  in p u t .  I n e q u i t i e s  
in  pay were in t ro d u ce d  by expe r im en ta l  pay in c r e a s e s ;  by in ­
forming both exper im en ta l  groups of  the  one g ro u p 's  e x t r a  pay, 
a change in th e  performance and a t t i t u d e  of  each group was 
p r e d i c t e d  to  occur .  Adams' fo rm ula t ion  of  i n e q u i ty  p r e s c r i b e s  
what th e s e  changes should  be and in  what d i r e c t i o n .
Pay was d e f in e d  as monetary reward f o r  performance. 
Performance, as o v e r t  job  b eh a v io r ,  was measured in  terms of  
bo th  q u a n t i t y ,  the  o u tpu t  f o r  a given work group, and q u a l i t y  
which was measured in  terms o f  ex c e l l e n c e  fo r  a given p e r f o r ­
mance. A t t i t u d e ,  which i s  b road ly  de f ined  as  d i s p o s i t i o n  
towards a c e r t a i n  a c t ,  was measured by the  JD I . Adams a l s o  
p o s t u l a t e s  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a comparator Other t o  which Person 
compares t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  outcome to  inpu t  r a t i o s .  I t  i s  on 
t h i s  b a s i s  t h a t  e q u i ty  i s  d e f in ed .  This whole p ro ces s  i s  
p e r c e p tu a l  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  a c o g n i t iv e  exper ience .  For t h i s  
r e s e a rc h  th e r e  were two exper im en ta l  groups and one c o n t ro l
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group. The exper im enta l  groups, on th e  b a s i s  o f  Adams' th e o ry ,  
were supposed to  compare t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  outcome-input r a t i o s .  
The c o n t ro l  group was u t i l i z e d  to  p rov ide  base  l i n e  compara­
t i v e  d a ta  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e  c o n t ro l  group d id  
not  dem onstra te  a complete ly  s t a b l e  performance du r ing  th e  
p e r io d  o f  th e  s u c c e s s iv e  t r i a l s .
Adams' fo rm u la t ion  o f  eq u i ty  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r e s c r i b e s  
what should  occur  to  an inpu t  when an outcome i s  a l t e r e d .  In 
t h i s  s tudy pay was de f ined  as th e  outcome; and performance 
(measured in  terms of q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y )  and a t t i t u d e  were 
t r e a t e d  as in p u t s .  In Adams' (1963a) s tudy  performance was 
a l s o  co n s id e red  in  terms o f  bo th  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y .  The 
hypotheses o f  t h i s  s tudy  c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t  t h i s  p rocedure .  
Furthermore Adams (1963a) s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e s  what should  
occur  r e l a t i v e  to  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  performance f o r  two 
d i f f e r e n t l y  compensated groups, assuming a p e r c e p t io n  o f  i n ­
eq u i ty .  G ene ra l ly  s t a t e d ,  and couched w i th in  t h e  framework 
o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  when c o n d i t io n s  o f  in e q u i ty  ( i . e . ,  undercom­
p e n s a t io n )  a re  p e rc e iv e d  to  e x i s t  f o r  E]^  q u a n t i ty  performance 
should  i n c r e a s e  and q u a l i t y  performance should d e c re a se .  At 
the  same t im e,  f o r  E2 , q u a n t i ty  performance should  d ec rease  
and q u a l i t y  performance should  i n c r e a s e  as a r e s u l t  o f  Person 
a t tem p t in g  to  r e s t o r e  c o g n i t iv e  ba lance  f o r  h i s  outcome to  
inpu t  r a t i o .
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Analys is  of Hypothesis  and 
Relevant D iscussion
The fo l low ing  a n a ly s i s  fo l lows a ch ro n o lo g ic a l  format 
based on t r i a l s  beg inn ing  with  T-2.
Hypothesis  1 c o n s i s t e d  of  a g ene ra l  s ta tem en t  t h a t  
p e rcep t io n  o f  in e q u i ty  would r e s u l t  from a t e n  p e r c e n t  i n ­
c rease  in  pay to  E2 . This s ta tem en t  was r e f in e d  through th e  
use of  minor hypotheses  which s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e a l t  w ith  a p r e ­
d i c t i o n  t h a t  would be made on the  b a s i s  of equ i ty  t h e o r y .^
The f i r s t  minor hy p o th e s is  s t a t e d  t h a t  no a l t e r a t i o n  in  quan­
t i t y  performance would occur f o r  Eg as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  ten  
p e rcen t  pay i n c r e a s e .  Compared to  th e  q u a n t i ty  P r e t r i a l  mea­
s u re s  no dec rease  occurred  f o r  Draftsmen. The reason  f o r  t h i s  
may be t h a t  th e  te n  p e rc e n t  pay in c re a s e  fo r  only fo u r  hours 
was not s i g n i f i c a n t  enough to  in t ro d u ce  co n d i t io n s  of  in eq u i ty  
f o r  Draftsmen. R e la t iv e  to  q u a l i t y  performance th e r e  was no 
in c re a s e  in  performance f o r  Eg Draftsmen. Again t h i s  sugges ts  
t h a t  no in e q u i ty  co n d i t io n  was c r e a te d  by the  ten  p e rc e n t  pay 
in c re a s e .  T o ta l  JDI sco re s  between groups did  change by i n ­
c re a s in g  fo r  bo th  EjL and Eg Draftsmen. This p r e s e n t s  a p o s s i ­
b le  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  when compared to  th e  q u a n t i ty  and q u a l i t y  
performance r e s u l t s .  A p o s s i b le  ex p lan a t io n  may be t h a t  th e
This same p rocedu ra l  format was followed f o r  a l l  
hypo thes is  s ta tem en ts  and w i l l  acco rd ing ly  be fo l lowed in  t h i s  
chap te r .
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"Hawthorne E f f e c t " ^  was o p e r a t iv e .  This however only p a r ­
t i a l l y  e x p la in s  th e  r e s u l t s  because o f  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
performance and a t t i t u d e .  Perhaps a b e t t e r  ex p lan a t io n  would 
be t h a t  a t t i t u d e  express ion  has a lower th r e s h o ld  than  p e r f o r ­
mance. A t t i t u d e  i s  a cover t  phenomenon while  performance i s  
o v e r t  and i t  i s  p o s s i b le  t h a t  i t  may take  a more dram atic  i n ­
c rease  in  pay to  b r in g  about a p e rce p t io n  of  in e q u i ty  t h a t  
w i l l  r e s u l t  in  changes in  o v e r t  behav ior  such as performance.
The hypotheses  f o r  T-3 s t a t e d  t h a t  a t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  
in c re a s e  in  pay would r e s u l t  in  measurable d i f f e r e n c e s  in  a l l  
groups. The f i r s t  minor h y p o th e s is  s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  t h i r t y  
pe rcen t  in c re a s e  in pay would in c re a s e  the  q u a l i t y  of p e r f o r ­
mance fo r  E2 . This  d id  not occu r .  The second minor hypoth­
e s i s  s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  pay in c re a se  would de­
c rease  q u a l i t y  performance and in c re a s e  q u a n t i ty  performance 
f o r  E^. Again th e  p r e d i c t i o n  was not s u b s t a n t i a t e d .  The 
t h i r d  h y p o th e s i s  s t a t e d  a moderation in  a t t i t u d e s  f o r  bo th  
E% and E2 . A t t i t u d e s  were d i f f e r e n t  between groups bu t  i n ­
s t e a d  of  going h ig h e r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  Eg, a t t i t u d e  dec reased  
fo r  both  and E2 . The r a t i o n a l e  employed to  ex p la in  t h e  
f in d in g s  of  T-2 does not appear  to be f e a s i b l e  in  t h i s  case  
because a t h i r t y  pe rcen t  in c re a se  in  pay would seem l a r g e  
enough to  be n o t i c e a b le .  Indeed no ex p lan a t io n  seems to  be 
reasonab le  o th e r  than t h a t  some unknown environmental  f a c t o r  
may have confounded the  r e s u l t s  o f  T-3. There i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y
Because these  employees were s in g le d  out f o r  s p e c i a l  
a t t e n t i o n  and c o n s id e ra t io n  the  groups '  performances may have 
been a l t e r e d  o r  he igh tened .
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t h a t  a t h i r t y  p e rcen t  pay in c re a se  was too  g r e a t  and t h e r e ­
fo re  was d e f in ed  by th e  Ss as u n r e a l i s t i c .  Should t h i s  l a s t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p la n a t io n  be c o r r e c t  then  i t  sugges ts  t h e r e  i s  
an apparent upper th r e s h o l d  on pay f o r  t h i s  type of  e x p e r i ­
ment. In any ev en t ,  th e  r e s u l t s  of  T-3 a re  c o n t r a d ic to r y  to  
what Adams' in e q u i ty  theory  would p r e d i c t .
The major h y p o th e s i s  f o r  T-4 p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  a f i f t e e n  
p e rcen t  in c r e a s e  in  outcome f o r  E£ would a f f e c t  th e  p e r f o r ­
mance and a t t i t u d e s  of  and Eg. The f i r s t  minor h y p o th e s is  
s t a t e d  th e  f i f t e e n  p e rce n t  in c re a s e  in  pay f o r  Eg would 
modera te ly  in c r e a s e  both  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y  f o r  Eg as com­
pared  to  th e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  R e la t iv e  to  th e  E^ group th e  
Eg group q u a n t i t y  performance in c re a s e d .  All  remaining p e r ­
formances decreased  on r e l a t i v e  bases .  This f i r s t  minor 
h y p o th e s i s ,  l i k e  a l l  minor hypotheses  f o r  T-4, i s  viewed as a 
s t r i n g e n t  examination o f  eq u i ty  and may ex tend  the  theo ry  
f u r t h e r  than  i t s  p r e s e n t  development w a r ra n t s .  The f i r s t  
minor h y p o th e s i s  ( i . e . ,  3a) was fo rm u la ted  to  f i n d  o u t  what 
would happen to  performance i f  pay was dec reased  r a t h e r  than  
in c re a se d  as had been th e  co n d i t io n  in  T-2 and T-3. I t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  even though Eg was s t i l l  r e c e iv in g  f i f t e e n  p e r ­
cent  more pay r e l a t i v e  to  normal pay t h a t  the  dec rease  from 
t h i r t y  p e rc e n t  e x t r a  pay in  T-3 to  f i f t e e n  p e rc e n t  e x t r a  pay 
in  T-4 was viewed as a decrease  in  outcome f o r  Eg by both  E^ 
and Eg. I f  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p lan a t io n  i s  c o r r e c t ,  and 
accord ing  to  Adams (1963a) i t  i s ,  then  q u a n t i t y  performance 
should  i n c r e a s e  f o r  Eg and q u a l i t y  performance should  dec rease
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This was th e  t r e n d  fo r  Eg Draftsmen. Perhaps th e  apparen t  
f a i l u r e  o f  the  r e s u l t s  to  suppor t  t h e  h y p o th e s is  i s  a conse­
quence of  th e  f a u l t y  fo rm ula t ion  of  th e  h y p o th e s i s  i t s e l f .
As w r i t t e n ,  i t  p r e d i c t s  changes in  employee in p u ts  r e s u l t i n g  
from an i n c r e a s e  in  outcome. (Much as s t a t e d  in  Hypotheses 
1 and l a . )  However, in  th e  exper im en ta l  sequence, the  115 
p e rce n t  pay fo r  th e  T-4 p e r io d  r e p r e s e n t s  a dec rease  in  o u t ­
come (when compared with th e  130 p e rc e n t  pay r a t e  fo r  T -3) .
I f  th e  h y p o th e s is  had been couched in  terms of a d e c reas in g  
outcome and based on Adams' concep ts ,  th e  performance of  th e  
groups would have more n e a r ly  sup p o r ted  th e  h y p o th e s is .
The second minor h y p o th e s i s  f o r  T-4 was an a t tem pt  to  
examine th e  e f f e c t s  of  f i f t e e n  p e r c e n t  pay in c r e a s e  f o r  Eg 
a f t e r  a p reced ing  t h i r t y  p e rce n t  pay in c re a s e  on th e  E^ 
g ro u p 's  q u a n t i ty  performance. According to  in e q u i ty  th e o ry  
th e  E^ g ro u p 's  q u a n t i ty  performance should  have been g r e a t e r  
in  T-4 than  in  T-1 bu t  l e s s  than  i t s  q u a n t i ty  performance in  
T-3. The r e s u l t s  fo r  t h i s  h y p o th e s is  a re  mixed and on the  
whole do not suppor t  eq u i ty  th eo ry  p r e d i c t i o n .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  once again  i t  i s  a q u e s t io n  as whether the  pay change 
from t h i r t y  p e rce n t  in  T-3 to  f i f t e e n  p e rcen t  in  T-4 was p e r ­
ce ived  by th e  E]^  group as a d ec rease  or  in c re a s e  in  outcome. 
The a v a i l a b l e  d a ta  do not f u rn i s h  a p l a u s i b l e  e x p la n a t io n .
The t h i r d  minor h y p o th e s is  f o r  T-4 ( i . e . ,  3c) i s  much 
l i k e  th e  second hy p o th e s is  and t h e r e f o r e  s u b je c t  to  th e  same 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and c o n s t r a i n t s .
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The fo u r th  minor hy p o th e s is  f o r  T-4 ( i . e . ,  3d) s t a t e d  
t h a t  a moderation of  a t t i t u d e s  would occur  when pay was i n ­
c rea sed  fo r  Eg by f i f t e e n  p e r c e n t .  This  h y po thes is  was 
suppor ted .  The t o t a l  JDI group mean sc o re s  in c re a se d  f o r  
and Eg which might i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  change in  e x t r a  pay r e ­
s u l t e d  in p e r c e p t io n s  of g r e a t e r  e q u i ty  between groups. This 
f in d in g  may lend  credence to  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  a t t i t u d e  
i s  more s e n s i t i v e  t o  pay s t i m u l i  than  i s  o v e r t  behav io r  such 
as performance.
The h y p o th e s is  fo r  T-5 p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  
of pay to normal l e v e l s  would s t a b i l i z e  performance and a t t i ­
tudes  to  th o se  l e v e l s  reco rded  p r i o r  to  pay in c re a s e s  fo r  Eg.
The f i r s t  minor h y p o th e s is  ( i . e . ,  4a) s t a t e d  t h a t  
q u a l i t y  performance l e v e l s  f o r  E% and E2  in  T-5 would match 
th o se  o f  t h e  P r e t r i a l  p e r io d .  This h y p o th e s is  was not sup­
p o r te d .  The second minor h y p o th e s is  ( i . e . ,  4b) was l i k e  the  
f i r s t  except  only  q u a n t i t y  performance f o r  E^ was emphasized. 
This h y p o th e s is  was a l s o  no t  su ppor ted .  The f in d in g s  o f  both  
o f  th e s e  hypo theses  should  be approached with  c a u t io n .  These 
hypotheses  a r e  too demanding on th e  theo ry  because of the  
p r e c i s io n  each r e q u i r e s  in i t s  own r i g h t .  The n a tu re  o f  th e  
t a s k  o f  Draftsmen i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  v a r i a b l e  to  change th e  p e r ­
formance r e s u l t s  on any g iven  d ay . Indeed t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
may have markedly in f lu e n c e d  any o f  th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  so 
f a r  w ith  th e  only p o s s i b l e  ex cep t io n  be ing  the  a t t i t u d e  s c o re s .  
Some comments about th e  n a tu re  o f  t h e  w h i t e - c o l l a r  job a re
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taken up in  l a t e r  d isc u s s io n s  concerning p o s s i b l e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
of t h i s  s tudy and th e r e fo r e  w i l l  not be e l a b o ra te d  on he re .
The fo u r th  minor hypo thes is  f o r  T-5 ( i . e . ,  4d) p re ­
d ic te d  a moderation of a t t i t u d e s  would occur r e l a t i v e  to  T-4. 
A t t i tu d e s  d id  not  change from T-4 to  T-5 f o r  e i t h e r  the  or  
the  E2  group.
The l a s t  major hypothes is  was f o r  th e  P o s t t r i a l  pe r iod  
and s t a t e d  t h a t  a l l  performance and a t t i t u d e  measures would 
be the  same as those  in  the  P r e t r i a l .  G enera l ly  speaking a l l  
measures were s l i g h t l y  h ig h e r  fo r  a l l  d r a f t i n g  groups in the  
P o s t t r i a l  p e r io d .
P o ss ib le  Study L im i ta t io n s
The fo l low ing  d is c u s s io n  of  p o s s i b le  l i m i t a t i o n s  for  
t h i s  s tudy focuses p r i n c i p a l l y  on methodologica l  concerns as 
t h e o r e t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  a re  p re se n ted  e l sew here .^
Sample S ize
The sample s i z e  fo r  t h i s  s tudy was n = 50. There were 
f o r ty  draftsmen and te n  keypunchers.  When th e  t o t a l  sample 
d iv ided  in to  t h r e e  groups th e  r e s u l t i n g  n s i z e  fo r  = 16,
E]^  = 17 and E2  = 17. With a l a r g e r  sample s i z e  p e r  c e l l  a 
g r e a t e r  confidence  could  be p laced  on th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  ANOVA
^The t h e o r e t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h i s  s tudy were d i s ­
cussed in  Chapter I in  th e  su b sec t io n s  e n t i t l e d  "T h eo re t ic a l  
Assumptions" and "L im i ta t io n s  of  S tudy."
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and c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s . ^  I t  i s  r e a d i ly  admitted  t h a t  
most r e s e a r c h e r s  almost always say they need a g r e a t e r  sample 
s i z e .
Length of T r i a l s
The leng th  of  each t r i a l  in  t h i s  experiment was four 
hours.  A more n e a r ly  optimum leng th  of t r i a l  should be at 
l e a s t  a week, o r  po ss ib ly  two weeks. The leng th  of  the  t r i a l s  
fo r  t h i s  experiment was p a r t l y  a func t ion  of  time and f in a n ­
c i a l  re so u rce s .  As a major o rg a n iz a t io n a l  change was sched-
u l t e d  fo r  t h r e e  weeks a f t e r  the P r e t r i a l  p e r io d  longer  t r i a l s  
were out of the  q u e s t io n .^  Also th e  longer  the  t r i a l  the  more 
money th a t  would be r e q u i r e d  fo r  e x t r a  pay. This i s  a r e ­
source i s s u e  not e a s i l y  r e so lv e d  in  a l l  ca ses .
Length of Time Between T r i a l s
Id e a l ly  t h e r e  should be a t  l e a s t  a week between each 
t r i a l .  By in c re a s in g  th e  i n t e r v a l  between t r i a l s  the  e x p e r i ­
menter would have more confidence in  th e  e f f e c t  o f  the  inde­
pendent v a r i a b l e  on a given t r i a l .
^The da ta  in Sec t ion  2 of  Chapter  IV were l im i te d  to  
Draftsmen fo r  s t a t i s t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The extreme s t a n ­
dard d ev ia t io n  for  Data Conversion O pera tors  r e q u i r e d  t h i s .  
The r e s u l t i n g  sample s i z e  per  c e l l  fo r  Data Conversion Opera­
t o r s  were C  ^ = 4, = 3 and E2  = 3. Sample s i z e  per  c e l l
fo r  Draftsmen were 0% = 12, Ei = 14 and E2  = 14.
O
The employees making up th e  p o p u la t io n  d id  not know 
of the impending o r g a n iz a t io n a l  changes.
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Method o f  Pay
The method of pay i s  c l e a r l y  a problem in  experim enta l  
p rocedure .  In t h i s  s tudy ,  management s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  the  
e x t r a  pay be c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  as coming from th e  r e s e a r c h e r .  
This  requirem ent  may have confounded th e  s tudy  to  a co n s id e r ­
ab le  e x t e n t .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  weakened th e  l i n k  between pay and 
performance and thus  i t  d i r e c t l y  impacted on th e  c o g n i t iv e  
outcome to  inpu t  r a t i o  of the  worker.
Task
The use of  w h i t e - c o l l a r  employees s u r e ly  added s i g n i f i ­
cant  co m p l ica t io n s .  As compared to  b l u e - c o l l a r  ta s k s ,  w h i te -  
c o l l a r  work t a s k s  are  more o f t e n  v a r i e d  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  in  
c h a r a c t e r .  Both of  th e se  a t t r i b u t e s  i n c r e a s e  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  sp e c i fy in g  and o b ta in in g  p r e c i s e  measures of  performance 
q u a n t i ty  and q u a l i t y .
Performance Measures
The use  of su p e rv i s o r s  fo r  performance e v a lu a t io n  of 
Draftsmen was a l i m i t a t i o n  imposed on t h i s  s tudy .  As th e r e  
were no means fo r  e v a lu a t io n  of  d raf tsmen performance a method 
had to  be dev ised .  The method depended on th e  Squad Leaders '  
c a p a b i l i t y  in  e v a lu a t in g  both q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y  p e r f o r ­
mance .
The above l i m i t a t i o n s ,  t o g e th e r  w ith  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
l i m i t a t i o n s  s e t  fo r th  in  Chapter I ,  c o n s t i t u t e  a r a t h e r  fo rmi­
dable  l i s t i n g .  Obviously ano ther  r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t  des igned to
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t e s t  and p o s s ib ly  extend th e  f in d in g s  of t h i s  s tudy should  
seek to  overcome th e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s .
Conclusions
To th e  b e s t  of t h i s  w r i t e r ' s  knowledge t h i s  s tudy i s  
th e  f i r s t  t o  a t tem pt  to  t e s t  Adams' in e q u i ty  theo ry  in  an 
a c tu a l  work environment,  and as such i s  in n o v a t iv e  thereby 
adding to  th e  in fo rm at ion  a l re ad y  p rov ided  by th o se  who have 
t e s t e d  the  theo ry  in  a more c o n t r o l l e d  s e t t i n g .  The d a ta  
o b ta in e d  were r e a l  d a ta  and t h e r e f o r e  d id  not  always conform 
to  p la n s ,  nor d id  the  d a ta  always complement s ta n d a rd iz e d  
s t a t i s t i c a l  methods. But th e s e  a r e  hazards  o f  f i e l d  r e s e a r c h .
The in c lu s io n  of  th e  JDI was unique:  no p rev ious
s t u d i e s  had inc lu d ed  an a t t i t u d e  measure in  connection  with 
the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  e q u i ty  th e o ry .  As th e  rea d e r  i s  w el l  
aware of by now, th e  JDI p rov ided  some of  th e  most c l e a r - c u t  
between groups r e s u l t s ;  th e  c r e d i t  f o r  t h i s  must be shared  
with those  who des igned th e  JDI.
This s tudy  d e a l t  with  t h r e e  r e s e a r c h  problems: the
e f f e c t  o f  changing pay on employee performance; the  e f f e c t  of 
changing pay on employee a t t i t u d e s ;  and th e  p e rc e p t io n  by one 
group of a pay in c r e a s e  awarded to  an o th e r  group.
With r e s p e c t  to  th e  f i r s t  r e s e a r c h  problem, on the  
b a s i s  of  th e  r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  s tudy i t  i s  not concluded t h a t  
changing pay does moderate employee perfo rm ance .^  Conclusions
^This s e c t io n  o f  Chapter  V c l o s e l y  fo l low s th e  "Research 
Problems" as  de f ined  in  Chapter  I .  Necessary e l a b o r a t io n s  a r e  
inc lu d ed  to  more c l e a r l y  d e f in e  th e  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  p o s i t i o n .
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cannot be drawn as to  the  exact manner in  which employee p e r ­
formance was moderated as r e l a t e d  to  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y  
measures. Q u a l i ty  performance p rov ided  th e  g r e a t e s t  d i f f i ­
c u l ty  f o r  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  to  e x p la in  why the  group mean s c o re s  
were in  a c e r t a i n  d i r e c t i o n  fo r  a given t r i a l .  Indeed, 
q u a l i t y  performance changes fo r  Ei and Eg groups e x h ib i t e d  
what appeared to  be an almost random p a t t e r n  of  change (as  
evidenced by F igure  10 on page 117). None of  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  
ana ly ses  used in  t h i s  study a ided  in  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h i s  
phenomenon. One p l a u s i b l e  ex p lan a t io n  might be in  th e  a c tu a l  
measure i t s e l f .  D ra f t in g  s u p e rv i s o r s  may not be a b le  to  
adequate ly  e v a lu a te  Draftsmen q u a l i t y  performance. R e la t iv e  
to  q u a l i t y  performance f o r  Data Conversion O pera to rs ,  th e  
type o f  keypunching ta s k  b ea rs  d i r e c t l y  on th e  number of  
e r r o r s  produced in  a given p e r io d .  During th e  course  o f  t h i s  
s tudy  th e  type of  keypunching t a s k  could  not be he ld  c o n s ta n t ;  
in s t e a d  t h e  changing t a s k  r e f l e c t e d  th e  normal work schedu l ing  
fo r  th e  d e p a r tm en t .
An e x p la n a t io n  of  q u a n t i ty  performance poses a somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  problem than does q u a l i t y  performance.  The q u a n t i ty  
performance, in  n a tu re  of  a t r e n d  as demonstra ted in  F igu re  11 
on page 118, was o p p o s i t e  as to  what could  have been expected .  
This may p o s s ib ly  be exp la ined  by c o n s id e r in g  re in fo rcem en t  
theo ry .  In an "e m p ir ica l  sense ,  a r e i n f o r c e r  i s  an event 
which, employed a p p r o p r i a t e ly ,  i n c r e a s e s  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
occurrence  of a response  in  a l e a r n in g  s i t u a t i o n ” (H i lg a rd  & 
M arqu is ' ,  p .  202).  Pay could have been viewed by th e  E2  group
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as a reward fo r  q u a n t i ty  performance. I f  such was the case ,  
then  as long as e x t r a  pay was being  r e ce iv e d  performance 
would con t inue  to  in c re a s e  u n t i l  i t  reached a p h y s ic a l  c e i l i n g  
( e . g . ,  no more ou tpu t  was p o s s i b l e  with th e  re sou rces  a t  
hand). Although t h i s  e x p lan a t io n  might s e rv e  to  j u s t i f y  why 
q u a n t i ty  performance demonstrated the  b ehav io r  i t  d id ,  t h i s  
conclusion  i s  o p p o s i te  t h a t  o f f e r e d  by Adams' in e q u i ty  th eo ry .  
Adams p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  q u a l i t y  performance fo r  Eg should i n ­
c rea se  but  t h a t  th e  q u a n t i ty  performance should  decrease .
Adams seems to  be i m p l i c i t l y  acknowledging the  e x i s te n c e  of 
the  re in forcem ent  phenomenon for  E2  but only  f o r  the  q u a l i t y  
v a r i a b l e .
The second re se a rch  problem d e a l t  w ith  th e  moderating 
e f f e c t s  of  pay on a t t i t u d e .  Based on th e  da ta  a n a ly s i s  i t  i s  
concluded t h a t  changes in  pay do moderate between group worker 
a t t i t u d e s .
A t h i r d  r e se a rch  q u es t io n  was whether an in c re a s e  in  
pay fo r  one group (E^) would be de f in ed  as a dec rease  by th e  
o th e r  group which has knowledge of  the  in c re a s e  but  d id  not 
i t s e l f  r e c e iv e  an in c re a s e .  I t  i s  concluded t h a t  such an 
occurrence  may a l t e r  the  outcome to  in p u t  r a t i o s  o f  the  E^ 
group. F igure  11 prov ides  a s t r i k i n g  example of how q u a n t i ty  
performance decreased  fo r  E^ beginning  d ra m a t ic a l ly  with  T-3 
(when th e  pay f o r  E2  was in c re a se d  to  130 p e rcen t  of normal) .  
As in the  f in d in g  r e l a t i v e  to  the  f i r s t  r e se a rch  q u es t io n  
t h i s  f in d in g  i s  in  r ev e r se  of what Adams p o s t u l a t e s  f o r  th e  
q u a n t i ty  performance. Reinforcement theory  may a l so  be used
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to  ex p la in  t h i s  b eh av io r .  The t r e n d  fo r  Ej c lo s e ly  resembles 
an e x t i n c t i o n  t r e n d  l i n e  when re in fo rcem ent  i s  withdrawn.
A focus of t h i s  s tudy was to  examine Adams' (1965) p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  as they r e l a t e  to  P e r s o n ' s  ad jus tm en ts  to  h i s  outcome 
to  inpu t  r a t i o .  S p e c i f i c a l l y  Adams' th eo ry  s t a t e s  t h a t  when 
pay i s  in c re a se d  f o r  th e  E2  group t h a t  q u a n t i t y  performance 
should dec rease  and q u a l i t y  performance shou ld  in c re a s e .  The 
opp o s i te  should  occur  fo r  th e  E^ group. The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  
s tudy i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  q u a n t i ty  performance dec reas in g  
f o r  E2  i t  in c re a s e d .  The r e s u l t s  f o r  E2  q u a l i t y  and fo r  th e  
E]^  group a re  not c l e a r  enough to w arran t  judgment on the  
remainder of Adams' th e o ry .
In conc lus ion ,  and on the  b a s i s  of t h i s  s tudy ,  i t  
seems t h a t  Adams' theory  o f  in e q u i ty  i s  a v ia b le  s t r u c t u r e  
f o r  e x p la in in g  employee behav ior  as i t  r e l a t e s  to  a pay and 
performance and a t t i t u d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The in fo rm ation  
ga the red  in  t h i s  s tudy  does not p rov ide  s u f f i c i e n t  under­
s ta n d in g  to  e v a lu a te  Adams' p r e d i c t i o n s  concern ing  the  q u a l i t y  
performance v a r i a b l e .  Inasmuch as Adams makes no p r e d i c t i o n s  
concerning th e  e f f e c t s  of  pay on worker a t t i t u d e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  
of t h i s  in q u i ry  have no bea r in g  on h i s  theo ry  of  in e q u i ty .
I f  the  re in forcem ent  theory  e x p la n a t io n  of  th e  f in d in g s  
fo r  q u a n t i ty  performance and pay r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  c r e d i t a b l e  
then i t  would appear  t h a t  c l a s s i c a l  wage i n c e n t iv e  programs 
are  a v i a b le  means to  in c re a s e  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  This conc lus ion  
i s  not viewed as b e in g  co n t ra ry  to  th e  b a s i c  outcome to  inpu t  
paradigm o f f e r e d  by Adams nor i s  i t  viewed as being  i n c o n s i s t e n t
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with the  concept of  the  comparator O ther .  This conc lus ion  
a l so  f i t s  very well  w i th in  the  param ete rs  o f f e r e d  by exchange 
theory .
Recommendations
A c o n t in u a t io n  of  s tudy in  t h i s  a r e a  i s  recommended 
with th e  fo l low ing  emphases:
1. Adams' theory  as  a theory  shou ld  be examined in  a 
work environment c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by g r e a t e r  c o n t r o l .  
I d e a l l y  t h i s  environment would have b l u e - c o l l a r  
workers performing l a r g e l y  manual t a s k s  which a re  
amenable to  p r e c i s e  measurement of  th e  q u a l i t y  and 
q u a n t i t y  o f  p ro d u c t io n .
2. The amount of  pay changes shou ld  be l e s s  dram atic
and each change shou ld  be in  e f f e c t  f o r  longer
p e r i o d s .
3. Pay should  be d i s t r i b u t e d  in  a normal fa sh io n  by
th e  employing o r g a n iz a t io n  and th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n
shou ld  take  p la c e  as soon a f t e r  the  t r i a l  p e r io d  
as  p o s s i b l e .
4. The b e t w e e n - t r i a l  p e r io d  shou ld  be extended to  no 
l e s s  than  one week.
5. Sample s i z e  should be a t  l e a s t  n = 120 fo r  a th ree -  
group des ign .  This would mean t h a t  each group 
would have f o r t y  employees; t h i s  would al low f o r  
absences and la b o r  tu rn o v e r  and s t i l l  leave  a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a rg e  number f o r  each c e l l .
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6 . A complete endorsement from a l l  invo lved  managers 
must be acq u i red  and m a in ta ined  fo r  t h e  e n t i r e  
p e r io d  of  th e  experiment.  I f  t h i s  s tudy  were to  
be conducted in  an un ion ized  f i rm  t h i s  endorsement 
should  in c lu d e  th e  union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
In g en e ra l  i t  i s  recommended t h a t  o t h e r  des igns  and 
t h e o r i e s  as they r e l a t e  to  exchange th eo ry  be employed in 
examining what i s  viewed as a very fundamental and normal 
b e h a v io ra l  phenomenon. The exchange model p rov ides  the  broad 
p e r s p e c t i v e  r e q u i r e d  to  f u l l y  unders tand  and a p p re c ia t e  the  
worker,  h i s  job  and h i s  employer. Equity  th eo ry  appears  f o r  
th e  p r e s e n t  to  be th e  b e s t  means fo r  in c r e a s in g  t h i s  under­
s ta n d in g  and, as t h i s  s tudy  has dem onstra ted ,  has f a c i l i t a t e d  
t h i s  u n d e r tak in g .  The eq u i ty  concept has a unique c a p a b i l i t y  
to  in c o rp o ra te  a broad range of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t h a t  may be made 
by th e  worker o r  th e  f i rm .  Pay, q u a n t i t y  performance and 
q u a l i t y  r e p r e s e n t  only  a small  number o f  th e s e  p o s s i b l e  con­
t r i b u t i o n s  so th e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  f o r  f u r t h e r  u s e fu l  r e sea rch  
a re  exceedingly  broad .
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THIS STUDY
Appendix A c o n s i s t s  of  t h r e e  p a r t s :  (1) A Demographic
Q u es t io n n a i re  t h a t  was ad m in is te re d  to  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,
(2) a summary of  th e  Job D e s c r ip t io n  Index (JDI) t h a t  was 
used to  measure a t t i t u d e  and th e  Retirem ent D e s c r ip t iv e  Index, 
and (3) a copy of  th e  JDI.
For Appendix A th e  cover  s h e e t s  of th e  Demographic 
Q u es t io n n a i re  and th e  JDI were om it ted .  Both o f  th e s e  cover 
sh e e ts  had th e  words "U n iv e rs i ty  o f  Oklahoma," "C o n f id e n t ia l  
D a ta , " and a space f o r  r e co rd in g  th e  fou r  d i g i t  employee code 
number. Both q u e s t io n n a i r e s  were th e  same f o r  Draftsmen and 
Data Conversion O pera to rs  excep t  where t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p ro ­
f e s s i o n s  were mentioned in  th e  Demographic Q u e s t io n n a i re .
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To keep t h i s  questionnaire  anonymous, p lease do not w r i te  your name anywhere on 
t h i s  page.
1
2
3
4
5
8
9
10
n
Personal code number ( l a s t  four d ig i t s  o f  your telephone number);
Year o f  b i r th  ________________
Sex: Male Female
How many months have you been employed by STAR?
How many months have you been working as a draftsman a t  
STAR?
How many months had you been working as a draftsman 
before you were employed by STAR?
How many months o f  t r a in in g  have you had as a draftsman in 
any of the following In s t i tu t io n s ?
High school
Other schools (such as vo-tech , p r iv a te  tech schools) ] 
Armed forces/N ational Guard ]
On-the-job t ra in in g  a t  STAR
On-the-job t r a in in g  a t  o ther  firms ]
months
NoWere you born in Oklahoma? Yes_____
How many years have you been l iv in g  in  the Oklahoma City 
area?
Show the  h ighes t  grade completed in  school by checking 
(X) one of the  fo llow ing:
Some grade school 
Completed grade schobl
Some high school 
Completed high school
Some co llege  
Completed ju n io r  co llege 
Completed co llege
months
months
months
months
months
months
months
years
Think of your impressions about your p resen t f in a n c ia l  s i tu a t io n .  How well 
do the  following words and phrases describe  your p resen t f in a n c ia l  s i t u a ­
t io n  as you see i t ?
I f  the  word o r  phrase describes your p resen t f in a n c ia l  s i tu a t io n  as you 
see i t ,  c i r c l e  t h e ( ï ^
I f  i t  does not describe  your p resen t f in a n c ia l  s i t u a t io n ,  c i r c l e  t h e ^ .
I f  you cannoFldecide whether i t  describes your p resen t f in a n c ia l  s i t u a t i o n ,  
c i r c l e  the  ( p .
FINANCIAL SITUATION
Barely l iv in g  on Income Yes ? No Good pension plan Yes ? No
Insecure Yes ? No Have to  make do Yes ? No
S a t is fa c to ry Yes ? No Serious f in a n c ia l  problems Yes ? No
Well o f f Yes 7 No No money to  meet emergencies Yes ? No
Steady Yes ? No Income from investments Yes ? No
Bad Yes ? No Need help from ch ild ren Yes ? No
Need ou tside  help Yes ? No Income provides luxuries Yes ? No
Worry about i t Yes ? No S e lf  supporting Yes ? No
High income Yes ? No Good Insurance plan Yes ? No
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Summary of the Job Description Index
The JDI i s  a means f o r  measuring job s a t i s f a c t i o n .
Job s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  fo r  th e  purposes  of t h i s  experiment,  i s  
d e f ined  as th e  a t t i t u d e  a worker has about h i s  job  a t  the  
time he completes th e  JD I .^  This d e f i n i t i o n  i s  in  agreement 
w ith  Smith e t  who s t a t e s  t h a t  "Job s a t i s f a c t i o n s  a re  f e e l ­
ings o r  a f f e c t i v e  responses  to  f a c e t s  of  the  s i t u a t i o n "  (1969, 
p. 6 ) .  Smith e t  ^  a s s e r t s  t h a t  " th e se  f e e l i n g s  a re  a s so ­
c i a t e d  with  a p e rce iv ed  d i f f e r e n c e  between what i s  expected  
as a f a i r  and reaso n ab le  r e t u r n  (o r ,  when th e  e v a lu a t io n  of 
f u tu r e  p ro sp e c ts  i s  invo lved ,  what i s  a s p i r e d  to )  and what i s  
exper ienced ,  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  in  a 
given s i t u a t i o n "  (1969, p. 6 ) .  This p rev io u s  quote p lu s  some 
a d d i t i o n a l  thoughts  comprises what Smith e t  ^  c a l l s  her  
g en e ra l  model. This model o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  base  in  in  ag ree ­
ment w i th  Adams' in e q u i ty  theo ry  and t h i s  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t .
The p o in t  of  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  i s  to  i l l u s t r a t e  in  a b r i e f  
manner th e  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  o f  th e  JDI and t h i s  experiment,  and 
i t s  use as a s u i t a b l e  measuring in s t rum en t .
The JDI p rov ides  a means f o r  measuring job  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
in  the  a re a s  of  pay, promotion, su p e rv i s io n ,  work and co­
workers .  The JDI c o n s i s t s  o f  seventy- two items;  e ig h te e n  fo r  
work, e ig h tee n  fo r  s u p e rv i s io n ,  e ig h teen  fo r  co-workers,  n ine  
f o r  pay and n ine items f o r  promotion. Each o f  t h e  f i v e
^Par t  o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  was taken  from Smith e t  a l  
(1969, p. 6 )
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groupings c o n s i s t s  of  a l i s t  of  a d j e c t i v e s  o r  d e s c r i p t i v e  
p h ra se s .  The S i s  asked to  c i r c l e  "yes" next  to  each i tem 
which d e s c r ib e s  h i s  pay, promotion, e t c . ,  and "no" f o r  each 
item which does no t .  A "?" response  i s  r e se rv e d  f o r  i tems 
on which th e  S cannot dec ide .  "Yes" answers a re  sco red  3,
"no" answers are  scored  0 and "?" answers a r e  sco red  1. These 
responses  a re  t o t a l e d  to  p rov ide  th e  index of  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
The g r e a t e r  the  t o t a l  th e  h ig h e r  th e  l e v e l  o f  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
For the  r e l i a b i l i t y  and homogenity th e  c o r r e c t e d  
s p l i t - h a l f  i n t e r n a l  co n s is te n cy  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  to  
exceed .80 f o r  each of  th e  s c a l e s .  Hulin (1969) a l s o  r e p o r t s  
th e  same s t a b i l i t y  over  t im e .  V a l id a t io n  of th e  JDI has 
undergone e x ten s iv e  examination w ith  im press ive  r e s u l t s . ^
The JDI accord ing  to  Vroom (1964) and Robinson, e t  ^  (1969) 
was developed through e x te n s iv e  and high q u a l i t y  r e s e a r c h .
Of s p e c i a l  note  in  t h e  JDI i s  th e  v e rba l  l e v e l  o f  th e  
i tems as they a re  q u i t e  low and t h e r e f o r e  do not r e q u i r e  th e  
S to  unders tand  com plica ted  o r  vague a b s t r a c t i o n s .  In ad d i ­
t i o n  th e  JDI i s  e a s i l y  a d m in is te r e d  and can be s c o re d  in  a 
2s h o r t  t ime.
^Vroom (1964) p r e s e n t s  a comprehensive review o f  h i s  
examination and t h a t  o f  Hulin ,  Smith, Kendall  and Lacke (1963), 
A dd i t iona l  suppor t  f o r  th e  JDI may a l so  be found in  Robinson, 
Athanasion, and Head (1969).
^This d e s c r ip t i o n  of  th e  JDI fo l low s very c l o s e ly  t h a t  
o f  Robinson, John P . , Robert  Athanasion,  and Kendra B. Head, 
"Measures o f  Occupational  A t t i t u d e s  and Occupationa l  C h a ra c te r ­
i s t i c s , "  (Appendix A to  Measures of  P o l i t i c a l  A t t i t u d e s ) ,
Survey Research Cen ter ,  I n s t i t u t e  fo r  S o c ia l  Research ,  Ann 
Arbor, 1969, p. 105.
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The JDI as u t i l i z e d  in  t h i s  experiment was a l t e r e d  by 
p la c in g  a " y e s , "  "?" and "no" in  t h i s  o rd e r  to  th e  r i g h t  of 
each q u e s t io n .  In th e  u n a l t e r e d  JDI the  S i s  asked to  w r i t e  
in  a "Y," "N" or  "?" to  th e  immediate l e f t  o f  th e  q u e s t io n .  
This change was made to  f a c i l i t a t e  answering and sc o r in g  th e  
q u e s t io n s .  Changes in  th e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  were a l s o  made to  
accommodate th e  change made in  th e  answer format.  No o th e r  
changes were made.
The Re tirem ent D e s c r ip t iv e  Index (RDI) as o r i g i n a t e d  
by Smith e t  (1969) was developed in  the  same r ig o ro u s
manner as th e  JDI. The RDI does la ck  the  e x ten s iv e  t e s t i n g  
common to  th e  JDI bu t  has a h igh degree  of  v a l i d i t y  accord ing  
to  Smith e t  (p .  84, 1969). Four s c a l e s  make up th e  RDI :
th e  A c t i v i t i e s  S ca le ,  t h e  F inances  S ca le ,  th e  People  Scale  
and th e  H ealth  S c a le .  Only th e  Finance Sca le  was u t i l i z e d  in  
t h i s  s tudy .  I t  was in c lu d ed  in  th e  Demographic Q u es t io n n a i r e ,  
and sco red  in  th e  same manner as th e  JD I . The mean sc o re  of 
30.96 was a r r i v e d  a t  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a n a t i o n a l  survey and 
was used f o r  comparison purposes  in  t h i s  s t u d y .
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Job Description Index
THINK or V:;;Jk IMPRESSIONS ABOUT YOUR PRESENT JOB
How i-.'oll 00  th e  follow ing words and phrases d esc r ib e  your p resen t job as you see  i t
t oday?
I f  the word o r  phrase d esc r ib es  your p re sen t  job  as you see  i t  today , c i r c l e  th e  
YES.
I f  i t  dor:' no t desc ribe  your p re sen t  job today , c i r c l e  th e  NO.
I f  you decide whether i t  describes  your p re sen t  job  today, c i r c l e  th e  ? .
SUPERVISION
Asks my advice Yes ? No T e l l s  me where I s tand Yes ? No
Hard to  p lease Yes ? No Annoying Yes ? No
Impolite Yes ? No Stubborn Yes ? No
P ra ises  good work Yes ? No Knows job well Yes ? No
Tactfu l Yes ? No Bad Yes ? No
I n f lu e n t ia l Yes ? No I n t e l l i g e n t Yes ? No
U p-to -da t; Yes ? No Leaves me on my own Yes ? No
Doesn’t: superv ise Lazy Yes ? No
enough
Quirk
Yes
Ypc
?
?
No
fjrt Around when needed Yes ? No
THINK OF YOUR IMPRESSIONS ABOUT YOUR PRESENT JOB.
How well do the  fo llow ing words and phrases d esc r ib e  your p resen t job  as you see  i t
today
I f  the  word o r  phrase d esc r ib es  your p resen t job  as you see  i t  today , c i r c l e  th e  
YES.
I f  i t  does not describe  your p re se n t  job today , c i r c l e  th e  NO.
I f  you cannot decide whether I t  describes  your p re se n t  jo b  today , c i r c l e  th e  ? .
WORK
F ascina ting Yes ? No Useful Yes ? No
Routine Yes ? No Tiresome Yes ? No
S a tis fy in g Yes ? No H ealth fu l Yes ? No
Boring Yes ? No Challenging Yes ? No
Good Yes ? No On your f e e t Yes ? No
C reative Yes ? No F ru s t r a t in g Yes ? No
Respected Yes ? No Simple Yes ? No
Hot Yes ? No Endless Yes ? No
P leasan t Yes ? No Gives sense o f
accomplishment Yes ? No
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THINK OF YOUR IMPRESSIONS ABOUT YOUR JOB.
How well do the  follow ing words o r phrases describe  your p re sen t  job  as you see 
i t  today?
I f  th e  word o r  phrase describes  your p re sen t  job as you see  I t  today , c i r c l e  the 
YES.
I f  i t  does no t d esc r ib e  your p re sen t  job  today, c i r c l e  th e  NO.
I f  you cannot decide whether i t  d e sc r ib es  your p resen t job  today, c i r c l e  th e  ? .
PAY
Income adequate f o r  normal expenses Yes ? No
S a t i s f a c to ry  p r o f i t  sharing Yes ? No
Barely l iv e  on income Yes ? No
Bad Yes ? No
Income provides lu x u rie s Yes ? No
Insecure Yes ? No
Less than I deserve Yes ? No
Highly paid Yes ? No
Underpaid Yes ? No
THINK OF YOUR IMPRESSIONS ABOUT YOUR JOB.
How well do th e  fo llow ing words o r phrases describe  your p re se n t  job as you see i t  
today?
I f  th e  word o r  phrase describes  your p re sen t  job as you see  i t  today , c i r c l e  th e  
YES.
I f  i t  does not d esc r ib e  your p re sen t  job  today, c i r c l e  th e  NO.
I f  you cannot decide whether i t  d esc rib es  your p resen t  job  today , c i r c l e  the  ? .
PROMOTIONS
Good opportun ity  f o r  advancement Yes No
Opportunity somewhat l im ited Yes No
Promotion on a b i l i t y Yes No
Dead-end job Yes No
Good chance fo r  promotion Yes No
U nfair promotion po licy Yes No
Infrequen t promotions Yes No
Regular promotions Yes No
F a ir ly  good chance f o r  promotion Yes No
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THINK OF YOUR IMPRESSIONS ABOUT YOUR PRESENT JOB.
How well do the  following words and phrases describe  your p re se n t  job as you sea i t
today?
I f  th e  word o r  phrase d esc rib es  your p re sen t  job as you see  i t  today , c i r c l e  the 
YES.
I f  i t  does not describe  your p re se n t  job today, c i r c l e  th e  NO.
I f  you cannot decide whether i t  describes  your p resen t job  to d ay , c i r c l e  the  ? .
CO-WORKERS
Stim ula ting Yes No Talk too much Yes ? No
Boring Yss No Smart Yes ? No
Slow Yes No Lazy Yes ? No
Ambitious Yes No Unpleasant Yes ? No
Stupid Yes No No privacy Yes ? No
Responsible Yes No Active Yes ? No
Fast Yes No Narrow in t e r e s t s Yes ? No
I n te l l i g e n t Yes No Loyal Yes ? No
Easy to  make enemies Yes No Hard to  meet Yes ? No
APPENDIX B
JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND STAR MANUFACTIRING 
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
The co n ten ts  of Appendix B are  th e  job d e s c r ip t i o n s  
of  employees and managers a t  STAR Manufacturing Company who 
were involved  in  t h i s  s tudy .  A Table of O rgan iza t ion  i s  a l s o  
inc luded  to  a id  the re ad e r  in  a c q u i r in g  an o v e r a l l  view of  
th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e .
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 M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
N o , S U B J E C T :
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
D A T E :
R E V :
D I S T R I B U T I O N ; I S S U E D  BY
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
I N S E R T  I N :
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE Supervisor, D rafting  Control
2.0 REPORTS TO Chief Draftsman
3 .0  SUPERVISES Weights Clerk
Senior B luep rin t Operator
4 .0 WORK RELATIONS
5.0 GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.0  SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.01
Manager, Engineering 
Chief S tru c tu ra l  Engineer 
Chief Estimating Engineer 
Chief P ro jec t  Engineer 
Engineers - Design
Manager, M aterial and Production Control
Superv isor, Production Control
Superv isor, M aterial Control
A ss is ta n t  Purchasing Manager
Buyer - Purchasing
Supervisor, Dealer Coordination
Regional Coordinators
D i s t r i c t  Coordinators
National Accounts Coordinator
Superv isor, Estim ating
Estimators
Supervisor, Operations - Information Services 
Squad Leaders -  Production
Schedules and monitors to  p r e - s e t  schedules a l l  
jobs and drawings from en try  in to  the D rafting  
Section u n t i l  e x i t  from the  Engineering Department 
to  Material and Production Control or customer.
Reviews and recommends scheduling procedures such as 
"short in te rv a l"  scheduling , e t c . ,  fo r  adoption by 
the Engineering Department.
6.02 Monitors the scheduled d ra f t in g  of orders  with Sales 
Serv ice , Material and Production C ontro l, the  Pro­
duction Departments, and o ther  Engineering s e c t io n s .
POLICY AND PROCEDURE BULLETIN NO: DATE:
Page of REV:
r
7.0 MINIMUM EDUCA­
TION AND 
EXPERIENCE
6.03 Monitors the scheduled d ra f t in g  of a l l  approval 
drawings and completion dates with Regional Coordinators.
6.04 Assess fo r  Production Control the number o f d ra f t in g  
hours necessary  to  complete a s p e c i f ic  job .
6.05 Reviews estim ated d ra f t in g  hours versus ac tua l  d ra f t in g  
hours on a continuing bas is  to  re f in e  and con tro l the 
scheduling system.
6.06 Reviews a l l  s a le s  orders fo r  c l a r i t y  and completeness 
so th a t  when the  jobs are  assigned to  a squad th i s  
squad can proceed with the  job with a minimum of 
delay. C la r i f ic a t io n  may req u ire  the  completion of 
the "Request f o r  C la r i f i c a t io n  or Hold" forms.
6.07 D irects  and supervises  the  B lueprin t functions  
s p e c i f ic a l ly  as re la te d  to b i l l s  o f  m a te r ia l ,  drawings, 
e t c . ,  and coordinates  the  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  B lueprin t 
Room with o th e r  STAR departments.
6 .08 Assumes the d u tie s  of Chief Draftsman when Chief 
Draftsman i s  not a v a i la b le  due to  i l l n e s s ,  v aca t io n ,  e tc .
6.09 D irects  and superv ises  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  "Weights 
Clerk" in conjunction with M aterial and Production 
Control to  determine " th e o re t ic a l  s c rap " ,  e s ta b l i s h  
parameters fo r  the s iz e  of p la te s  to  be stocked
by the p la n ts ,  and to  provide a b as is  fo r  b e t t e r  
scrap c o n t r o l .
7.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have
completed courses in D rafting and Design, a lg eb ra ,
and trigonom etry , or a two year course in  D rafting
and Design from a repu tab le  tech school.
7.02 A minimum of four years  p rog ress ive ly  respons ib le
experience in the  p repara tion  of s t r u c tu r a l  s te e l
fa b r ic a t io n  drawings, two years o f  which must have 
been with STAR. He must a lso  have a working knowledge 
of p ra c t ic a l  s t r u c tu r a l  design theory and s t r u c tu r a l  
s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  shop p ra c t ic e .
7.03 A demonstrated superv isory  a b i l i t y .
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S T AR M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
No. SUBJECT:
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
DATE:
REV:
DISTRIBUTION; ISSUED BY: INSERT IN:
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
.0  TITLE Data Conversion Supervisor
.0  REPORTS TO Supervisor, Computer Operations
«
.0  DIRECTS Lead Data Conversion Operator 
Data Conversion Operators
4 .0  WORK RELATIONS
5 .0  GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
6 .0  SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES
Computer Operators
User personnel providing computer input
Supervises a l l  personnel engaged in  keypunching, key 
v e r if ic a t io n  and in  the operation  o f other data con­
version  d e v ic e s .
6 .01  Schedules workloads.
6 .02  D istr ib u tes  work assignm ents.
6 .0 3  Checks accuracy o f keypunched m a ter ia l.
6 .04  Evaluates keypunch personnel performance for  sa lary  
adm in istra tion , tra in in g  and promotion.
6 .05  Interview s job a p p lica n ts .
6 .06  M aintains con tro l o f data w h ile  in  keypunch s e c t io n .
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STAR M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
N o S U B J E C T ;
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
D A T E :
R E V :
D I S T R I B U T I O N
1
I S S U E D  BY
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
I N S E R T  I N:
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE Squad Leader - Production
2 .0  REPORTS TO Chief Draftsman
3.0 DIRECTS Production Squad Personnel
4 .0  WORK RELATIONS
5.0 GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.0  SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.01
Chief S truc tu ra l Engineer 
Chief Estimating Engineer 
Chief P ro jec t Engineer 
Engineers - Design 
Supervisor, Production Control 
Supervisor, Material Control 
Buyer - Purchasing 
Supervisor, Dealer Coordination 
Regional Coordinators 
D is t r i c t  Coordinators 
Supervisor, Estimating 
Estimators
Supervisor, Operations - Information Services 
Squad Leaders - Production
Under general d i r e c t io n ,  plans and supervises the 
preparation  of a l l  drawings, shipping l i s t s  and 
other m ateria l requ ired  to  process the orders assigned 
to  his production squad.
Confers with superv iso r  regarding section  p o licy , 
procedure, s ta f f in g  and r e la te d  d e ta i l  m atters .
6.02 Trains squad personnel.
6.03 Upon r e c e ip t ,  review each order. Review job information 
to  assure com patib il i ty  o f  s a le s  o rder, d ea le r  informa­
t io n  and engineering .
a) D is tr ib u tes  them to squad personnel on a com­
p lex ity  and p r io r i ty  b a s is .
b) Assures th a t  prelim inary  B/M goes to  M aterial 
C ontro l.
POLICY AND PROCEDURE BULLETIN NO: DATE:
Page 2 o f 2 REV:
r
7.0 MINIMUM EDUCA­
TION AND 
EXPERIENCE
c) Provides suggested approaches fo r  d e ta i l in g  by 
subord inates , ve rba lly  or by sketch.
6.04 Prepares prelim inary b i l l i n g  fo r  Purchasing and 
M aterial Control Departments' a c q u is i t io n  of m ate r ia ls  
required .
6.05 Upon request ,  in v e s t ig a te s  s p e c i f ic  d e ta i l  complaints 
and reports  to  superv iso r. Assigns simple complaints 
to  subordinates and reviews r e s u l t s .
6.06 A ss is ts  in formulation of wage adjustm ent, t r a n s f e r ,  
or term ination recommendations and, upon req u es t ,  
a s s i s t s  in o ther ac tions  regarding production squad 
personnel.
6.07 Develops specia l p a r ts  or standards from repeating  
orders or previous problems as assigned.
6.08 Provide l ia iso n  with assigned sec tion  of the  company 
on problems or coord ina tion .
6.09 A ss is t  Chief Draftsman in e x tra  p ro je c t  work requ iring  
d ra f t in g  e x p e r t is e .
7.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have 
completed courses in D rafting and Design, a lgebra , 
and trigonometry, or a two year  course in Drafting 
and Design from a repu tab le  tech  school.
7.02 A minimum of th ree  years experience in  the  preparation  
of s t ru c tu ra l  s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  and e rec tio n  drawings, 
two years of which must have been in th i s  industry  
and one year  with STAR. He must a lso  have a working 
knowledge of p ra c t ic a l  s t r u c tu r a l  design theory and 
s t ru c tu ra l  s te e l  fa b r ic a t io n  shop p ra c t ic e .
7.03 A demonstrated supervisory  a b i l i t y .
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I I I
U J J D  . .
N o. •U B JC C T ;
JOB DESCRIPTION
OATK:
REV:
O lS T N iaU T IO N ; IS S U E D  BY:
DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING
IN SE R T  IN ;
1.0  TITLE
2 .0  REPORTS TO
3.0  DIRECTS
4 .0  WORK RELATIONS
5.0  GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.0  SPECIFIC
• RESPONSIBILITIES
6.01
6.02
6.03
Manager, D rafting
D ire c to r ,  Engineering
Chief Draftsman, Production 
Chief Draftsman, Product and Systems
Manager, Product Engineering 
Manager, Product Development 
Manager, Design Engineering "
Manager, Sales Serv ice 
Manager, P lan ts  
Manager, Purchasing
Manager, M aterial and Production Control 
Manager, Inform ation S erv ices
P lan s ,  d i r e c t s ,  su p erv ises  and co o rd in a tes  a l l  
D rafting  a c t i v i t i e s  concerning o rd e r  process ing  
f o r  a l l  b u ild in g s  so ld  by th e  Company, a ssu r in g  
scheduled , a c c u ra te ,  e f f i c i e n t  and economical 
completion o f  a l l  o rd e rs .
Reviews design  and d e t a i l s  on a p e r io d ic  b a s is  to  
in su re  t h a t  m anufacturing and m ate r ia l  c o s ts  a re  
such to  optim ize company's m anufacturing c o s t s .
P la n s ,  d i r e c t s ,  su p erv ises  and co o rd in a te s  D ra ft ing  
a c t i v i t i e s  in  regards  to  computer programs fo r  
d e ta i l in g  and o rd e r  p rocess ing  and i s  re sp o n s ib le  
f o r  th e  maintenance o f  a l l  s tandard  components, 
p iece  marks, d e t a i l s ,  packages f o r  a l l  s tandard  
b u ild in g s .
Supervises D ra ft in g  s e c t io n s  genera ting  t im e ly ,  
a c c u ra te ,  e f f i c i e n t  and economical o p e ra t io n s .
Coordinates th e  scheduled D rafting  o f  o rd e rs  w ith 
th e  Sales S e rv ic e ,  M ateria l  and Production Control 
and Production Departments and o th e r  engineering  
Departments.
Develops, p re p a re s ,  and analyzes  D raft ing  con tro l 
r e p o r ts  covering e f f i c i e n c y ,  sch ed u les ,  production  
comparison to  s ta n d a rd s ,  performance, q u a l i t y ,  
com pla in ts ,  e t c .
ROCEDURE d U L L & Ü M  n u :
0 MINIMUM EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE
6:04
6:05
6.06
6.07
6.08 
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
7.01
7.02
Page of REV:
I n te r p r e t s  e x i s t in g  D ra f t in g  p o l ic y  and recommends 
m o d if ica t io n  in  s t a f f i n g  and r e l a t e d  D ra f t in g  m a t te r s ;  
Develops procedures and su p p lie s  to  in su re  conformance 
to  and im plem entation o f  approved p o l i c i e s .
Develops, reviews and v e r i f i e s  D raft ing  p rocess ing  
s tanda rds  used by sch e d u le rs  and e s t im a to rs  assuming -
a c c o u n ta b i l i ty  f o r  r e s u l t i n g  d e v ia t io n s  o f  s tan d a rd s  
to  a c tu a l .
Advises su b o rd in a te s  su p e rv iso rs  t o  r e so lv e  d e t a i l  
procedure o r  o th e r  problems.
Approves r e q u i s i t i o n s  f o r  r o u t in e  s u p p l ie s  re q u ire d  
by th e  Drafting- room an d /o r  B lu e p r in t  room. Consults  
w ith  D ir e c to r ,  Engineering reg ard in g  unusual e x p en d itu re s .
A dm inisters personnel and employee r e l a t i o n  programs 
covering employee development and t r a i n i n g ,  compensation, 
a p p ra isa l  and s t a f f i n g .
Prepares  and ad m in is te rs  an annual D ra ft in g  budget 
assuming r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  budget d e v ia t io n  and 
seeking approval f o r  d e v ia t io n s  o f  5% and expen d itu res  
exceeding $500.
P la n s ,  co o rd in a te s  and m ain ta ins  a l l  s tan d a rd  p a r t  
d e t a i l s ,  packages, and items r e l a t i n g  to  s ta n d a rd  b i l l s  
o f  m a te r ia l  f o r  a l l  s tan d a rd  components p rocessed  and 
produced by Company.
A s s i s t s  in  re so lv in g  f i e l d  problems caused by f a b r i c a t io n  
o r  d e t a i l i n g  e r r o r s  and v i s i t s  jo b  s i t e s  to  re so lv e  these  
problems as  n ecessa ry .
I n i t i a t e s  and m a in ta in s  s tandard  D ra ftin g  Procedures 
Manual f o r  s ta n d a rd iz a t io n  o f  methods to  be used by a l l  
D ra f t in g  Employees.
M ain ta in s ,  c o o rd in a te s  an d /o r  i n i t i a t e s  computer programs 
r e l a t i n g  to  D ra f t in g  d e t a i l i n g  o r  b i l l s  o f  m a te r ia l  
o rd e r s .  *
E quiva len t o f  two y e a r s  c o l le g e  o r  t r a d e  school course 
in  D raft ing  and Design.
A minimum o f  s ix  y e a r s  p ro g re s s iv e ly  r e sp o n s ib le  
experience  in th e  p re p a ra t io n  o f  s t r u c tu r a l  s t e e l  
f a b r i c a t io n  draw ings, fo u r  y ea rs  o f  which must have 
been w ith  STAR. He must a lso  have a working knowledge 
o f  p r a c t i c a l  s t r u c t u r a l  design th eo ry  and s t r u c t u r a l ’ 
s te e l  f a b r i c a t i o n  shop p r a c t i c e .
A demonstrated s u o e rv iso ry  a b i l i t y .
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UUJ  1 1,
No. •U aJC C T:
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
OATK:
RKV;
OltTRIBUTION; IS8UCO BY:
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN SERT IN ,
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE Checker -  Production
2 .0  REPORTS TO Squad Leader -  Production
3 .0  DIRECTS None
4 .0  GENERAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES
5.0 SPECIFIC 
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.0  MINIMUM EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE
Under d i r e c t io n ,  checks a l l  drawings, shipping l i s t s  and 
o th e r  m ateria l  prepared by members.of Production Squad.
5.01 Checks f a b r ic a t io n  drawings, anchor b o l t  p la n s ,  e re c t io n  
p lan s ,  shipping l i s t s  and o ther  m ateria l as assigned fo r  
completeness, accuracy, c l a r i t y ,  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  conformity 
with design notes and standard  p r a c t ic e s .
5.02 Trains squad personnel.
5.03 Upon re q u e s t ,  a s s i s t s  Squad Leader in form ulation  of 
wage adjustm ents and o ther  ac tio n s  concerning the  d e ta i l  
squad.
5.04 Assumes the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the Squad Leader in  h is  
absence.
6.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have completed
courses in  D rafting  and Design, a lg eb ra ,  and trigonom etry,
o r  a two year  course in  D rafting and Design from a repu­
ta b le  tech  school.
6.02 A minimum of th re e  years  experience in  th e  p repara tion  .
o f  s t r u c tu r a l  s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  and e re c t io n  drawings,
two years  o f  which must have been in  t h i s  Industry  and 
one year  w i th ‘STAR. He must a lso  have a working know­
ledge o f  p r a c t ic a l  s t ru c tu ra l  design theory  and s tru c tu ra l  
s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  shop p ra c t ic e .
6 .03 A demonstrated supervisory  a b i l i t y .
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S T AR M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
NO. SUBJECT:
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
DATE:
REV:
DISTRIBUTION; ISSUED BY:
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
INSERT IN:
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE Senior Draftsman - Production
2.0 REPORTS TO Squad Leader - Production
3.0  SUPERVISES None
4.0 GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
5.0  SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES
6.0  MINIMUM EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE
Under general superv ision  prepares drawings and/or 
shipping l i s t s  requ ired  to  process orders o f  maximum 
complexity.
5.01 Analyzes an assigned sp ec ia l  o rder.
5.02 Determines a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  s tandard  components.
5.03 Prepares a shipping l i s t  and necessary f a b r ic a t io n  
drawings requ ired  fo r  p roduction , sh ipp ing , co s t  
accounting and e re c t io n .
5.04 Prepares p relim inary  b i l l s  f o r  Purchasing Department's 
a c q u is i t io n  of m a te r ia ls  req u ired .
5.05 Submit a l l  work to  Checker (designated  by Squad Leader) 
fo r  accuracy and completeness check.
6.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have 
completed courses in  D rafting  and Design, a lg e b ra ,  
and trigonom etry , o r  a two y ea r  course in  D rafting  
and Design from a rep u tab le  tech  school.
6.02 A minimum of th re e  y ears  experience In th e  p repara tion  
o f  s t r u c tu r a l  s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  and e re c t io n  drawings, 
o r  c lo se ly  reTated f i e l d ,  two years  o f which must have 
been In t h i s  in d u s try .  He must a lso  have a working 
knowledge o f  p ra c t ic a l  s t r u c tu r a l  design theory and 
s t ru c tu ra l  s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  shop p ra c t ic e .
T a R
176
u  I N «  #
STAR M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
NO. SUBJECT:
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
OATB:
RCVi
OISTRiaUTlON; l a s u e o  BV;
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
INSERT IN:
POLICY & PROCEDURE
_________ ___jm % i ........................ .
1.0 TITLE
2.0  REPORTS TO
3.0  DIRECTS
4.0  GENERAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES
5.0 SPECIFIC 
RESPONSIBILITIES
6 .0  MINIMUM EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE
Draftsman - Production 
Squad Leader -  Production 
None
Under su p e rv is io n ,  prepares drawings and/or shipping 
l i s t s  requ ired  to  process o rders .
5.01 Analyzes an assigned modified s tandard  o r sp ec ia l  o rde r .
5.02 Determines a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  standard  components.
5.93 Prepares a shipping l i s t  and necessary fa b r ic a t io n  
drawings requ ired  fo r  production , sh ipp ing , cos t  
accounting, and e re c t io n .
5.04 Prepares prelim inary  b i l l s  fo r  Purchasing Department's 
a c q u is i t io n  o f  m a te r ia ls  requ ired .
5.05 Submit a l l  work to  Checker (designated  by Squad Leader) 
fo r  accuracy and completeness check.
6.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have 
completed courses in D rafting  and Design, a lg e b ra ,  
and trigonom etry , or a two year  course in  D rafting  
and Design from a rep u tab le  tech school.
6.02 A minimum o f  one year  experience in  the  p rep a ra tio n  
o f  s t r u c tu r a l  s te e l  f a b r ic a t io n  and e re c t io n  drawings, 
o r  c lo se ly  r e la te d  f i e l d ,  or equ iv a len t educa tion .
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NO, SUBJECT:
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
DATE:
REV:
DISTRIBUTION; ISSUED BY;
MANAGER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
INSERT IN:
POLICY & PROCEDURE 
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE Ju n io r  Draftsman - Production
2.0 REPORTS TO Squad Leader - Production
3.0 SUPERVISES None
4.0 GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Under c lose  su p e rv is io n ,  prepares drawings and/or 
shipping l i s t s  requ ired  to  process o rders .
5 .0 SPECIFIC 5.01 Analyzes an assigned s tandard  or modified s tandard  o rd e r .
RESPONSIBILITIES
6 .0  MINIMUM EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE
5.02 Determines the  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f s tandard  components and 
packages.
5.03 Prepares a shipping l i s t  and necessary  fa b r ic a t io n  
drawings requ ired  fo r  p roduction , sh ipp ing , co s t  
accounting , and e re c t io n .
5 .04 Prepares pre lim inary  b i l l s  f o r  Purchasing Department’s 
a c q u is i t io n  o f  m a te r ia ls  req u ired .
5.05 Submit a l l  work to  Checker (designated  by Squad Leader) 
f o r  accuracy and completeness check.
6.01 Incumbent must be a highschool graduate and have 
completed courses in  D rafting  and Design, a lg e b ra ,  
and trigonom etry , or a two year  course in  D rafting  
and Design from a repu tab le  Tech school.
6.02 No experience req u ired .
u  I N
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S T A R  M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
NO. •UBJKCTi OATKi
JOB DESCRIPTIONS m v i
o iem iau T io N i IH U IO  #Y: INmENT INI
POLICY & PROCEDURE
MANUAL
1.0 TITLE
2 .0  REPORTS TO
3.0  WORK RELATIONS
4.0  GENERAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES
5.0  SPECIFIC 
RESPONSIBILITIES
Data Conversion Opera tor  
Data Conversion Su p e rv iso r  
Data Conversion personnel
Keypunches and k e y - v e r i f l e s  da ta  as d i r e c t e d  by keypunch 
su p e r v i so r .
5.01 Prepar ing  punched cards  In accordance w i th  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
provided by s u p e r v i s o r s .
5 .02  Main tain ing  sequence and con t ro l  of  source  documents.
5.03 D e tec t ing  e r r o r s  and repunching c o r r e c t e d  Informat ion .
5 .04  Main tain ing  n e a t  and o rd e r ly  work a r e a .
TAR MANUFAL >RING COMPANY •
JltDiNGS DIVISION - ORGANIZATION CHART ATIACHkwVr 1
G 9 0 M .O U 6 E L
■**
0»nHOUJER * *
HVWQB ** 
DKAITING
HUMGER ♦ *  
PROD. B C .  :
VICE PRESIDENT 
OPERATIGNS
mvn,\q ;rnvvuF,\crvRiNG
ENCINLERINC
««
MVV\nCR 
n n tiiiv siN C  (  
IR M TIC
MANAGEI 
SALES SERVICE
DIRECTOR OF 
MARKETING * *
PRESIDENT * *  
STAROOX
VICE PRESIDENT 
MARKETING
VICE PRESIDENT 
STAR REALTY 
MANACDENT
VICE PRESIDENT 
COMPOSITE S Y S m g
m  I  T r T H K i m m
EXECUTIVE 
VICE PRESIDENT
* * I n d ic a te s  a  p ro m o tio n  o r  re a s s ig n m e n t,
APPENDIX C
FLOORPLANS FOR THE DRAFTING 
AND KEYPUNCH WORK AREAS
The fo l lowing f lo o rp la n s  were p repared  fo r  the  study 
a f t e r  i s  completion by th e  Draftsmen involved in t h i s  e x p e r i ­
ment. Before red u c t io n  the  s c a l e  fo r  th e  d r a f t i n g  work a re a  
was 1/8" = 1' -  0, The s c a le  fo r  the  keypunch room i s  
1 / 8 " = 1 ' -  0 .
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D ra f t in g  Work Area 
(Reduced from 1/8" = 1' -  0)
NORTH t
J L l .
0
□
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Keypunch Work Area 
( 1 / 8 " = 1 ' -  0 )
NORTH t
/ { i - y //
APPENDIX D 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE EMPLOYEE BRIEFING
The fo l lo w in g  i s  a t r a n s c r i p t  o f  the  b r i e f i n g  fo r  a l l  
d r a f t i n g  employees. The p r i n c i p a l  sp eak e rs  a r e  Weldon Cain, 
D ra f t in g  Manager, and Will iam H. Keown from th e  U n iv e r s i ty  of 
Oklahoma. The only e d i t i n g  on t h i s  t r a n s c r i p t  was in  the  
n a tu re  of  p u n c tu a t io n  and o th e r  such grammatical changes t h a t  
might a id  a r e a d e r .  The same p r e s e n t a t i o n  was made a second 
t ime to  th e  Data Conversion O pera to rs .
Mr. Cain There i s  a gentleman Paul  S h a f fe r  h e re ,  p r o f e s s o r  
a t  OU and he i s  working on h i s  d o c to ra te  as I 
unders tand  i t .  I assume h i s  t h e s i s  i s  involved  
in  s o r t  of  a survey about what a f f e c t s  produc­
t i v i t y  amongst w h i t e - c o l l a r  o r  t h a t  type  of 
worker,  and the ,  STAR had extended th e  cou r te sy  
th u s  t o  v o lu n te e r  you i f  you wish to  be volun­
t e e r e d  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  t h i s  s tudy .  I t  i s  
p u re ly  v o lu n ta ry —which I had asked your Squad 
Leaders t o  t e l l  you.
Mr. Keown, who i s  a d o c to r  a t  OU in  th e  
School of  Business  A d m in s t ra t io n , I assume, i s  
going to  ex p la in  th e  t h in g  to  you and go i n t o  i t  
so I w on ' t  a t tempt to  t r y  t o .  Paul i s  th e  daddy
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of t h i s  th in g ,  but I th in k  he f e e l s  he i s  so i n ­
volved in i t  he would r a t h e r  l e t  someone e l s e  
more o b j e c t i v e ,  l i k e  Dr. Keown, ex p la in  i t  t o  you; 
because t h i s  i s  P a u l ' s  l i t t l e  p r o j e c t .  So I d o n ' t  
know of  any th ing  e l s e  to  say o th e r  than  they are  
both from OU and I 'm an aggie so— ( la u g h te r )
Dr. Keown T h a t ' s  q u i t e  a l l  r i g h t ,  ( l a u g h te r )
Mr. Cain I 'm not a p o lo g iz in g ,  ( l a u g h te r )
Dr. Keown As Weldon s a i d ,  t h i s  i s  a r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t .  We
are  both in  th e  College of Business  A dm inis tra­
t i o n  and we approached management a t  STAR to  see  
i f  they would he lp  us in  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t — 
i t  has to  do w ith  a t t i t u d e s  of  people  towards 
many a s p e c t s  o f  t h e i r  job .  The s tudy  t h a t  we 
p roposed /p lanned  has been conducted in  many 
p la c e s  a c ro s s  the  country over th e  l a s t  few y e a r s .  
But t h i s  i s  unique in  a number o f  ways, one of  
which i s  t h a t  as f a r  as we know t h i s  k ind  of
s tudy  has  never  d e a l t  with draf tsmen and t h e i r
a t t i t u d e s  towards t h e i r  work. So we have de­
s igned  th e  s tu d y ,  and management a t  STAR i s  not 
involved  in  any way except you might say the  
h o s p i t a l i t y  o f  o f f e r i n g  us the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  
come and c o l l e c t  th e  da ta .  They have not been 
involved  in  th e  des ign  of th e  s tudy ,  th e  c o l l e c ­
t i o n  o f  th e  d a ta ,  o r  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  th e
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r e s u l t s .  That r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r e s t s  with  us. 
Because th e  s tudy does involve  comparison of 
a t t i t u d e s  of you people ,  looking a t  d r a f t i n g  
jobs  with w h a t 's  been found in  o th e r  s t u d i e s ,  I 'm 
not ab le  to  t a l k  very much about i t  a t  t h i s  p o in t ;  
because I 'm a f r a i d  t h a t  what I say might i n f l u ­
ence your a t t i t u d e s  and th e r e f o r e  th e  in fo rm ation  
we might get  could  not be t r u e  about how you 
th in k  about th in g s .  And so I won ' t  t a l k  more 
about th e  s tudy i t s e l f  today,  except to  t a l k  
about what would be expected of  you as p a r t i c i ­
pan ts .
The p a r t  you would play would be sm all :  
mostly t h i s  a f te rn o o n .  We have two q u e s t io n ­
n a i r e s  to  f i l l  ou t ,  one i s  s o r t  of  a background 
in fo rm at ion  k ind  of  th in g  about each p a r t i c i p a n t ,  
which t e l l s  about the  leng th  of time on th e  job ,  
educa t ion ,  r e s id e n c e  h e re  in  the  Oklahoma City 
a rea  and th in g s  o f  t h a t  s o r t .  This would be 
f i l l e d  out today and t h a t  would be th e  end of  i t .  
And ano ther  q u e s t io n n a i r e  would be f i l l e d  out 
today and t h i s  i s  the  one t h a t  d ea ls  with  a t t i ­
tudes  towards th e  job .  And t h i s  same q u e s t io n ­
n a i r e ,  th e  one you w i l l  see  today,  th e  second one, 
would be a l so  f i l l e d  out again  s e v e ra l  more t imes 
during th e  next two weeks. This i s  on the  b a s i s  
t h a t  p e o p le ' s  a t t i t u d e s  towards t h e i r  work change
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over  time. I d o n ' t  know how i t  i s  with you, but 
i t ' s  c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  with  me t h a t  th e  way I th in k  
about my work i s  d i f f e r e n t  one month to  th e  next;  
i t ' s  even probably d i f f e r e n t  on Friday  a f te rn o o n  
and Monday morning, ( l a u g h te r )  We want to  ge t  
s e v e r a l  re co rd in g s ,  you might say, o f  your a t t i ­
tudes  toward your work a t  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  p o in t s  
in  t ime dur ing  the  next two weeks. This would 
be, Paul would be coming in  here  to  d i s t r i b u t e  
th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  a t  the  l a s t  15 minutes or  so 
b e fo r e  a lunch hour one day. I t  would j u s t  take  
a few minutes;  a f t e r  you have been through i t  
once today i t  won ' t  take  long to  f i l l  i t  out 
aga in ;  but t h a t  would be th e  ex ten t  o f  your i n ­
volvement—prov id ing  t h i s  in fo rm at ion  today and 
th en ,  in  subsequent days, t h r e e  o r  four  t imes in
th e  next couple of  weeks.
The q u e s t io n n a i r e s  w i l l  be, th e  completed 
q u e s t io n n a i r e s  w i l l  only be handled by Paul ,  1 
w i l l  see  n e i t h e r .  They are  c o n f i d e n t i a l ,  when 
he g e t s  back to  Norman he w i l l  punch the  d a ta  on 
punch cards  and des t roy  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e s .  We 
a re  only i n t e r e s t e d  in  th e  a t t i t u d e s  of th e  group, 
not o f  i n d iv i d u a l s .  There w i l l  be no name on the
q u e s t io n n a i r e s ,  any of  them; we would l i k e  a code
number on them—a number o f  your own choosing, a 
fo u r  d i g i t  number of  your own choosing—so t h a t
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we can put a l l  the  q u e s t io n n a i r e s  from one person 
to g e th e r  to  see  how i t  ( h i s  a t t i t u d e s )  changed, 
i f  i t  d id  change, over  t im e.  There w i l l  have to  
be a l i t t l e  p ie c e  of paper ,  a s e p a r a t e  p ie c e  of  
paper ,  which Paul g e t s  today and keeps s e p a r a t e l y  
which has th e  same code number and your name so 
t h a t  we can w r i t e  a check f o r  you to  exp ress  our 
a p p r e c ia t io n  f o r  your p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h i s  s tu d y .  
You c a n ' t  w r i t e  a check to  a code number. T h a t ' s  
th e  only connect ion  between your name and your 
code number, t h a t  c h i t  w i l l  be c o l l e c t e d  s e p a r a t e ­
ly .  What I am t r y i n g  to  say i s  a r a t h e r  e l a b o r a t e  
way to  ex p la in  th e  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  o r  th e  anonym­
i t y  of your re sp o n ses  as f a r  as anybody i s  con­
cerned,  except Pau l .  The STAR people  w i l l  not 
handle  the  q u e s t io n n a i r e s  a t  a l l ,  n e i t h e r  w i l l  I; 
and none of  us w i l l  know what names a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  
w ith  what code numbers.
I th in k  you w i l l  f in d  i t  i n t e r e s t i n g  and 
a f t e r  the  experiment i s  over  we propose to  have 
an o th e r  meeting to  t a l k  in  g ene ra l  about how 
th in g s  a re  in  t h i s  k ind  o f  s tudy  elsewhere  and 
what we were r e a l l y  t r y i n g  to  measure and so on 
from th e se  in s t ru m e n ts .  I f  you have q u e s t io n s  I 
would be g lad  to  t r y  and respond i f  I can w i th ­
out  compromising th e  s tudy  in  any way. The 
purpose o f  my remarks was i n t e n t e d  to  t e l l  you
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in  a g en e ra l  way what t h i s  i s  about and what 
would be e n t a i l e d  from your end. Does anybody 
have a q u es t io n ?
Mr. Cain I want to  say one th in g  I meant to  say in  open­
ing— I d o n ' t  say i t  now to  i n h i b i t  you—but I do 
want you to  know w h a t ' s  going on—Paul had wanted 
t h i s  s e s s io n  recorded  so t h a t  he could g a th e r  a l l  
the  in fo rm at io n  from t h e  s t a r t  of  th e  s e s s io n ,  
th e  beg inn ing  of  the  s e s s io n ,  so t h a t  we could 
know any th ing  might have been s a i d  by th e  people ,  
t h e i r  a t t i t u d e ,  o r  an y th in g .  So t h i s  i s  be ing  
reco rded  in  th e  a t t i c  h e re —which I meant to  say 
b e fo re  I s t a r t e d .  However I do want you to  know 
i t .  I f  you cu t  me down, i t ' s  f i n e  so long as I 
hea r  you ( l a u g h t e r ) .
Dr. Keown One o f  th e  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  about d o c to ra l  r e s e a rc h
i s  th e  need f o r  com pleteness ,  and so on. We have 
w r i t t e n  up and shown to  the  management, Weldon, 
P e te  and o th e r s  a s o r t  o f  s c r i p t  f o r  th e  remarks 
I was supposed to  have made. I t  was obvious I 
d i d n ' t  read  anyth ing  o f f ,  bu t  I th in k  I have 
covered th e  main p o in t s  t h a t  were in  t h a t ,  and 
we wanted to  be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  with  management 
o f  what we would say to  you peop le— in  a g e n e ra l  
way, you see ,  in  a n t i c i p a t i o n .  Now f o r  th e  p u r ­
pose of  th e  d i s s e r t a t i o n  and th e  r e s e a rc h  i t
Mr. Cain
Dr. Keown
Mr. Gain
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would be a l l  r i g h t  to  put t h a t  s c r i p t  in and say 
t h a t  B i l l  Keown s a id  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the  fo l low ing;  
bu t  i t ' s  a lo t  b e t t e r  i f  we have a t r a n s c r i p t  of 
what he s a i d  without any gaps or anything  e l s e  
in  i t .  ( l a u g h te r )  What was a c t u a l l y  s a id ,  so 
t h a t  we hope th e r e  w i l l  be complete, a complete­
ness  of  th e  record ,  t h a t ' s  what i s  necessary  in  
t h i s  k ind  of r e se a rch ;  and we f e e l  t h a t  the  r e ­
s e a rch  design we are engaged in  here  overcomes 
some o f  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of what e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s  
have found. They ran i n t o  problems and we a re  
b e n e f i t i n g  from t h e i r  ex p e r ien ce  by r e p l i c a t i n g  
the  good p a r t  of what they  d id .  So t h a t ' s  th e  
reason  f o r  the  t a p in g — to  have th e  f u l l  s t o r y .
Can t h a t  be shu t  o f f  a t  t h i s  p o in t ,  or?
I would th in k  you would want to  reco rd  th e  ques­
t i o n s  so t h a t  you would know how the  answers 
might have a f f e c t e d  your r e s e a r c h .
Well as  I was th in k in g ,  yes ,  as we ge t  l a t e r  in  
th e  meeting.  Is  t h e r e  any p la c e  here  t h a t  i t  
can cu t  i t  o f f  o r  does i t  run i n d e f i n i t e l y :
I can cu t  i t  o f f .
Dr. Keown Oh no, not now, I d i d n ' t  mean r i g h t  now bu t  I
meant i s  th e  switch in  t h i s  room.
Mr. Cain He i s  in  t h i s  room ( p o in t i n g  to  ad jo in in g  room)
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Dr. Keown Not y e t .  I f  anybody has a q u es t io n  I w i l l  be
g lad  to  answer i t  because i t  w i l l  be p a r t  o f  my 
ex p lan a t io n .  Do you have a q u e s t io n ?  Any 
q u es t io n s?
Mr. Cain You d o n ' t  have to  g ive  your name b e fo re  you ask
a q u es t io n  ( l a u g h te r )
Dr. Keown Well Paul ,  why d o n ' t  we d i s t r i b u t e  the  f i r s t
q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
Mr. Cain Do you want to  ask i f  everybody wants to  p a r t i c i ­
pa te?
Dr. Keown I assume they w i l l ,  and i f  they d o n ' t  they won 't
f i l l  one ou t .
Mr. Cain What I wanted to  be su re  o f  i s  t h a t  they do under­
s ta n d  a check w i l l  be w r i t t e n  to  them. And i f  
they a re  not going to  ask, t h a t ' s  t h e i r  problem, 
i f  they a re  not going to  ask how much th e  checks 
w i l l  be.  I thought t h i s  would be a q u es t io n  they 
w i l l  ask.
Mr. Cain By the  way, any q u es t io n s  about t h i s  those  guys
w i l l  be happy to  answer any t h a t  they  can.
Dr. Keown This f i r s t  q u e s t io n n a i r e  has a cover  s h e e t ,  i t ' s
j u s t  one page long—on t h a t  second page. This 
second q u e s t io n n a i r e  which you w i l l  f i l l  s e v e r a l  
t imes i s n ' t  much; i t ' s  j u s t  a small  job ,  i t ' s  
s e v e r a l  pages—
191
Dr. Keown I t ' s  a l i t t l e  crowded fo r  you to  f i l l  th e se  out 
w ithou t  your neighbor s e e in g .  I d o n ' t  t h in k  you 
can s h i e l d  them so— Let me say a word about th e  
code number p le a s e .  P ick  any four  d i g i t  number 
t h a t  you can remember. I t  might be, i f  you have 
got a s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  ca rd ,  i t  might be four  
d i g i t s  out of t h a t ,  th e  l a s t  fou r  d i g i t s  out of  
t h a t ;  o r  fou r  d i g i t s  ou t  of  your te lephone num­
ber ;  o r  your s t r e e t  add ress ;  o r  o f f  your d r i v e r ' s
l i c e n s e ;  o r  your b i r t h  d a te ,  i f  you were born
today you might w r i t e  0619 fo r  th e  s i x t h  month, 
n in e te e n th  day; o r  any number t h a t  you can th in k  
about aga in .  We are  hoping t h e r e  won 't  be any 
d u p l i c a t i o n s  p u t t i n g  i t  t h a t  b road ly ,  j u s t  choose 
a number.
Paul S. I would suggest  t h a t  you not put 2222 or  some­
th in g  l i k e  t h a t  because th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a 
group t h i s  s i z e  having two 2 2 2 2 ' s  i s n ' t  as small  
as you th in k .  Mix them up, make a l l  th e  numbers 
d i f f e r e n t .
Dr. Keown I f  you pick a number t h a t  i s  s o r t  o f  p e r so n a l ly
r e l a t e d  to  your l i f e ,  a phone number or  something, 
then  you more l i k e l y  w on ' t  be . . . anyone e l s e  
need p e n c i l s ?
Mr. Cain Next t ime I have a meeting I w i l l  know how many
of  you a l l  d o n ' t  take  n o te s .
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Dr. Keown
Mr. Cain 
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Paul S. 
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Dr. Keown
Dr. Keown
Is  a fo u n ta in  pen okay?
On the  l i t t l e  s l i p  you w r i t e  your code number 
and your name, t h a t  w i l l  be detached ,  not a sso ­
c i a t e d  w ith  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e — t h a t  l i t t l e  c h i t  
on th e  top  th e r e .  On th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e s  from 
h e re  on w i l l  be j u s t  th e  code numbers. Put your 
name up he re  ( p o in t in g  to  th e  l i t t l e  c h i t ) .
Paul i s  making th e  rounds so you put  the  l i t t l e  
c h i t  in  th e  envelope f o r  him, pu t  your name and 
code number on i t .
Do we have a l l  th e  l i t t l e  c h i t s  now with  your 
name and code on them?
Paul w i l l  pass  out th e  second one, q u e s t io n n a i r e ,  
and swap you the  f i r s t  one whenever you f i n i s h . . .
You th e  one who wanted a l a r g e  sample?
Oh to  put a s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  number here?
Be su re  to  put your code number h e re  p le a s e .
No ly in g  now ( l a u g h te r )
Does everybody have th e  second q u e s t io n n a i r e  
y e t?  Anybody not got th e  second q u e s t io n n a i r e ?
I th in k  t h a t  whenever you f i n i s h e d  the  second 
q u e s t io n n a i r e ,  be su re  th e  code number i s  on the  
f r o n t ;  Paul w i l l  be a t  th e  door.  You can j u s t  
leave  whenever you a re  f i n i s h e d ;  we d o n ' t  have 
to  a l l  w a i t  and go to g e t h e r .
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Mr. Cain You can go back to  work o r  leave
APPENDIX E
EXTRA PAY MEMORANDUM DISTRIBUTED
TO THE AND Eg GROUPS
June 23, 1974
To: Draftsmen who a re  ta k in g  p a r t  in  th e  OU study
From: Paul S h a f fe r ,  OU Study Coord ina tor
OU has made a v a i l a b l e  some e x t r a  pay f o r  some of  you p a r t i c i ­
p a t in g  in  th e  s tu d y .  This temporary e x t r a  pay i s  f o r  today 
only and fo r  only a fou r  hour p e r io d .  The fo l low ing  people  
w i l l  r e c e iv e  an e x t r a  1 0 % of t h e i r  hourly  pay f o r  th e  f i r s t  
fou r  hours of t h i s  workday (6 -24-74) :
Names of  Eg Draftsmen 
or
Data Conversion O pera tors
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Oiinnttty of Work 
Duvln* t h i s  4-hour Period
Draftsmen: Q uality  o f  Work 
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